Konflikten i Syrien

Tensions also exist within Rojava. While the PYD was only founded in 2002, the KDP has had a Syrian branch since 1957 (although the party has been through various changes and divisions since then34). Under the initiative of Iraq's KDP, the KDP-S and other pro-Barzani parties converged in 2011 into the Kurdish National Council (KNC) to establish a unified opposition to the PYD.35 The main problem of the KNC is that most of the politicians involved, as well as their "shadow" army, are currently based outside Rojava and thus lack practical influence. However, when it comes to the first general elections in Rojava, the KNC has considerable power to influence their legitimacy through its ability to boycott them. Although their differences are vast, we can see some developments easing those inner Kurdish tensions, allowing a careful resurrection of the pan-Kurdish idea.36 Western military, technical or political support for Rojava could secure the democratization process to find a compromise between the factions.

ELECTIONS
Organizations, particularly those close to the KNC, continually accuse the PYD, the Asayish (Rojava's police force) and the YPD/YPJ — all of which they conflate — of human-rights abuses, the imprisonment of political opponents, and other acts characteristic of an authoritarian one-party system.37 Given the character of the feud between the Barzani group and the PKK/PYD, it is difficult to judge accusations from an objective position. The KDP tends to respond in a similar fashion, including closing offices of PKK affiliates in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq through their own Asayish.38 One opposition politician in Rojava with whom I spoke, whose party is currently not part of the PYD government, vehemently rejected many of the accusations.39 Although difficult to judge, the Human Rights Watch40 report on Rojava indicates that there are some grounds for the accusations.