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Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion

Spoiler

Coercion is generally understood to refer to the practice of inducing or preventing changes in political behavior through the use of threats, intimidation, or some other form of pressure—most commonly, military force. This article focuses on a very particular nonmilitary method of applying coercive pressure—the use of migration and refugee crises as instruments of persuasion. Conventional wisdom suggests this kind of coercion is rare at best. Traditional international relations theory avers that it should rarely succeed. In fact, given the asymmetry in capabilities that tends to exist between would be coercers and their generally more powerful targets, it should rarely even be attempted. However, as this article demonstrates, not only is this kind of coercion attempted far more frequently than the accepted wisdom would suggest but that it also tends to succeed far more often than capabilities-based theories would predict.
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Coercive engineered migrations (or coercion-driven migrations) are “those cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political,military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states.” The instruments employed to affect this kind of coercion are myriad and diverse. They run the gamut from compulsory to permissive, from the employment of hostile threats and the use of military force (as were used during the 1967-1970 Biafran and 1992-1995 Bosnian civil wars) through the offer of positive inducements and provision of financial incentives (as were offered to North Vietnamese by the United States in 1954-1955, following the First Indochina War) to the straightforward opening of normally sealed borders (as was done by President Erich Honecker of East Germany in the early 1980s).

Coercive engineered migration is frequently, but not always, undertaken in the context of population outflows strategically generated for other reasons. In fact, it represents just one subset of a broader class of events that all rely on the creation and exploitation of such crises as means to political and military ends—a phenomenon I call strategic engineered migration. Coercive engineered migration is often embedded within mass migrations strategically engineered for dispossessive, exportive, or militarized reasons. It is likely, at least in part as a consequence of its embedded and often camouflaged nature, that its prevalence has also been generally under-recognized and its significance, underappreciated. Indeed, it is a phenomenon that for many observers has been hiding in plain sight.
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In fact, well over forty groups of displaced people have been used as pawns in at least fifty-six discrete attempts at coercive engineered migration since the advent of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention alone.
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However, I focus on the post-1951 period because it was only after World War II—and particularly after ratifcation of the 1951 Refugee Convenition—that international rules and norms regarding the protection of those fleeing violence and persecution were codified. It was likewise only then that migration and refugees “became a question of high politics” and that, for reasons discussed later in this article, the potential efficacy of this unconventional strategy really began to blossom.

To put the prevalence of coercive engineered migration in perspective, at a rate of at least 1.0 cases/year (between 1951 and 2006), it is significantly less common than interstate territorial disputes (approximately 4.82 cases/year). But, at the same time, it appears to be markedly more prevalent than both intrastate wars (approximately 0.68 cases/year) and extended intermediate deterrence crises (approximately 0.58/year). At a minimum, this suggests that the conventional wisdom about the relative infrequency of coercive engineered migration (my operative null hypothesis) requires reconsideration.
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Coercive engineered migration can be exercised by three distinct types of challengers: generators, agents provocateurs, and opportunists. Generators directly create or threaten to create cross-border population movements unless targets concede to their demands. Agents provocateurs by contrast do not create crises directly, but rather deliberately act in ways designed to incite others to generate outflows. Many see themselves as engaging in a kind of altruistic Machiavellianism, whereby the ends (e.g., autonomy, independence, or the restoration of democracy) justify the employment of these rather unconventional means. Finally, opportunists play no direct role in the creation of migration crises, but simply exploit for their own gain the existence of outflows generated or catalyzed by others.

Ever since the first years of conflict in Syria, Shiite Afghans (primarily Hazara) have been recruited by the Revolutionary Guard in Iran and sent to Syria in order to fight for the Assad regime. Many of them have signed up voluntarily when offered strong incitements like permanent residence permits in Iran and considerable salaries.

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Under 2012 och i början av 2013 rapporterades det om Bashar al- Assadregimens förluster i Syrienkonflikten gentemot, i huvudsak, olika sunnitiska rebellgrupper i landet. Senare vände dock läget, bland annat med hjälp av det understöd utifrån som Assadregimen fick av Iran genom libanesiska Hizbollah samt andra shiamiliser. Dessa shiamiliser visade sig bli centrala för Assadregimens överlevnad, och reflekterade även Irans målsättning att skydda sin allierade i Damaskus. Iran har i hög grad organiserat dessa shiamiliser, vilka i stor utsträckning rekryterat i Irak, men även i andra länder. Afghanska shiiter har utgjort den största icke-arabiska resursen bland de utländska stridande som anslutit sig till kriget i Syrien på regimens sida. Redan i oktober 2012 rapporterades det om en afghansk shiitisk krigare som tillfångatagits av syriska oppositionselement, och under våren 2013 blev förekomsten av dessa utländska shiitiska krigare i Syrien allt vanligare. Men det var först under 2014 som journalisten Christoph Reuter fann mer påtagliga bevis för afghanska krigares faktiska deltagande i kriget på den syriska regimens sida. Därefter har rapporteringen om fenomenet blivit alltmer frekvent förekommande.

Petra Åkesson fick hjälp av kuratorer vid tre skolor och en organisation som arbetar med unga brottslingar för att få kontakt med de unga rånarna. Hon intervjuade dem både enskilt och i grupp.

- Det var tur att jag använde bandspelare för de svar jag fick var så anmärkningsvärda att jag fick lyssna flera gånger för att riktigt inse vad de sagt. "När vi är ute på stan och rånar så krigar vi, vi krigar mot svenskarna", var ett återkommande argument.