Citat:
Intressant att Kazakhstan distanserar sig från Ryssland och tar Ukrainas sida i kriget. Putin måste vara ursinnig över att hans närmaste "allierade" numera klassas som "nazister" av honom.
Riskerar Kazakhstan en invasion av Putin för att denazifieras? Kommer Putin ha nån arme kvar efter Ukraina att kunna anfalla Kazakhstan också?
Russian writers have a long list of complaints about how Kazakhstan is responding to the Ukrainian crisis. They are upset that Kazakhstan has permitted pro-Ukrainian demonstrations while banning pro-Russian ones, angry that the Kazakhstani authorities have allowed their citizens to organize humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but not to (Russian-occupied) Donbas, and furious that instead of eliminating “Russophobes” from the government after January, the national authorities have allegedly brought more of them onboard and even allowed groups that Moscow views as anti-Russian to form new political parties (Regnum, April 1). But in the “patriotic” Russians’ minds, those actions pale in comparison to the remarks that Timur Suleymenov, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration in Kazakhstan, made in a recent interview, during a visit to European Union officials in Brussels (EurActiv, March 29; Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 1).
Speaking with EurActiv, Suleymenov rejected all of Moscow’s positions on Ukraine. He said that “Kazakhstan will not be a tool to circumvent sanctions on Russia [passed] by the [United States] and the EU,” that Kazakhstan will label what Russia is doing in Ukraine a war regardless of what Moscow says, that Kazakhstan has not and will not recognize Crimea as part of Russia, and that Kazakhstan is working hard to diversity its export routes so as to bypass Russian territory. The senior Kazakhstani official, who has the ear of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, added that Kazakhstan does not want to be put “in the same basket” with Russia and that both its status as an independent country and its membership in the United Nations are more important as far as these issues are concerned than its membership in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (EurActiv, March 29). Suleymenov’s remarks suggest that Kazakhstan is perhaps further from Russia on the Ukrainian conflict than almost any other post-Soviet state, despite the fact that Moscow had clearly expected it to be among its closest backers (Thinktanks.by, March 18).
Moscow is most upset by Kazakhstan’s positions on the war itself and the sanctions regime, but it almost certainly faces two larger, longer-term challenges there. On the one hand, Kazakhstan is now seeking, as Suleymenov said, to end the biggest leverage Russia has on that country. At present, more than 90 percent of the oil from Kazakhstan passes through Russia; but as President Tokayev’s deputy noted, the administration is working hard to change that, looking both eastward to China and even more to the countries of the South Caucasus. It recently signed an agreement with Georgia to expand trade through that region, bypassing Russia to the south (Regnum, April 1). And it is seeking to do the same thing with Azerbaijan, expanding its shipping capacity on the Caspian to make the achievement of those goals possible (Casp-geo.ru, March 12, April 2).
https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-outraged-that-kazakhstan-becoming-a-second-ukraine/
Riskerar Kazakhstan en invasion av Putin för att denazifieras? Kommer Putin ha nån arme kvar efter Ukraina att kunna anfalla Kazakhstan också?
Russian writers have a long list of complaints about how Kazakhstan is responding to the Ukrainian crisis. They are upset that Kazakhstan has permitted pro-Ukrainian demonstrations while banning pro-Russian ones, angry that the Kazakhstani authorities have allowed their citizens to organize humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but not to (Russian-occupied) Donbas, and furious that instead of eliminating “Russophobes” from the government after January, the national authorities have allegedly brought more of them onboard and even allowed groups that Moscow views as anti-Russian to form new political parties (Regnum, April 1). But in the “patriotic” Russians’ minds, those actions pale in comparison to the remarks that Timur Suleymenov, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration in Kazakhstan, made in a recent interview, during a visit to European Union officials in Brussels (EurActiv, March 29; Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 1).
Speaking with EurActiv, Suleymenov rejected all of Moscow’s positions on Ukraine. He said that “Kazakhstan will not be a tool to circumvent sanctions on Russia [passed] by the [United States] and the EU,” that Kazakhstan will label what Russia is doing in Ukraine a war regardless of what Moscow says, that Kazakhstan has not and will not recognize Crimea as part of Russia, and that Kazakhstan is working hard to diversity its export routes so as to bypass Russian territory. The senior Kazakhstani official, who has the ear of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, added that Kazakhstan does not want to be put “in the same basket” with Russia and that both its status as an independent country and its membership in the United Nations are more important as far as these issues are concerned than its membership in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (EurActiv, March 29). Suleymenov’s remarks suggest that Kazakhstan is perhaps further from Russia on the Ukrainian conflict than almost any other post-Soviet state, despite the fact that Moscow had clearly expected it to be among its closest backers (Thinktanks.by, March 18).
