Citat:
Rapport på ca 118 sidor från FOI Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut. Publicerades idag.
Abstract
Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 marks a turning point, not only for Ukraine, Russia and their relations with the rest of the world, but also for global security in a long-term perspective. This anthology is an attempt to identify the most important political, economic and military consequences of the first year of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. The focus is on the consequences for Russia, its neighbouring countries and international security. Three main observations can be made about the first year of war. The first is that the invasion had less to do with Ukraine's political development, but more so with the Russian political leadership's perception of Russia as a great power. The second observation regards the risk of escalation. So far, the war has been fought under the assumptions that a direct conflict between Russia and NATO should be avoided, and that nuclear weapons should not be used. If either of these are called into question, there is a substantial risk of escalation - both geographically and in terms of the intensity of the conflict. The third observation is, that regardless of how the war in Ukraine develops, Russia's confrontation with the West is of a long-term nature.
Russia᾽s War Against Ukraine and the West: The First Year
https://foi.se/en/foi/reports/report-summary.html?reportNo=FOI-R--5479--SE
Abstract
Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 marks a turning point, not only for Ukraine, Russia and their relations with the rest of the world, but also for global security in a long-term perspective. This anthology is an attempt to identify the most important political, economic and military consequences of the first year of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. The focus is on the consequences for Russia, its neighbouring countries and international security. Three main observations can be made about the first year of war. The first is that the invasion had less to do with Ukraine's political development, but more so with the Russian political leadership's perception of Russia as a great power. The second observation regards the risk of escalation. So far, the war has been fought under the assumptions that a direct conflict between Russia and NATO should be avoided, and that nuclear weapons should not be used. If either of these are called into question, there is a substantial risk of escalation - both geographically and in terms of the intensity of the conflict. The third observation is, that regardless of how the war in Ukraine develops, Russia's confrontation with the West is of a long-term nature.
Russia᾽s War Against Ukraine and the West: The First Year
https://foi.se/en/foi/reports/report-summary.html?reportNo=FOI-R--5479--SE
SVD refererar till ovanstående rapport: https://www.svd.se/a/onxWMK/ryssland-utgor-allvarligt-hot-mot-sverige.
Vad jag tycker är intressant, som du inte tar upp, är följande enligt SVD:
"Till det positiva för Sverige hör, enligt Robert Dalsjö, att det går dåligt för Ryssland i Ukraina. Desto mer negativt är tecken på att Rysslands president Vladimir Putin agerar känslomässigt och oförutsägbart" Jag vågar inte utesluta att om Sverige skulle göra nånting som förargar Putin så skulle han, bara för att trycka dit oss, kunna göra något, säger Robert Dalsjö.
Varför agerar då Putin känslomässigt och oförutsägbart? Ett skäl kan vara Putins hälsa som jag tog upp i ett tidigare inlägg. Hur som helst, det är förbannat obehagligt
Verkar som orcherna behöver en uppdatering...