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Fri vilja - alltså typ fyrkantiga trianglar och sådant..http://stevewatson.info/courses/Introduction%20to%20Philosophy%20(Alternative)/Resources/Frankfurt-FreeWill.pdf
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Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Harry G. Frankfurt
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Jan. 14, 1971), pp. 5-20.
What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all. Strawson, whose usage represents the current standard, identifies the concept of a person as "the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type."
But there are many entities besides persons that have both mental and physical properties. As it happens-though it seems extraordinary that this should be so-there is no common English word for the type of entity Strawson has in mind, a type that includes not only human beings but animals of various lesser species as well. Still, this hardly justifies the misappropriation of a valuable philosophical term.
Whether the members of some animal species are persons is surely not to be settled merely by determining whether it is correct to apply to them, in addition to predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, predicates that ascribe states of consciousness. It does violence to our language to endorse the application of the term 'person' to those numerous creatures which do have both psychological and material properties but which are manifestly not persons in any normal sense of the word. This misuse of language is doubtless innocent of any theoretical error. But although the offense is "merely verbal," it does significant harm. For it gratuitously diminishes our philosophical vocabulary, and it increases the likelihood that we will overlook the important area of inquiry with which the term
'person' is most naturally associated. It might have been expected that no problem would be of more central and persistent concern to philosophers than that of understanding what we ourselves essentially are. Yet this problem is so generally neglected that it has been possible to make off with its very name almost without being noticed and, evidently, without evoking any widespread feeling of loss.
There is a sense in which the word 'person' is merely the singular form of 'people' and in which both terms connote no more than membership in a certain biological species. In those senses of the word which are of greater philosophical interest, however, the criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives. Now these attributes would be of equal significance to us even if they were not in fact peculiar and common to the members of our own species. What interests us most in the human condition would not interest us less if it were also a feature of the condition of other creatures as well.
Our concept of ourselves as persons is not to be understood, therefore, as a concept of attributes that are necessarily species-specific. It is conceptually possible that members of novel or even of familiar nonhuman species should be persons; and it is also conceptually possible that some members of the human species are not persons. We do in fact assume, on the other hand, that no member of another species is a person. Accordingly, there is a presumption that what is essential to persons is a set of characteristics that we generally suppose-whether rightly or wrongly-to be uniquely
human.
It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call "second-order desires" or "desires of the second order."
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. he are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the-first order," which are simply desires to do or not to
do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
Harry G. Frankfurt
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1. (Jan. 14, 1971), pp. 5-20.
What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all. Strawson, whose usage represents the current standard, identifies the concept of a person as "the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type."
But there are many entities besides persons that have both mental and physical properties. As it happens-though it seems extraordinary that this should be so-there is no common English word for the type of entity Strawson has in mind, a type that includes not only human beings but animals of various lesser species as well. Still, this hardly justifies the misappropriation of a valuable philosophical term.
Whether the members of some animal species are persons is surely not to be settled merely by determining whether it is correct to apply to them, in addition to predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, predicates that ascribe states of consciousness. It does violence to our language to endorse the application of the term 'person' to those numerous creatures which do have both psychological and material properties but which are manifestly not persons in any normal sense of the word. This misuse of language is doubtless innocent of any theoretical error. But although the offense is "merely verbal," it does significant harm. For it gratuitously diminishes our philosophical vocabulary, and it increases the likelihood that we will overlook the important area of inquiry with which the term
'person' is most naturally associated. It might have been expected that no problem would be of more central and persistent concern to philosophers than that of understanding what we ourselves essentially are. Yet this problem is so generally neglected that it has been possible to make off with its very name almost without being noticed and, evidently, without evoking any widespread feeling of loss.
There is a sense in which the word 'person' is merely the singular form of 'people' and in which both terms connote no more than membership in a certain biological species. In those senses of the word which are of greater philosophical interest, however, the criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives. Now these attributes would be of equal significance to us even if they were not in fact peculiar and common to the members of our own species. What interests us most in the human condition would not interest us less if it were also a feature of the condition of other creatures as well.
Our concept of ourselves as persons is not to be understood, therefore, as a concept of attributes that are necessarily species-specific. It is conceptually possible that members of novel or even of familiar nonhuman species should be persons; and it is also conceptually possible that some members of the human species are not persons. We do in fact assume, on the other hand, that no member of another species is a person. Accordingly, there is a presumption that what is essential to persons is a set of characteristics that we generally suppose-whether rightly or wrongly-to be uniquely
human.
