Citat:
Ursprungligen postat av
Momento
håller med . Men de bedöms väl som aldelles för starka.
Alltså det kanske har något symboliskt värde om de själva tar hand om det här, men det är helt omöjligt. All modern utrustning är hos shia irakierna och de har längre inte kvar en arme. Det är iranska shia militantgrupper som styr hela Bagdad samt alla andra städer och byar. Det är dem som strider mot IS. Man kan inte låta dessa grupper gå in i 100% sunni områden för då blir det verkligen ett religöst krig. Dem kommer slakta sunnitier, förstöra deras hus etc.
Kurdernas militär kollapsade inte på samma sätt som irakiernas, men som sagt de har inga sofistikerade vapen som IS och Irak har. De behöver liknande vapen och de behöver träning i att använda dem. Vidare så har kurderna inget flyggvapen.
Om inte amerikanerna hade blandat in sig så hade inte ett skit hänt. Alla tre partena betraktar varandra som fiender, alltså även KRG och Irak. Så man hamnar i ett statiskt läge där ingen kan angrippa den ena eftersom den andra då kommer angrippa en.
Sedan så är det bara amerikanerna som är intreserade av att hålla ihop staten Irak, de tre parterna som utgör Irak har inte samma intresse. De vill ha sitt eget.
Här nedan kan ni se hur omfattande korumptionen var inom irakiska armen. Det var inte konstigt att den kollapsade, eftersom det inte ens fanns en arme från första början. Officiererna och alla andra i maktposition utnyttjade sin ställning för att tjäna pengar och skett fulltständigt i sina soldater. När Deash kom så var de bättre beväpnade än Iraks arme.
Citat:
Still, the Kurdish army is a more promising partner than its Iraqi counterpart. To the Kurds, the hollowness of the Iraqi Army was evident for years, even as the Americans poured billions of dollars into it. “It was never a real army,” Najmuddin Karim, the governor of Kirkuk, said. “It was a checkpoint army—they manned checkpoints. It was an employment opportunity. The Americans were always telling us how good they were, but we didn’t believe them.” I asked Fatih, the Kurdish general, if the Americans stationed in Iraq were aware of the deep-seated problems. “Of course they knew,” he said. “They were just pretending to believe.”
Barham Salih, a Kurd who is a former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, told me that even before the ISIS offensive the Iraqi Army was useful mainly as a piggy bank for its officers. At a meeting of senior generals earlier this year, Salih told me, the commanders noted that one of the élite armored divisions, meant to comprise more than ten thousand men, had dwindled to about five hundred. The division’s remaining officers were marking the men present and pocketing their wages. “This is a corrupt system,” Salih said. “You have no division, all the units are gone, and the commanders are stealing all the money.”
A week after the Iraqi Army collapsed, I sat with Mohammed Ghafar, a twenty-eight-year-old soldier from Kirkuk. Ghafar, a Shiite Arab, told me that he had joined the Army, ten years ago, with pride. “I needed a job, but the truth is that I joined to serve my country,” he said. He was assigned to the 12th Division, which oversaw his home town. Ghafar earned a good salary, got married and had two children, and looked forward to a career as a soldier. The Army never functioned as well as he had hoped, Ghafar said, but it grew much worse in 2011, when the American military departed. Ghafar liked the Americans. He respected their professionalism and the training they offered, and, most important, he felt that they helped to keep his superiors honest. “Everything changed after the Americans left,” Ghafar said. “The commanders steal everything. They sell it in the local market—clothes, boots, our equipment.” Ghafar said that he was forced to buy boots at the local bazaar. In his unit, the absentee rate soared. Even the rations went bad, he said. “We used to have the best food,” Ghafar said. “After the Americans left, all we got was eggplant. Eggplant at every meal! Breakfast, lunch, and dinner.”
Ghafar was based in Dibis, a largely Sunni area near Kirkuk, when ISIS approached. By then, he and his men had heard what happened in Mosul: senior commanders had fled, and the soldiers had quickly followed. “The betrayal started in Mosul,” he said. “When your commanders quit, why should the soldiers fight?” It was clear, he said, that the locals sympathized with ISIS, and that his own Army was overmatched. He had no rifle; all his equipment had been stolen or was in disrepair. “ISIS was better equipped than we were!” he said. His comrades started to abandon their posts, and finally, he said, a Kurdish officer in his division told him to go home. “And so I went home,” he said, shrugging. “It was an order.”
Ghafar said that he hasn’t been paid since April. He spoke wistfully of his former career, and of his homeland. “I miss the Americans,” he said. “Iraq? Maybe Iraq is finished.”
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/9/state8519.htm
