Jag ser att ni börjat snacka om Händelserna krig Mosuls övertagande och tänkte bidra.
Så här gick det till enligt det kurdiska perspektivet dagen då Mousul föll. Alla viste långt innan det skedde att det skulle ske, men Maliki vidtog inga åtgärder för att han litade på sin arme. Även dagen då IS var påväg att ta över den militära kontrollen över staden så vägrade Maliki ta emot hjälp ifrån kurderna. Han litade på sina mannar och tänkte att ifall kurderna släpps in i Mosul så kommer han aldrig bli av med dem. Sedan framkom det att IS börjat ta över stora delar av staden under väldigt kort tid, då ville Maliki ha hjälp, men då var det försent för över 52 000 man (6 divisioner) hade försvunnit och Mosul tillhörde nu IS.
Citat:
At about nine-thirty on the night of June 9th, Kurdish officials began receiving reports that ISIS militants were pouring into the northern city of Mosul. The intelligence indicated that they were planning to free some fourteen hundred captured Sunnis from Badush Prison, inside the city. The Kurds, whose border runs through Mosul, were alarmed but not surprised. For months, ISIS fighters had been quietly infiltrating the city’s Arab neighborhoods and setting up a shadow government. Kurdish officials estimated that ISIS leaders had been collecting fifteen million dollars a month in taxes from local businesses.
Barzani had been concerned about ISIS for some time. The previous fall, he called Nuri al-Maliki, then the Iraqi Prime Minister, to warn him and to offer help. “His answer to me was ‘You just take care of Kurdistan, and the rest is under control,’ ” Barzani said. According to Fuad Hussein, Barzani’s chief of staff, Maliki was increasingly isolated, his hold on reality slipping. In meetings with Kurdish officials, Maliki boasted that the Iraqi Army was performing brilliantly against ISIS and other Sunni insurgents, when, according to Kurdish intelligence, it was falling apart. “Maliki created a fantasy world for himself and the people around him,” Hussein said. Still, as ISIS fighters spread across Mosul, it seemed that Maliki could not ignore what was happening. In the preceding days, Hussein had called Tariq Najm, Maliki’s closest confidant, to offer the Kurds’ assistance in confronting ISIS. Najm refused—worried, apparently, that if the peshmerga went into Mosul they would never leave.
At two o’clock on the morning of June 10th, Najm called back, pleading for help. By then, the Iraqi Army and the police force in Mosul—some fifty-two thousand men in all—had disintegrated. The commander of Iraqi forces in the region and the deputy chief of staff of the Army had fled, as had the leaders of six divisions. Iraqi soldiers were throwing their guns away and stripping off their uniforms—in some cases, rushing through the streets in their underwear. However limited ISIS’s plans may have been initially, they appeared to be expanding; Mosul had fallen. “It’s too late, my friend,” Hussein told Najm. “Your Army has disappeared.”
Här nedan är förklaringen till varför en vällutrustad arme som kostat amerikanerna 25 miljader dollar att träna, kollapsade vid första provet. Korumption. När IS kom till Mosul så var dem bättre beväpnade än den irakiska armen, en del soldater hade inte ens vapen eller klädder. Under flera år så har alla med högre ställning inom armen utnyttjat sin ställning för att tjänna så mycket pengar som möjligt på bekostnad av dem som är under dem och har en lägre ställning. Moralen är låg på grund av detta, de har inga vapen för att möta fienden som närmade sig och de befinner sig i fientlig terräng (sunnidominerat område). Vem hade inte lämnat stridsfälltet i en sån situation? Man vill strida för sitt land och skydda sina medmänniskor, men inte för att bevara det korupta systemet som de varit offer för. Därför smälte irakiska armen bort och ersattes nästan helt av shittiska militanter med koppling till Iran.
Redan långt innan då när armen skickades in för att styra upp demonstrationen i Anbar så kunde man se att den kollapsade. Korumption är en stor orsak till att utvecklings länder inte utvecklas.
Citat:
Barham Salih, a Kurd who is a former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, told me that even before the ISIS offensive the Iraqi Army was useful mainly as a piggy bank for its officers. At a meeting of senior generals earlier this year, Salih told me, the commanders noted that one of the élite armored divisions, meant to comprise more than ten thousand men, had dwindled to about five hundred. The division’s remaining officers were marking the men present and pocketing their wages. “This is a corrupt system,” Salih said. “You have no division, all the units are gone, and the commanders are stealing all the money.”
A week after the Iraqi Army collapsed, I sat with Mohammed Ghafar, a twenty-eight-year-old soldier from Kirkuk. Ghafar, a Shiite Arab, told me that he had joined the Army, ten years ago, with pride. “I needed a job, but the truth is that I joined to serve my country,” he said. He was assigned to the 12th Division, which oversaw his home town. Ghafar earned a good salary, got married and had two children, and looked forward to a career as a soldier. The Army never functioned as well as he had hoped, Ghafar said, but it grew much worse in 2011, when the American military departed. Ghafar liked the Americans. He respected their professionalism and the training they offered, and, most important, he felt that they helped to keep his superiors honest. “Everything changed after the Americans left,” Ghafar said. “The commanders steal everything. They sell it in the local market—clothes, boots, our equipment.” Ghafar said that he was forced to buy boots at the local bazaar. In his unit, the absentee rate soared. Even the rations went bad, he said. “We used to have the best food,” Ghafar said. “After the Americans left, all we got was eggplant. Eggplant at every meal! Breakfast, lunch, and dinner.”
Ghafar was based in Dibis, a largely Sunni area near Kirkuk, when ISIS approached. By then, he and his men had heard what happened in Mosul: senior commanders had fled, and the soldiers had quickly followed. “The betrayal started in Mosul,” he said. “When your commanders quit, why should the soldiers fight?” It was clear, he said, that the locals sympathized with ISIS, and that his own Army was overmatched. He had no rifle; all his equipment had been stolen or was in disrepair. “ISIS was better equipped than we were!” he said. His comrades started to abandon their posts, and finally, he said, a Kurdish officer in his division told him to go home. “And so I went home,” he said, shrugging. “It was an order.”
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/9/state8519.htm
Jag känner till att trådens invånare har misstankar om sajten ekurd eftersom ordet kurd är med i namnet, men notera här att det är en känd amerikansk jornalist med specialisering inom krig som skrivit texten och ingen kurd. Han jobbar heller inte för ekurd så som många andra jornalisters artiklar som läggs upp på sajten.
https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dexter_Filkins