It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call "second-order desires" or "desires of the second order."
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. he are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the-first order," which are simply desires to do or not to
do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
https://philpapers.org/archive/NAHCCA.pdf
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Philosophical Studies (2006) Springer
EDDY NAHMIAS
CLOSE CALLS AND THE CONFIDENT AGENT: FREE WILL, DELIBERATION, AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
ABSTRACT. Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate effectively and control our actions accordingly: the Deliberation and Control (DC) condition. The other intuition is that free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way. I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face close calls, situations in which, after deliberating, we still do not know what we really want to do.
Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a confident agent who, after deliberating, always feels confident about what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude that intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought experiment and its relevance to the free will debate.
EDDY NAHMIAS
CLOSE CALLS AND THE CONFIDENT AGENT: FREE WILL, DELIBERATION, AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
ABSTRACT. Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate effectively and control our actions accordingly: the Deliberation and Control (DC) condition. The other intuition is that free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way. I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face close calls, situations in which, after deliberating, we still do not know what we really want to do.
Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a confident agent who, after deliberating, always feels confident about what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude that intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought experiment and its relevance to the free will debate.
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Nej - eftersom att jag redan förstått att du tillsammans med de största såpbox-predikarna inte alls är ute efter riktigt kunskapsutbyte utan mest bara vill sprida era icke-falsifierbara metafysiska övertygelser, så avstår jag från att spela erat spel. Jag är inte ute efter att få din infantila världsbild nedtryckt i halsen utan samtalar mer gärna med de som förstår att skilja ett påstående från ett argument. Jag är en alldeles för dålig schacklärare att undervisa spelet för duvor. Om Du inte kan redogöra för hur det kommer sig att 'du' är något annat än en död abstraktion bestående av excitationer i kvantfälten helt utan förmåga till rationellt tänkande, och börjar med att förklara hur kvantskummet som utgör rumtiden samt de olika kvantfälten började fluktuera från första början - då bevisar väl det att 'du' tillsammans med hela universum omöjligtvis existerar alls - Visst? Tror du andra i tråden ska läsa igenom en massa länkar som du vräker ur dig som kanske inte ens är relevant för topic? Kommer du läsa alla länkar om jag ger dig ett gäng länkar som leder till tusen sidor text?
Jag bad dig att redogöra för hur den fria viljan kan ha uppstått men detta klarar du uppenbarligen inte av. Hade du haft underlag i dina länkar för detta skulle du kunna förklara detta med egna ord eller citera relevanta delar från dina länkar.
Jag bad dig att redogöra för hur den fria viljan kan ha uppstått men detta klarar du uppenbarligen inte av. Hade du haft underlag i dina länkar för detta skulle du kunna förklara detta med egna ord eller citera relevanta delar från dina länkar.
Läs på innan du återkommer, så slipper du skämma ut dig inför de läsare som trots allt är rationella varelser.
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Senast redigerad av Datura.Naturans 2021-01-27 kl. 10:27.
Senast redigerad av Datura.Naturans 2021-01-27 kl. 10:27.
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Haha! 
Ja, de som av självaste naturen förlänats metafysiska sanningar kan tänkas ha koll..
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Majoriteten av alla inlägg här är ju rent skräp. Jag tänker mig att det är lite som att leta ädelstenar på Grönland.
Kul att du får ut något av det! Ursäkta det sena svaret, råkade missa din notifikation av någon anledning.
Mycket sten skall man gå igenom för att hitta ädelstenarna, och så länge det lönar sig ibland hägrar det att fortsätta.
Ibland slår hackan i en riktig åder där man hittar både välpolerade och stora råa safirer och rubiner.
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Ett sådant universum behöver kanske inte skilja sig från vårat så väldigt?Inte påstod väl jag att det i universumet ifråga enkom återfinnes märkliga kausalitetskedjor?
Det kan kanske tänkas att någon variant av newtonsk mekanik är en fungerande modell på någon skala även där.
Är vårt universum en turingmaskin, och hur vet vi i sådant fall det?
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Senast redigerad av Datura.Naturans 2021-01-27 kl. 12:44.
Senast redigerad av Datura.Naturans 2021-01-27 kl. 12:44.
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