Som sagt, för att komma vidare i syrien måste nog alla offra minst en kär liten baby:
Citat:
Syria Policy Under Trump
If the incoming Trump administration executes a pivot on Syria, the United States needs to keep a clear-eyed view of its core interests in the conflict, and it needs to avoid falling victim to a new, opposite set of misapprehensions. America’s core interests in Syria are, as I understand them: counterterrorism; the stability of regional and European allies; and, to the extent possible, civilian safety and well-being inside Syria and in its neighbors. All these interests matter and have to be entertained simultaneously, even if the first two are given priority.
Washington needs to be realistic about what it can achieve in Syria. There is more to be done in the fight against the Islamic State, for example, but there are limits on what the United States can plausibly accomplish without prejudicing other relevant interests. The United States should not try to capture the Islamic State’s Syrian capital of Raqqa with such single-minded, maniacal focus that it destroys its relationship with Turkey. And it should not allow itself to be duped into a counterterrorism partnership with the Assad regime and its allies that serves their nefarious aims at the expense of American interests.
Trump has said repeatedly that Assad is fighting the Islamic State. This is technically true, but with some fairly serious caveats. The Assad regime and its allies are fighting primarily against non-Islamic State rebels to pacify Syria’s strategic west. I think it unlikely the regime will ever muster the will or strength to retake Islamic State-held eastern Syria. The regime is not a capable, useful partner in the fight against the Islamic State.
The regime is also dependent on tactics – chemical weapons, “barrel bombs,” siege and deliberate starvation – that are disgusting, illegal, and, over the long term, counterproductive. The regime’s indiscriminate, barbaric approach to counterinsurgency amounts to bombing civilian populations into traumatized submission and driving large numbers of damaged, angry Syrians into other countries. This does not serve American aims. Normalization with the Assad regime would come with few tactical benefits and entail substantial reputational costs, from damaging America’s relationships with traditional allies and fueling radical anti-American anger. It would also serve the aims of Iran, which is working now in Syria to reinforce and expand a deterrent architecture aimed at the United States and U.S. allies.
The regime has proved more resilient than anyone expected, but it is still a dramatically weakened, pariah state. If it convinces America to come begging for its cooperation, that may be the most incredible Jedi mind trick we’ve ever seen. Under Trump, America should try to extricate itself, to whatever extent possible, from Syria’s war. It should not put its superpower arsenal in service of a malicious, provincial gang.
America should continue to apply pressure to the Islamic State. But it also ought to put that effort in perspective, with the recognition that it has denied the Islamic State its last border outlets, that the organization is now substantially less dangerous than in 2014, and that total, perfect victory is likely impossible. America must also be conscious of its other equities in the region. For example, if it inadvertently provokes a war between Turkey and its Kurdish allies, its gains to date against the Islamic State will evaporate. America should continue to deconflict its fight against the Islamic State and Fateh al-Sham with Russia and its Syrian ally, but no more than that.
If the United States is going to disengage from the Syrian opposition, it should not do so abruptly or for free. America’s support for the opposition represents a substantial source of leverage, and America owes something to its opposition partners and to U.S. allies who are co-invested in them. It should negotiate away support for the opposition only in exchange for Russian buy-in for smaller, internationally guaranteed enclaves in the eastern Aleppo countryside, southern Syria, and the Kurdish northeast. These areas, secured in part through the continued presence of foreign troops, could provide long-term havens for internally displaced persons and serve as buffer zones against various bad actors, thus serving the security needs of America and allies Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. And for areas the regime will likely recapture, America should coordinate with Turkey and Jordan to allow the safe exit of refugees who cannot survive under regime control.
And lastly, America should continue its generous humanitarian relief to Syrians on all sides inside Syria and in Syria’s neighbors, and its stabilization assistance to Syria’s rebel-held areas. It’s impossible to undo the damage of Syria’s war to the country’s civilians, but this aid can at least mitigate these bad effects and minimize some of their destabilizing impact on the region. America should not invest in the regime’s reconstruction efforts, which will be used to juice the regime’s patronage networks and on which it will be impossible to impose any effective conditionality.
None of these steps are particularly gratifying. But if we can strip away some of America’s illusions about Syria, I think they might do a good-enough job of satisfying America’s core interests in the country’s war. This doesn’t look like “winning,” necessarily. But if America is going to divorce itself from Syria’s civil war, I think this is the realistic, responsible way to do it.
