Charles Lister om al-Qaidas/al-Nusras planer på att skapa ett till IS konkurrerande emirat i nordvästra Syrien.
Man har senaste tiden stärkt upp al-Nusra genom att sända al-Qaidaledare till Syrien.
Lister pekar på att om IS förluster fortsätter, kan IS-jihadister istället ansluta till al-Nusra.
Citat:
Al Qaeda Is About to Establish an Emirate in Northern Syria
After years on the back foot, the Nusra Front is laying the groundwork for al Qaeda’s first sovereign state.
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The Islamic State and al Qaeda use different tactics in Syria, but their ultimate objective there is the same: the creation of an Islamic emirate. Whereas the Islamic State has imposed unilateral control over populations and rapidly proclaimed independence, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate has moved much more deliberately, seeking to build influence in the areas they hope to rule. This is a long-game strategy that the terrorist group began adopting in the late 2000s, first in Yemen, in 2011, and then in Mali, in 2012.
But the Nusra Front in Syria has proved the first potentially successful test case. After years of painstaking work to increase its sway in northern Syria, Nusra Front recently launched consultations within its own ranks and among some sympathetic opposition groups about proclaiming an emirate. Given the stakes involved, al Qaeda has recently transferred a number of highly influential jihadi figures from its central leadership circles into Syria. Their mission is to assuage the concerns expressed by other Syrian Islamist movements and those members of Nusra Front who, for now, oppose the idea of an independent emirate.
The presence of a militarily powerful and socially accepted al Qaeda emirate in northwestern Syria, led by several dozen veteran al Qaeda figures and heavily manned by local Syrian fighters, could have significant consequences for the Syrian crisis and for international security.
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The international implications of an emirate proclamation would be even more significant. The combination of an al Qaeda emirate and a revitalized al Qaeda central leadership in northern Syria would represent a confidence boost for the jihadi organization’s global brand. Al Qaeda would present itself as the smart, methodical, and persistent jihadi movement that, in contrast to the Islamic State, had adopted a strategy more aligned with everyday Sunni Muslims. Eventually, the decision would be made to initiate the plotting of foreign attacks, using Syria’s proximity to Europe and al Qaeda’s regional network to pose a far more urgent threat than the group ever posed in Yemen and Afghanistan. Should the Islamic State continue to suffer losses to its territorial claims in Iraq and Syria, we might also see some defections to the emboldened al Qaeda affiliate next door.
al-Qaidas ledare al-Zawahiri har beordrat al-Nusra att söka framtona som några slags hyggliga jihadister som är en del av den sk "syriska revolutionen" - till skillnad från IS:
Citat:
However, the Islamic State’s proclamation of a caliphate in June 2014 posed a substantial challenge to the jihadi credibility of Nusra Front, which until that moment had controlled no territory unilaterally, frequently cooperated with nationalist forces to govern areas, and was only imposing a bare minimum of sharia law.
In the time since, the al Qaeda affiliate has slowly revealed more and more of its extremist face while trying to avoid risking its accepted status within the mainstream opposition. Nonetheless, concerns about Nusra Front’s long-term intentions for Syria did begin to emerge among other opposition groups in late 2014 — around the same time that the United States initiated airstrikes against apparent Nusra Front cells allegedly planning attacks on the West.
This sparked the group’s partial “re-moderation” in late 2014 and early 2015, with al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri even secretly ordering the adoption, again, of a more moderate, friendly face for the organization and the cessation of foreign plotting. Nusra Front subsequently assumed a lead role in capturing much of northern Idlib province from Bashar al-Assad’s regime between March and June 2015, recementing its status as an invaluable ally to the revolution.
Lister ser naturligtvis faran med att al-Nusra/al-Qaida utropar ett emirat. En potentiell katastrof. Så långt allt väl i Listers analys.
Sen levererar Lister sitt förslag på lösning. De idag 50 FSA-grupper som får stöd från USA, ska förses med än mer vapen och stöd för att bekämpa al-Nusra:
Citat:
Whether we like it or not, the United States and its allies are now in an urgent battle for influence with al Qaeda’s most effective and successful affiliate yet. The consequences of ignoring, or losing, that battle are potentially catastrophic.
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There is still an opportunity to rescue some of this lost opportunity. However, it will require a substantial expansion of military, political, and financial assistance to a broad spectrum of Syria’s opposition. There are currently more than 50 separate FSA groups that have been vetted by the CIA, all of which operate in coordination with locally legitimate civil, political, and judicial bodies. In dramatically expanding its support, the West should embrace an “ink spot” strategy that empowers these opposition strands in tandem. The aim should be to establish a gradually expanding network of empowered, internationally backed, and genuinely influential opposition communities, whose individual successes empower the others and provide a barrier to al Qaeda influence.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/al-qaeda-is-about-to-establish-an-emirate-in-northern-syria/
Trots att Lister säkerligen vet att upp till hälften av de vapen som USA förser de sk moderata rebellerna med, hamnar hos al-Nusra, vill han fortsätta med galenskapen. Trots att Lister vet att flera av de USA-stödda grupperna idag är i militär allians med al-Nusra, ser han inga hinder.
Lister är utan tvekan kunnig. Men hans slutsatser är orealistiska.
Han anklagas ofta för att vara betald av Qatar ( han arbetar för Brookings Institution in Qatar ), vilken skulle förklara hans märkliga propaganda som går ut på att beskriva en "moderat" opposition som inte längre finns. De FSA-grupper som är av betydelse idag, är ofta knutna till Muslimska Brödraskapet, vilka stöds av Qatar.
Den strategi som Lister rekommenderar, skulle möjligen på sikt kunna leda till ett något mindre inhumant kalifat i MB:s regi. Men det finns inget större stöd för MB bland Syriens folk, frågan är om de ens har fler sympatisörer bland civilbefolkningen än vad al-Nusra och IS har.
