Intressant rapport genomförd av Elizabeth Tsurkov om hur befolkningen i "rebell"-kontrollerade områden upplevde situationen. Hon är knappast någon Assadist om man säger så:
(EDIT: Ett mycket viktigt dokument som alla bör läsa)
The Breaking of Syria’s Rebellion
The Assad regime is winning the war in Syria not simply by regaining territory, but also by breaking the spirit and willingness to resist it in areas under its control and areas still outside of it
Rural Sunni Syrians - Not a Monolithic Group
(EDIT: Ett mycket viktigt dokument som alla bör läsa)
The Breaking of Syria’s Rebellion
The Assad regime is winning the war in Syria not simply by regaining territory, but also by breaking the spirit and willingness to resist it in areas under its control and areas still outside of it
This research demonstrates that even in the case of a civil war that originated in a mass popular uprising, significant diversity of attitudes exists among those who are considered to be the support base of the rebels - rural impoverished Arab Sunnis who have been subjected to incessant war crimes perpetrated by the regime. This research was carried out over the span of 17 months and is based on hundreds of interviews and off-the-record conversations conducted over messaging applications and social media with Syrians inside Syria as well as fieldwork in Turkey. All names of interviewees have been altered to ensure their safety.Lite utdrag:
Rural Sunni Syrians - Not a Monolithic Group
My research indicates that a significant share of civilians in rebel-held Syria are not supportive of the rebels, and that this group has grown in recent years due to rebel conduct, war fatigue and changing dynamics of the war. This largely silent group includes both people who never supported the uprising, as well as people who once supported it, participated in anti-regime protests and took up arms as part of rebel groups with the aim of removing Assad from power.Rebel Abuses and Lawlessness
During the first year of the Syrian uprising, despite enormous risks, millions of Syrians took to the streets across the country to call for the downfall of the Assad regime. However, even in areas considered hostile to the regime due to their sectarian makeup, marginalization, and exposure to regime atrocities, many civilians did not support the uprising. Some did this because of fear of instability, or due to a general desire to stay out of any politics, an attitude the regime worked to inculcate in the Syrian populace. Some believed, at least to a certain extent, the narrative offered by the regime. “I did not participate in the revolution from the start because I knew how it would end,” said Ameer, an electrician residing in a border town in Idlib that witnessed large protests in the first years of the uprising. “I saw that the protesters in my town were the ignorant and idiots, not some educated individuals… they wanted the downfall of the country, not the downfall of the regime.” He added “I’m not with the individual Syrian regime, but I am with the regime as a system and a state.”
Throughout the war, rebels have engaged in looting, notably in eastern Aleppo city in 2012, Idlib city in 2015, Naseeb crossing in Daraa in 2015, al-Bab in northern Aleppo in late 2016 and Efrin in March 2018. While the phenomenon of looting by regime forces is much more systematic, this conduct by the rebels has angered many civilians who remained under the rule of the forces who looted their homes, businesses and factories.Abuses and Exploitation in Besieged Regions
Conversations with civilians across all rebel-held areas of Syria indicate that they are largely perceived as incompetent and abusive rulers, who fail to provide civilians with basic necessities, services and law-and-order and exploit their power advantage for their personal benefit. Naturally, constant regime and Russian airstrikes and shelling of these region makes any governance challenging, and much of popular anger, naturally, is directed at the regime. Some failings of local governance can be attributed to regime bombings and policies, mismanagement, lack of funding for aid and services. Many other problems stem from corruption, nepotism and wanton disregard for the lives of civilians.
Temporary ceasefires and “de-escalations” (more on them below) concluded between the backers of the regime and the opposition since 2016 have made the failing of rebel governance much more obvious in the eyes of the populace under rebel control. In areas where regime and Russian jets are (temporarily) not bombing, the main threats to civilians’ safety and livelihood stem from criminal gangs and rebel themselves. Phenomena of exorbitant transit fees, robbery, assassinations, carjackings, kidnappings for ransom, and murder are incredibly common across rebel-held Syria. In some cases the perpetrators are clearly rebels: for example in the collection of “taxes” in the rebel checkpoints, attacks on and robbing of NGOs, confiscation of private and public property, armed confrontation over minor issues, kidnappings and torture of suspected opponents and random unlucky civilians. Foreign donors invested heavily in setting up civilian-managed courts and “Free Police” departments, but civilians abused by rebels or criminal elements usually can not find recourse with the local courts or police, due to their ineptness, corruption, and dependence and subservience to the rebels, who are oftentimes the aggressors. One manifestation of rebels’ impunity is the habit of some rebel factions, and in particular Hayat Tahrir a-Sham, to wear balaclavas when interacting with the population under their control, enabling them to avoid identification, public opprobrium and justice. Rebels further undermine the civilian courts by operating a parallel “justice” system, in which the rebels serve as judges and executioners without proper proceedings.
http://www.regthink.org/en/articles/the-breaking-of-syrias-rebellion
Several pockets under rebel-control survived under regime siege for years until their violent takeovers by regime forces in 2015-2018. In these areas, rebels (along with regime officials and traders) exploited the acute needs of the besieged population for profit. After regime forces laid siege to Aleppo, some rebel groups began confiscating aid, stockpiling food and distributing it unequally - mostly to family members and those with connections to them.
In the besieged area in the northern Homs countryside, several large factions controlled unofficial and official crossings into regime areas and taxed traders who move goods through them, as well as civilians who wished to escape the enclave. According to a teacher in Rastan, the largest town in the besieged area, this has created a great deal of anger among the population toward those rebel groups, while smaller local groups continued to enjoy people’s support. In eastern Ghouta, the Jaysh al-Islam rebel group taxed goods that enter through the Wafideen crossing, and other rebel groups profited from taxes on goods that were smuggled in tunnels they constructed linking eastern Ghouta to neighborhoods in Damascus city under ceasefire deals with the regime. Civilians who wanted to be smuggled out had to pay exorbitant fees to be allowed to cross to Damascus. At the same time, hungry children who were caught stealing food to survive have been sentenced to jail and hard labor by Jaysh al-Islam’s courts. The early 2018, negotiations for surrender of Harasta, one of the towns in the besieged eastern Ghouta under the control of Ahrar al-Sham and local profiteers, were reportedly delayed due to the insistence of the rebels to take with them civilian goods that they have smuggled from Damascus and hoarded in underground storage.
Several locals in eastern Ghouta have told me that only members of the rebel factions, who benefitted financially from the groups, support them. A 2015 study by the London School of Economics found that “Relations between armed groups and residents are highly strained” in eastern Ghouta. “Citizens told us that they are fed up with the armed groups who coerced the population by manipulating aid and food supplies in a situation of near starvation. There was widespread resentment at the armed groups who have enough to feed themselves during a siege, enriching themselves while civilians suffer. This is being expressed overtly through protests. Not one participant expressed sympathy with the main armed groups of Ghouta, although all the participants were very clearly against the government and many had participated in the early days of the revolution.” Tamer, a displaced man residing in eastern Ghouta and wanted by the regime told me in late 2016, as he was recovering from a severe injury due to a regime airstrike, “I hope the regime retakes control of all the area [of eastern Ghouta]. These FSA groups are worse than the regime.”
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Senast redigerad av arbetet 2018-07-11 kl. 15:36.
Senast redigerad av arbetet 2018-07-11 kl. 15:36.
