F-35 ett fiasko? Läckta Rand rapporten och annat kul

Speaking to The Hindu at Port Blair, Admiral Verma has been quoted as saying, "They [ADA] focused largely on the Air Force programme and the LCA [Navy] did fall behind…. There have been many promises made by the ADA but they failed us... It is often said that there is only 15 per cent difference between both versions. The Navy has always maintained that it may be 15 per cent in terms of material and systems, but it is a substantial part. And they [ADA] underestimated it."

The LCA Navy effort battles huge odds, and has come in for some pretty harsh criticism recently. Last week, former IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy wrote in a newspaper column, "A naval variant of the LCA seems unlikely to ever land on a ship’s deck. It may probably need a new engine apart from lots of testing and modifications. There is little demonstrated stamina to take these risks."

Italy is aiming to slash €1.45 billion ($1.9 billion) from its defence procurement spending in 2012, with its plan to acquire 131 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs likely to be in the firing line.

It previously indicated it would order a total of 131 of the type - 69 conventional take-off and landing F-35As and 62 of the short take-off and vertical landing variant F-35B. However, more recently, defence sources have suggested a reduction to the total order of between 20-30 units, with the majority of these F-35Bs.

The F-35 in on track to be the most expensive program in the history of the Defense Department, and it has repeated just about every mistake we invented since Robert McNamara concocted the multimission, multi-service TFX — a program conceived with the same kind of fanciful one-shoe fits all imaginings as the F-35.

Technical problems, cost overruns, and schedule slippages caused the TFX to implode into one of the most infamous debacles in Pentagon’s history. The result was the super-costly single-mission (deep strike), single service, swing-wing F-111. Planes were delivered without mission essential avionics and sat on the runway for two years awaiting parts. Production rates were slowed and total production quantities were reduced from 1,500 to 500. That cutback would have worked materially to wreck tactical fighter aviation in the Air Force, had it not been for the intervention of a brilliant iconoclastic band of military officers and civilians, who became known in the Pentagon and industry as the Fighter Mafia (their exploits are described here).

But the F-35 program is not at serious risk, despite all the hysterical hype in the trade press — not by a long shot. The F-35′s political safety net has been front- loaded and politically engineered (the general practices of the power games are explained here) with exquisite malice of forethought. Domestically, the F-35 employs 130,000 people and 1300 domestic suppliers in 47 states and Puerto Rico. The only states missing the gravy train are Hawaii, Wyoming, and North Dakota. Internationally, there are already cooperative development/production plans involving nine countries, and more are in the offing. Given the intensity of the geographic carpet-bombing of contracts around the globe, can there be any question why the Secretary of the Air Force said in September, “”Simply put, there is no alternative to the F-35 program. It must succeed.” If you think that is an accident, dear reader, I have a Brooklyn Bridge to sell you.