Fox benämns i AB som den konservativt inriktade kanalen, vågade de inte säga rasistisk hatmedia?
Hysterin hos den svenska eliten är närmast komisk och de desperata försöken till ”damage control” med alternativa fakta.
Visst Trump uttryckte sig slarvigt när han refererade till Fox reportaget som visats kvällen innan. Men han pratar som det verkar till stor del fritt utan absolut manus och att en del syftningar blir fel är inte konstigt. Är man hederlig bedömer man efter kontexten i helheten och då är denna slarviga syftning en petitess.
Men man kan anta att State Departement och sk ”deep state” har en mer objektiv bild av Sverige.
Här är en intressant skrivelse om Sverige som inte går att hitta på nätet längre:
Hysterin hos den svenska eliten är närmast komisk och de desperata försöken till ”damage control” med alternativa fakta.
Visst Trump uttryckte sig slarvigt när han refererade till Fox reportaget som visats kvällen innan. Men han pratar som det verkar till stor del fritt utan absolut manus och att en del syftningar blir fel är inte konstigt. Är man hederlig bedömer man efter kontexten i helheten och då är denna slarviga syftning en petitess.
Men man kan anta att State Departement och sk ”deep state” har en mer objektiv bild av Sverige.
Här är en intressant skrivelse om Sverige som inte går att hitta på nätet längre:
THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapon Decisionmaking in Sweden 1945–1972
https://anonfile.com/h7D7vebabb/Nuclear_Weapon_Decisionmaking_in_Sweden_.pdf
Imagine, for a moment, the reliability of an article on British security policy written by a journalist who does not speak English, who has no appreciation of the Battles of Britain or Trafalgar, is not familiar with Winston Churchill, and who has visited England for only a few days. The product probably would not be taken seriously in most places. Yet the views of the English-speaking world concerning Sweden’s security policy tend to be shaped by people who do not speak Swedish, have no sense of the significance of the Battles of Lützen and Poltava, are not familiar with the consequences of the foreign policies of Gustav IV Adolph or Östen Undén, and whose familiarity with the country is limited to a few days in Stockholm on a research visit.
/…/
Sweden is a remarkably secretive and closed society in which official information, particularly primary data concerning national defense issues, traditionally has been difficult to obtain. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the parliamentary body responsible for managing Sweden’s foreign affairs for over a century, for example, was called the “Secret Committee” (Hemliga utskottet).
In the twentieth century, the largest financial transaction in Scandinavian history, the decision to procure the Viggen combat aircraft, was not made known to the entire cabinet of the Swedish government until after the order had been placed.4
[4. The research and development costs for the Viggen project consumed a proportion of Swedish resources equivalent to the percentage of R&D consumed by the Apollo man on the moon project in the United States.]
Impressing a positive image of Sweden on the outside world was made easier by a linguistic barrier. The majority of the contemporary literature in English concerning Sweden’s foreign and security policy has been written, by and large, by people who do not speak or read Swedish.
/…/
There is no statutory access to SAP archives, and SAP loyalists serving in government have often used party and other informal networks to convey information without leaving a trail of paper in the National Archives. Foreign Minister Östen Undén (1945-1962), who exercised a decisive influence on Sweden’s post-war foreign policy, distinguished Foreign Ministry personnel by the standard of whether they were, in his view, SAP “party friends.” The late Olof Palme was known to use public telephones at airports, for example, to discuss matters of state in order to eliminate the possibility for notes or any other written record of the conversations to be made and subsequently made part of the official record.
The Social Democrats also have made repeated efforts since 1945 to inhibit public scrutiny of Sweden’s defense and foreign policies, in order to sustain Sweden’s positive image.
Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapon Decisionmaking in Sweden 1945–1972
https://anonfile.com/h7D7vebabb/Nuclear_Weapon_Decisionmaking_in_Sweden_.pdf
Imagine, for a moment, the reliability of an article on British security policy written by a journalist who does not speak English, who has no appreciation of the Battles of Britain or Trafalgar, is not familiar with Winston Churchill, and who has visited England for only a few days. The product probably would not be taken seriously in most places. Yet the views of the English-speaking world concerning Sweden’s security policy tend to be shaped by people who do not speak Swedish, have no sense of the significance of the Battles of Lützen and Poltava, are not familiar with the consequences of the foreign policies of Gustav IV Adolph or Östen Undén, and whose familiarity with the country is limited to a few days in Stockholm on a research visit.
/…/
Sweden is a remarkably secretive and closed society in which official information, particularly primary data concerning national defense issues, traditionally has been difficult to obtain. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the parliamentary body responsible for managing Sweden’s foreign affairs for over a century, for example, was called the “Secret Committee” (Hemliga utskottet).
In the twentieth century, the largest financial transaction in Scandinavian history, the decision to procure the Viggen combat aircraft, was not made known to the entire cabinet of the Swedish government until after the order had been placed.4
[4. The research and development costs for the Viggen project consumed a proportion of Swedish resources equivalent to the percentage of R&D consumed by the Apollo man on the moon project in the United States.]
Impressing a positive image of Sweden on the outside world was made easier by a linguistic barrier. The majority of the contemporary literature in English concerning Sweden’s foreign and security policy has been written, by and large, by people who do not speak or read Swedish.
/…/
There is no statutory access to SAP archives, and SAP loyalists serving in government have often used party and other informal networks to convey information without leaving a trail of paper in the National Archives. Foreign Minister Östen Undén (1945-1962), who exercised a decisive influence on Sweden’s post-war foreign policy, distinguished Foreign Ministry personnel by the standard of whether they were, in his view, SAP “party friends.” The late Olof Palme was known to use public telephones at airports, for example, to discuss matters of state in order to eliminate the possibility for notes or any other written record of the conversations to be made and subsequently made part of the official record.
The Social Democrats also have made repeated efforts since 1945 to inhibit public scrutiny of Sweden’s defense and foreign policies, in order to sustain Sweden’s positive image.