Moscow is most upset by Kazakhstan’s positions on the war itself and the sanctions regime, but it almost certainly faces two larger, longer-term challenges there. On the one hand, Kazakhstan is now seeking, as Suleymenov said, to end the biggest leverage Russia has on that country. At present, more than 90 percent of the oil from Kazakhstan passes through Russia; but as President Tokayev’s deputy noted, the administration is working hard to change that, looking both eastward to China and even more to the countries of the South Caucasus. It recently signed an agreement with Georgia to expand trade through that region, bypassing Russia to the south (Regnum, April 1). And it is seeking to do the same thing with Azerbaijan, expanding its shipping capacity on the Caspian to make the achievement of those goals possible (Casp-geo.ru, March 12, April 2).
https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-outraged-that-kazakhstan-becoming-a-second-ukraine/
Det verkar som om lilla Pruttan får allt färre kompisar
Kan riktigt se hur han ligger i fosterställning i sin bunker och gråter och skakar av ilska
Citat:
Det här är faktiskt en intressant vinkel... som jag inte riktigt vågar ta helt för given än men den har både element som stämmer överens med vad vi redan vet, såväl som en del saker som överraskar? FSB utpekas som bödlarna i Butsja :
FSB-soldaterna i Butja inledde massakern
Ryska styrkör erövrade Butja i början av kriget, den 27 februari. Olena berättar att den ryska armén i staden till en början främst bestod av unga ryska soldater som inte gjorde den civila befolkningen illa.
– Två veckor senare kom det andra soldater. Äldre soldater. De var mer än 40 år gamla och de var brutala. De behandlade alla dåligt. Det var då som massakerna började, säger Olena till AFP.
Hon säger att de äldre soldaterna var välutrustade jämfört med de yngre. Hon berättar att de var klädda i svarta och mörkgröna uniformer i stället för den vanliga klädseln.
– Det fanns några snälla män bland de ryska soldaterna och så fanns det några väldigt hårda män, speciellt från FSB – den ryska federationens federala säkerhetstjänst.
https://svenska.yle.fi/a/7-10015078
FSB-soldaterna i Butja inledde massakern
Ryska styrkör erövrade Butja i början av kriget, den 27 februari. Olena berättar att den ryska armén i staden till en början främst bestod av unga ryska soldater som inte gjorde den civila befolkningen illa.
– Två veckor senare kom det andra soldater. Äldre soldater. De var mer än 40 år gamla och de var brutala. De behandlade alla dåligt. Det var då som massakerna började, säger Olena till AFP.
Hon säger att de äldre soldaterna var välutrustade jämfört med de yngre. Hon berättar att de var klädda i svarta och mörkgröna uniformer i stället för den vanliga klädseln.
– Det fanns några snälla män bland de ryska soldaterna och så fanns det några väldigt hårda män, speciellt från FSB – den ryska federationens federala säkerhetstjänst.
https://svenska.yle.fi/a/7-10015078
Jag hade fått intrycket att FSB var mer underrättat och underförstått om hur totalt menings- och lönlös den här invasionen är, men det kanske mer handlar om de (åldrade) veteranerna i högkvarteren hemma i Moskva? FSBs "ungtuppar" ute i fält tycks vara mer i linje med både Putins brutala ideologiska linje och den ryska maffia-anknytning som organisationen under lång tid odlat:
https://tbcarchives.org/fsb-and-organized-crimes-connection-analytical-report-english-translation/
Citat:
Att de yngre gröngölingarna och ryska värnpliktiga i den reguljära armén inte (än så länge iaf.) har utvecklat den brutala omänsklighet som Putins SS-trupper i FSBs aktiva styrkor tar för given är både tänkbart och troligt, men samtidigt vågar jag inte riktigt än bara frikänna dem med ett "goda ryssar"-pass, med tanke på den omfattning av övergrepp som den ryska armén begått (och fortsätter att begå)...
The connection between the FSB and organized crime
Artikeln ger tyvärr en väldigt, väldigt tydlig bild om vad Ryssland håller på med just nu, i vilket fall:
Citat:
Lik överallt i staden, tortyr och våldtäkter: "Putin kan dra åt helvete"
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