Ukrainas motoffensiv

Ukrainska styrkor har tagit sig igenom Rysslands första defensiva linje nära Zaporizjzja. Detta efter veckor av noggrann minröjning, rapporterar The Guardian.

”Vi är nu mellan första och andra försvarslinjen", säger den ukrainska generalen Oleksandr Tarnavskij.

Vidare uppskattar han att Ryssland ägnat 60 procent av sina resurser till att bygga den första försvarslinjen och endast 20 procent vardera till den andra och tredje linjen. Enligt Tarnavskij hade Moskva inte förväntat sig att ukrainska styrkor skulle ta sig igenom.

https://www.svd.se/a/ja1n9q/konflikten-mellan-ukraina-och-ryssland-har-ar-senaste-nytt

Ukrainian forces have decisively breached Russia’s first defensive line near Zaporizhzhia after weeks of painstaking mine clearance, and expect faster gains as they press the weaker second line, the general leading the southern counteroffensive has said. Brig Gen Oleksandr Tarnavskiy estimated Russia had devoted 60% of its time and resources into building the first defensive line and only 20% each into the second and third lines because Moscow had not expected Ukrainian forces to get through.

“We are now between the first and second defensive lines,” he said. Ukrainian forces were now pushing out on both sides of the breach and consolidating their hold on territory seized in recent fighting, he said.

“In the centre of the offensive, we are now completing the destruction of enemy units that provide cover for the retreat of Russian troops behind their second defensive line.”

A vast minefield trapped Ukrainian troops for weeks as infantry sappers slowly cleared an assault route on foot. Russian troops behind it “just stood and waited for the Ukrainian army”, picking off vehicles with shells and drones, he said.

But now that barrier has been crossed, Russians have been forced into manoeuvres and Ukrainians are back in their tanks and other armoured vehicles. In a sign that Moscow is feeling the pressure, it has redeployed troops to the area from frontlines inside occupied Ukraine – Kherson to the west and Lyman to the north-east – and also from inside Russia, he said.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/02/everything-is-ahead-of-us-ukraine-breaks-russias-first-line-of-defence-in-stronghold

Now that the minefield has been breached, Russians have lost much of their advantage. “There is a very big difference between the first and second line of defence,” said Tarnavskiy.

The second line is not as well built, so Ukrainians can use their vehicles, although there are still minefields. Because Russian forces are also operating in this area, they are in patches rather than a single defensive cordon.

The mission for the Ukrainian unit was to take a single house, in a village that is only a speck on the map but was serving as a stronghold for Russian soldiers.
Andriy, a veteran marine, had waited for three days with his small assault team — none of whom had seen combat before — as other Ukrainian units crawled through minefields, stormed trenches and cleared a path to the farming village of Urozhaine. Finally, one day last month, the order came to move.
They raced to a predetermined location in an armored personnel carrier, and disembarked as explosions and gunfire rattled the ground beneath their feet, Andriy and members of his unit said. Driving out or killing the remaining Russians, they secured the house as night fell, posting guards and reviewing the day’s tactics to see how they might improve.

In the morning, the new order came: Take another house.

The monthslong campaign to breach heavily fortified Russian lines is being conducted in many domains and in many forms of battle, with artillery duels and drone strikes across the breadth of the front in southern Ukraine. But the engine driving the effort are hundreds of small-scale assault groups, often just eight to 10 soldiers, each tasked with attacking a single trench, tree line or house.
...
“After the first and the second lines there will be the straight way toward the sea, no more fortifications,” said Maksym, another veteran marine who fought in Urozhaine. “We will move like rockets.”
The marines are fighting on a line that runs south along the T0158, a rural road that winds its way through the Mokri Yali River Valley, where Ukrainians have retaken a series of villages since launching their counteroffensive in June. The next major assault target is Staromlynivka, about 12 miles from where the campaign began.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-russia-counteroffensive.html

Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Popov has maintained contact with his former subordinates in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that these officers turned to Popov for help instead of their new commander.[8] The Russian military command dismissed Popov as the commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) in early July after he engaged in clear insubordination by attempting to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities, heavy losses, and a lack of rotations directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[9] Russian sources have routinely expressed concern about the issues that Popov highlighted and their detrimental impacts on the Russian defensive effort in southern Ukraine.[10] Popov partially established a precedent for insubordination, and his conduct reportedly prompted the Russian military command to begin removing similarly insubordinate commanders from frontline units, although not all reports of commanders removed were confirmed.[11] Russian sources claimed that Popov encouraged his former subordinates to report the truth about the front to the higher Russian command, possibly encouraging them to replicate his insubordination.[12] Popov’s contact with his former subordinates, if true, suggests that Popov’s replacement has not won the trust of his subordinates either because he is less competent or because he is less forthright with senior Russian leadership about continuing challenges facing the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2023