Citat:
Ursprungligen postat av
Meiji
Den enklaste förklaringen är att Socialdemokraterna 1. inte vill ta en strid med Vänsterpartiet och Miljöpartiet ngr månader före valet - samt 2. splittra de borgerliga partierna.
Centerpartiets Annie
30 miljoner Lööf vill inte ha ngn intern strid med den salvelsefulla Johanna Jönsson m.fl. och det är väl tveksamt om
30 miljoner Lööf har ngn annan uppfattning än Jönsson. (Råkade av misstag skriva Johanna Hönsson, h- och j-tangenterna ligger ju bredvid varandra.
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Det är rimligt att Jönssons centerpartiet och Vänsterpartiet speglar sin självbild i deras politiska normativ. Rebecca Thorburn Stern:
Responses to the “refugee crisis”:
What is the role of self-image among EU countries?
http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/...FULLTEXT01.pdf
Citat:
A country’s self-image and how it wants to be perceived by others as regards respect for human rights can also, I argue here, influence policy and legislation, or at least how it is presented. ”Self-image” in this context refers to how a particular state views itself in the context of its own historical experience, an image which in turn is the image presented to onlookers. Self-image in this sense can be seen as a reflection of national identity and culture and of what are considered fundamental values of a particular country. National identity and self-image are also likely to be influenced by the rational considerations of the political elite, related to national interests and current situations. Thee identity of a state and its self-image from this perspective is thus not static, but a process shaped “by past and present and by human reason".
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What made the situation different in 2015 was that the number of asylum seekers and migrants trying to reach Europe and the EU rose to unprecedented heights, the result, to a large extent, of ongoing and protracted armed conflicts such as in Syria, Iraq and Somalia. Even though the great majority of the individuals forcibly displaced by reasons of persecution, armed conflict or other human rights violations, either do not cross an international border or remained in a neighbouring country, the number of asylum seekers came to dominate the EU’s political agenda and the situation became referred to as “the refugee crisis”.
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As noted above, the issue of migration, migrants and asylum seekers has been on the agenda of European countries for many years and is not something that suddenly emerged in 2015. The attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers arriving in Europe expressed by different governments are thus closely linked to national politics. Commentators point to the rise of populist parties and movements as a key factor influencing migration and asylum policies in European countries. In the early days of the refugee situation – the summer and early autumn months of 2015 - European governments responded to what was happening in quite different ways. Some countries adopted what has been described as a ‘welcoming culture’, most notably perhaps Germany, Sweden and Austria, who all expressed their aim and willingness to provide protection for many of those arriving, in particular from Syria.
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It seems clear that during this period the democratic European states appear to have been forced to show their cards as regards their commitment and obligations to refugees and migrants. So how can the underlying basis for these positions be described? Matthew Gibney has suggested dividing theories of refugee admission policies into two broad approaches: the partialist and the impartialist approach. In short, a partialist approach is based on the idea that states are obliged to give preference to the needs of citizens over those of foreigners. Essential to this approach is the value and importance of a common identity and culture, and how this can best be preserved. Any undermining of these common grounds could, following this approach, lead to the weakening of a just and egalitarian political regime.
The preservation of a common ground is thus not only considered justifed, it also allows the state to exclude aliens whose presence and claims might risk the established regime. From a partialist point of view, in order to be legitimate “a refugee policy must reglect the values and interests of the State’s members”. The prerogative of the state to decide who enters and remains in a territory must therefore be both the starting point of any migration policy and the basis upon which decisions are made. It can be added that the partialist position is often referred to, be it true or not, as reflecting public opinion, an opinion sometimes wrongfully argued to be negative about immigration by default.
The impartialist approach, on the other hand, is based on the idea of a common responsibility for humanity where citizens and non-citizens are treated equally and where the state responds impartially to their claims. From an impartialist perspective, restrictions on entrance are problematic, as there is nothing supporting the position that some human beings are entitled to more protection or rights than others based simply on their membership of a certain community (a nation state). An impartialist approach requires states to let basic and universal human rights take precedence over cohesion of the community, from the position that the contemporary system of nation states is unfair. Ideally, Gibney concludes, impartialist states should allow entry to as many people as possible without threatening the underlying constitutional order.
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For countries like Sweden and Germany, who first proudly welcomed refugees and asylum seekers but later, when political pressure became too high and reception systems were strained, imposed equally strict measures, including closing borders in practice to potential asylum seekers, other explanatory models have been necessary. These have focused more on necessity and pragmatism in the face of an extraordinary burden; on the risk of system failure and collapse, and on trying to force other stakeholders into doing their share. For Sweden, it has also seemed particularly important to justify the introduction of stricter measures from an ethical point of view. The Swedish government, as well as individual ministers, has described the stricter measures introduced in terms of being forced by events beyond government control, necessary to provide acceptable reception conditions, to prevent the welfare system and other vital aspects of Swedish society from collapsing completely (’we cannot cope’), and as temporary measures that were horrible and painful to implement: in other words, necessary evils brought about by an extreme situation and by the lack of solidarity of other EU member states who were not accepting their part of the burden. These explanations could be understood as attempts both to preserve the Swedish self-image of being a humanitarian superpower – and the image Sweden presents to the world – and to explain the new policy as somebody else’s (the EU and other member states) fault or a result of unfortunate circumstances; saying that Sweden is still the forerunner of humanitarianism and human rights it always has been; just not at this moment. This, I would argue, is the offcial Swedish position. Whether the image of Sweden can survive this new policy in the eyes of others is another question; the comments in international media on recent developments in Sweden indicate astonishment, surprise and sometimes a little schadenfreude.
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It seems as if a country’s self-image is not seriously affected by its actual policies, as long as more or less acceptable changes in policy can be explained and defended with reference to external circumstances, such as the influx of more refugees and migrants than ever before in modern history. Seen this way, self-image is challenged, but can nevertheless remain unchanged if a country wants to uphold its humanitarian ideals but is unable to. A self- image as a “bastion of humanitarianism” only seems to prevent the adoption of strict policies to a certain extent. When seriously challenged, the state follows the general trend and follows the partialist approach to asylum policy, thus signalling that this is the only realistic approach, at least in times of large migration flows. Whether it is the result of an actual crisis in the world, or a political crisis when ideals and agreements are put to the test, does not seem to be the deciding factor. At the end of the day, the interests of one’s own community are prioritised before the interests and needs of the Other.
Absolut är självbilden något som man vill upprätthålla. Det är jobbigt med kognitiv dissonans. Man kan upprätthålla självbilden genom att kriga för Den Goda Saken. Dvs kriga för att 9000 afghaner/hazarer/iranier utan skyddsskäl ska stanna i Sverige.
Men det förklarar inte varför dessa 9000afghamer/hazarer/iranier utan skyddsskäl kom från första början. Varför just då 2015?
Den humanitära självidentiteten ger inte en fullständig förklaring till varför dessa hazarer ska få stanna i Sverige. Den förklarar Jönsson/centern och Vänsterpartiets hållning. Men den förklarar inte de geopolitiska skälen för detta. Vilket jag misstänker starkt finns.
Detta är din källa!
