Syftet innan Israel brakade på verkar ha varit att inlemma Hizbollah i en libanesisk arme, demilitarisera dem och minska syriens inflytande sedan president Lahode avgår 2007. Nu är nog den chansen förverkad för år framöver, beroende både på Hizbollah och Israel.
Ibland undrar jag om inte internationell och nationell politik är för lite "sunt förnuft" och för mycket Stake. Jag menar....varenda förälder till en tonåring vet väl att om man säger "knarka inte...för dåååå...." så provar ungen knark. Säger man "avväpna för annars..." till Hizbollah" så upprustar de....för att kolla och meddela "kan själv!"
Här har ni en intressant artikel om situationen i Libanon innan det brakade lös.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052306.html
How UN Pressure on Hizballah Impedes Lebanese Reform
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A way out
Though international pressure has thus far proven counterproductive, there is a way out of the Lebanese political imbroglio, provided that the US and France modify their approach. Most importantly, Hizballah is now in the government. If the US and the EU would put the arms issue on the back burner (as they initially hinted they would), Hizballah would have a hard time explaining to its relatively marginalized and impoverished constituency why it will not take part in the reform program. Without international hounding, Hizballah would have no real justification for clinging to Lahoud as an indispensable ally. The outcome of the Hariri murder trial would do the rest in consigning the president to irrelevance. In other words, Hizballah would be left with little choice other than prioritizing its self-declared mission to improve the plight of Lebanon’s deprived and get down to the business of reform.
It should be recalled, in this vein, that Hizballah was among the first to present a blueprint for a fair and balanced electoral law.[19] The party’s current ministers have vowed to clean up corruption in state institutions they control. Moreover, since it began participating in local government in 1998, Hizballah has worked to provide effective public services, especially in Beirut’s southern suburbs, for which efforts the UN gave its Best Practices Award to the Ghubayri municipality.
Ironically, without the heavy external pressures for it to disarm, Hizballah’s military agenda would likely become less pertinent by the day. Hizballah’s position in south Lebanon would return to the low-intensity conflict preceding the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, with the added complication for the party that Israel could now hold the Lebanese government, in which it takes part, directly responsible for any attacks in the south. The US and the EU could further demand that Israel stop its intimidating and almost daily incursions into Lebanese airspace, and withdraw from the Shebaa Farms -- steps that, after the party cried victory, would make Hizballah fighters appear to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Hizballah would surely try to find alternative pretexts for continuing its armed “resistance.” But it is unlikely that even its own supporters would get excited about a jihad on behalf of others, whether Palestinians or Iranians, or rally behind the party’s remaining quarrels with the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel. Driven out of the limelight, Hizballah fighters would have nowhere else to go than the Lebanese army barracks. Only in such a changed atmosphere could any Lebanese government become attentive to the pressing need to finally embark on a serious reform program and start addressing the high expectations expressed in the spring of 2005.
