Början på ett mediakrig om mångkulturen?

Every major contestant of WWII – including the great Asian powers Japan and China – developed fascist governance to an advanced state. The essential feature was state seizure of the economy’s ‘commanding heights’ in the delegated (and integrated) ‘popular interest’. During war time such interest is peeled back to sheer survival, and thus publicized with dramatic intensity, which is also to say with an unusual absence of skepticism. Fascism is therefore broadly identical with a normalization of war-powers in a modern state, that is: sustained social mobilization under central direction. Consequently, it involves, beside the centralization of political authority in a permanent war council, a tribal hystericization of social identity, and a considerable measure of economic pragmatism. Fascism is practical socialism, distinguished from its dim cousin by its far more sophisticated grasp of incentives, or of human nature in its motivated individual and tribal particularity. When compared to universalistic communism, fascism’s practical advantages are such that ‘actually existing socialism’ always soon turns into it. National socialism and socialism in one country are not sanely separable things. Everyone knows that the literal meaning of ‘fascism’ is bundling

Like its Continental European and Soviet competitors, American fascism had been fully consolidated by the beginning of the war. The New Deal cemented its structural pillars into place. Socialization of the economy through central banking, the transformation of the Supreme Court into a facilitator of systematic executive over-reach, and a transformation of mass-politics through broadcast media technologies had composed a new, post-constitutional political order. It is this formation that is so flagrantly entering its phase of terminal dementia today.

In dramatic contrast to the prevailing historical myth, fascism won WWII so decisively that its opponents were driven to the political fringes of paleo-conservatism (once mainstream conservatism), libertarianism (once mainstream liberalism), and Trotskyism (once simply ‘communism’). The victory was so complete that even policy objectives as blatantly fascistic as nationalization could be considered wholly innocent of fascist taint.

Since fascism had entirely filled the Overton Window, it lost contour, and became invisible. The word persisted in public conversation only as an empty slur. Under this cover, and the absurdly misleading branding associated with it, American fascism ascended to a state of global hegemonic dominance. Since 1989, it has been essentially unchallenged, except by the geopolitical temper-tantrum that is radical Islam. Yet suddenly, from left field, the Trump candidacy has thrown it into crisis.

An especially obvious catalyst for political radicalization has been the embrace of demographic engineering as an explicit policy objective, of deliberate partisan asymmetry, attended by a rolling thunder of cultural-elite approved rhetoric that has not only been indiscreet, but blatantly triumphalistic. When dismissing fears of ‘white genocide’ as malignant, and over-wrought, it is not helpful to laugh in public about the steady progress of population replacement (in the fashion of John Judis and Ruy Teixeira, most obviously). At some point, Bertholt Brecht’s most celebrated example of devil’s advocacy – “Would it not be easier … for the government to dissolve the people and elect another?” – switched ideological polarity, to become a bitter Alt-Right joke. The new American demography is really going to screw you guys over is funny as hell, until – suddenly – it isn’t.

There’s been a lot of laughter in 2016, but not much smiling. Perhaps it won’t be so long before people realize what they’ve done.

No European country has a larger proportion of refugees in its population and in 2015 none welcomed a larger flow of asylum-seekers, proportionate to its population, than Sweden did. Employment rates for refugees are no lower than in most European countries, but the difference with Swedish-born workers is striking. Partly it is because many Swedish-born women work and Swedes are highly educated. Nevertheless, fears are mounting about the social impact of the two-tier labour market that is developing. Magnus Henrekson, an academic, fears further ghettoisation and alienation.

On the surface, Sweden has one of the least troubled labour markets in the world. The economy is growing, vacancies are plentiful, only 5% of 15-74-year-old native-born workers are jobless and the unemployment rate is falling. But foreign-born workers are three times as likely to be unemployed, and the ratio is rising. For those from outside the EU it is higher still (22.5% are unemployed).

The paradox, says Thomas Liebig, from the OECD, is that Sweden has among the most advanced refugee-integration policies. A two-year programme is meant to make refugees “job-ready”, but is often too long for educated refugees and too short for those lacking basic literacy and numeracy. Only 22% of low-educated foreign-born men and 8% of women found work in the year after completing the programme.

Worries about unemployed refugees have been masked by the recent strong performance of Sweden’s economy—ironically boosted by increased spending on refugees. (IKEA, a furniture chain, is reported to have run out of mattresses at one point.) But there is a growing realisation that Sweden—and Europe as a whole—cannot afford to delay reforms to ease the integration of refugees. The numbers now are simply too big.

Highly educated migrants also lag behind their Swedish-born peers in finding work. The biggest difficulties are posed by the large group with few qualifications. The obvious way to help is to train them better, particularly the young. Around 70,000 of last year’s arrivals were minors, half of them unaccompanied. But a large proportion of 15-24 year-olds, especially women, drop out of education or training.

KD kan vara på väg ut ur riksdagen. Det är inget att hänga läpp över.

För Anna Kinberg Batra är Kristdemokraternas utförslöpa förstås en huvudvärk. KD är en viktig bit i ett tänkt alliansbygge. Men gudarna ska veta att KD kostade mer än det smakade i regeringen Reinfeldt:

Fastighetsskatten avvecklades på ett tanklöst sätt och ersattes med en låg avgift och en skadlig "flyttskatt". Detta fick KD igenom därför att det var en av pyttepartiets hjärtefrågor. Finansminister Anders Borg orkade knappt låtsas att han såg det som ett lyckat drag. Vårdnadsbidraget, som ökar utanförskapet hos kvinnor med svag förankring på arbetsmarknaden, var också KD:s baby. Dessutom var partiet säkerligen medskyldigt till att dess älsklingsflumbegrepp, "värdegrund", har fått samma dignitet i skollagen som kunskap, otroligt nog.

Ingenting tyder på att KD skulle vara till större glädje i en alliansen 2.0. Ebba Busch Thor är minst lika begiven på klichésvammel om värdegrunder som sina föregångare. Riksdagen är ingen skyddad verkstad - det kan vara en nyttig påminnelse för riksdagspartierna, som numera är så dopade av offentliga medel att de knappt behöver ragga medlemmar längre.

Någon har sagt att svenskarna är ”fredsskadade”. Kanske är det därför som så mycket tas för givet i det här landet? Som man tror att staten per automatik alltid vill medborgarna väl? Som man lättvindigt slänger sig med pompösa begrepp som ”demokrati” och ”yttrandefrihet” utan att förstå vad sådant förutsätter i praktiken? Som man ägnar sig åt agera humanitär superdupermakt när man istället borde lägga sig på terapisoffan och gå till botten med sitt självskadebeteende?

Dokumentärfilmaren och vänsteraktivisten Michael Moore har kallat Donald Trump för "en handgranat" som de maktlösa kunnat kasta rakt in i ett politiskt etablissemang som inte längre bryr sig om dem. Ett stort fett "långfinger" åt det Washington som inte räddat jobben och som hotar den livsstil man vant sig vid och som man gillar.

När man känner sig hotad har man laddat sin valsedel och fyrat av - rakt in i nationens feministiska, minoritetskramande, HBTQ-älskande hjärta.

Men stödet för Donald Trump har många fler bottnar är proteströsten. Det är inte de allra fattigaste som röstat på honom utan den vita lägre medelklass och arbetarklass som ännu har något att förlora. De som känner sig hotade av frihandeln, globaliseringen och invandringen.

Och här säger oss egentligen både den brittiska Brexit-omröstningen och det amerikanska valet samma sak: de hunsade tänker inte finna sig. Nu kommer deras revansch.

Erika Bjerström: Valrörelsen när USA:s elit fick möta vreden