Citat:
Ursprungligen postat av
Bahram
Jag kanske inte kan det här men jag söker o kollar upp det. Om transpondern var på, varför tvekade operatören?
Vad har du fått det ifrån? Operatören förefaller ha försökt följa ordergång och få bekräftelse från högre ort, men den uteblev. Stressig natt, spänt läge, osv. Hen valde att inleda bekämpning. Om det fanns stående order, om det var ett helt eget initiativ eller något däremellan vet jag inte, men det verkar inte ha varit någon tvekan annat än att vilja följa den ordergång som troligen var uppsatt.
Från rapporten, Irans egna ord:
Citat:
The information in this section was provided by military authorities. The
investigation team was able to see evidence that confirmed it.
At 04:54, on January 08 2020, one of the air defense units of Tehran was
locally relocated for the last time in order of 100 meters according to
tactics of mobile ADUs. This relocation clearly caused a change in the
ADU's heading and therefore the ADU suffered an error of 105 degrees
due to operators' failure in conducting north realignment properly. The
ADU remained on standby mode until 06:07 and after this time, the ADU
was set at operation mode. As such, while the Ukrainian aircraft was
flying, the direction of objects and targets detected by this unit was being
observed with an increase of 105 degrees by the operator.
At about 06:14, the air defense system operator detected a target at his
azimuth of 250 degrees flying on a 56-degree course. At the same time,
after takeoff, the PS 752 was flying towards the defense system from a 143-
degree azimuth. The aircraft was taking a 309-degree course.
At 06:14:19, the operator announced the specifications of the detected
target over the communication network of the relevant Coordination
Center. The message was not relayed to the Center. In fact, it had not been
recorded in the recorded messages of the Coordination Center.
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Mar. 2021PS752 Accident Investigation- Final Report
I.R.IRAN AAIB
Without receiving a response (command) from the Coordination Center,
the operator came to the conclusion that the observed target was a threat
and fired a missile at it at 06:14:39.
The system recorded the activation of the missile proximity fuse at
06:14:57.
After the first missile radio fuse was activated, the air defense system
radar still locked on the target and kept detecting and tracking it.
Having observed the continuity of the detected target trajectory, the
second missile was fired at the aircraft by the ADU crew at 06:15:09.
At 06:15:22, the last communication between the second missile and the
defense system was recorded in a place close to the aircraft route. After
that, the defense system showed a message indicating the strike had failed,
with the aircraft clearing from the radar lock-on after some time.
Släpp det här med transpondern. Det är så jävla uppenbart och bevisat att den var på, annars hade Iran skrikigt i högan sky om det. Till att börja med hade ATC uppmärksammat planet
innan det lyft om saken, sedan hade Frankrike upptäckt det när man läste CVR och FDR, sedan hade de iranska utredarna givetvis upptäckt saken och grävt rejält i det och dessutom hade tusentals människor med flygspotting och liknande, anhöriga som följer fligther på FR24, alla flygintresserade flashbackare, osv, osv, upptäckt detta inom loppet av timmar.