Israel lämnade förvisso Gaza (även om de behöll kontrollen över bl.a. gränserna, har en säkerhetszon inuti området och kontrollerar befolkningsregistret) men de gjorde det unilateralt, d.v.s. utan att komma överens med palestinierna om detta och de visste att palestinierna inte gick med på det.
Demografiskt, ekonomiskt men också politiskt var utrymningen en succé för israelerna även om racketattackerna som ökade mycket (de hade ju startat flera år innan utrymningen) drog ner lite på det. Genom att göra sig av med runt 8,000 bosättare plus soldater så ansåg Israel att man slapp ansvaret för det fattiga och trångbodda området med då runt 1,4 miljoner palestinier samtidigt som man tänkte det också skulle frysa fredsprocessen.
Istället kunde Israel fokusera på Västbanken, där det nu bor runt 650 000 judiska bosättare och 2,7 miljoner palestinier på en mycket större, och för israelerna också en mycket viktigare, yta än Gaza. Samma år så växte faktiskt bosättarantalet trots utrymningen av Gaza (vissa av bosättarna därifrån flyttade till och med till Västbanken) och ett par bosättningar på Västbanken.
Peter Beinart har tagit upp detta:
Citat:
To grasp the perversity of using Gaza as an explanation for why Israel can’t risk a Palestinian state, it helps to realize that Sharon withdrew Gaza’s settlers in large measure because he didn’t want a Palestinian state. By 2004, when Sharon announced the Gaza withdrawal, the Road Map for Peace that he had signed with Mahmoud Abbas was going nowhere. Into the void came two international proposals for a two state solution. The first was the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, in which every member of the Arab League offered to recognize Israel if it returned to the 1967 lines and found a “just” and “agreed upon” solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. The second was the 2003 Geneva Initiative, in which former Israeli and Palestinian negotiators publicly agreed upon the details of a two state plan. As the political scientists Jonathan Rynhold and Dov Waxman have detailed, Sharon feared the United States would get behind one or both plans, and pressure Israel to accept a Palestinian state near the 1967 lines. “Only an Israeli initiative,” Sharon argued, “will keep us from being dragged into dangerous initiatives like the Geneva and Saudi initiatives.”
Sharon saw several advantages to withdrawing settlers from Gaza. First, it would save money, since in Gaza Israel was deploying a disproportionately high number of soldiers to protect a relatively small number of settlers. Second, by (supposedly) ridding Israel of its responsibility for millions of Palestinians, the withdrawal would leave Israel and the West Bank with a larger Jewish majority. Third, the withdrawal would prevent the administration of George W. Bush from embracing the Saudi or Geneva plans, and pushing hard—as Bill Clinton had done—for a Palestinian state. Sharon’s chief of staff, Dov Weisglass, put it bluntly: “The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with authority and permission. All with a presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.”
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:V0UKCRo6ZiUJ:www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.608008+&cd=1&hl=sv&ct=clnk&gl=se
http://mondoweiss.net/2014/07/beinart-demolishes-hasbara
Noam Chomsky har också skrivit mycket om detta, bl.a.:
Citat:
That agreement was reached shortly after Israel withdrew its settlers and military forces from Gaza. The motive for the disengagement was explained by Dov Weisglass, a confidant of then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was in charge of negotiating and implementing it.
"The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process," Weisglass told Haaretz. "And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with authority and permission. All with a [U.S.] presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress."
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20141002.htm
Huruvida Västbanken är ockuperat eller inte är tydligt. Faktum är att Israel inte haft någon suveränitet där och det är det som räknas. Palestinierna som bor där har givetvis rätt till området. Därför anser det internationella samfundet, den Internationella domstolen i Haag, den överväldigande majoriteten av människorättsgrupper och experter att det är ockuperat område. Faktum är att till och med Israels högsta domstol anser det och den israeliska regeringen har också sagt så när det tagits upp i olika fall i domstol, t.ex. år 2004:
Citat:
Beit Sourik Village Council
v.
1. The Government of Israel
2. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank
The Commander of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria issued orders to take possession of plots of land in the area of Judea and Samaria. The purpose of the seizure was to erect a separation fence on the land. The question before us is whether the orders and the fence are legal.
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1. Since 1967, Israel has been holding the areas of Judea and Samaria [hereinafter – the area] in belligerent occupation. In 1993 Israel began a political process with the PLO, and signed a number of agreements transferring control over parts of the area to the Palestinian Authority. Israel and the PLO continued political negotiations in an attempt to solve the remaining problems. The negotiations, whose final stages took place at Camp David in Maryland, USA, failed in July 2000.
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23. The general point of departure of all parties – which is also our point of departure – is that Israel holds the area in belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica). See HCJ 619/78 “El Tal’ia” Weekly v. Minister of Defense; HCJ 69/81 Abu Ita v. Commander of the Area of Judea and Samaria; HCJ 606/78 Ayoob v. Minister of Defense; HCJ 393/82 Jam'iat Ascan Elma’almoon Eltha’aooniah Elmahduda Elmaoolieh v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria. In the areas relevant to this petition, military administration, headed by the military commander, continues to apply. Compare HCJ 2717/96 Wafa v. Minister of Defense (application of the military administration in “Area C”). The authority of the military commander flows from the provisions of public international law regarding belligerent occupation. These rules are established principally in the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 [hereinafter – the Hague Regulations]. These regulations reflect customary international law. The military commander’s authority is also anchored in IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949. [hereinafter – the Fourth Geneva Convention]. The question of the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention has come up more than once in this Court. See HCJ 390/79 Duikat v. Government of Israel; HCJ 61/80 Haetzni v. State of Israel, at 597. The question is not before us now, since the parties agree that the humanitarian rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply to the issue under review. See HCJ 698/80 Kawasme v. Minister of Defense; Jam'iyat Ascan, at 794; Ajuri, at 364; HCJ 3278/02 Center for the Defense of the Individual v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank Area, at 396. See also Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 262 (1971).
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.htm
