Demokraterna inleder riksrättsförfarande mot Donald Trump (sep 2019)

A longtime career employee at the Office of Management and Budget is expected to break ranks and testify in the House Democrats' impeachment inquiry, potentially filling in important details on the hold-up of military aid to Ukraine.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/11/14/career-white-house-budget-official-expected-break-ranks-testify-impeachment-inquiry/

The ratings of Wednesday’s hearing suggest the public found the proceedings to be more interesting than some DC journalists. According to Variety, “[t]he first day of the impeachment hearings against President Donald Trump drew over 13 million total viewers across the broadcast and news networks combined” — a number that doesn’t even include those who streamed it online.

Trump Promised To Release His Tax Returns But Will Defy The Law To Keep Them Secret

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Man utfrågar nu vittnen om vad de hört och sett. Det är bara där vi är nu.

Meningen för demokraterna är att göra vad de tycker är rätt. De sätter inte sig själva och partiet för landet.

Men när man börjar en utredning behöver man ju inte ha bevis.

Tycker inte du att det är konstigt och fel att Giuliani som är advokat på presidenten och reser runt och försöker få andra länders politiker förtala presidentens motståndare i ett kommande val?

Yet, by and large, those who have examined Trump’s efforts to put pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as potential bribery have done so through the narrow lens of modern federal statutory criminal law.

But that is the wrong place to look when considering impeachment. In fact, the Founders had a broader conception of bribery than what’s in the criminal code. Their understanding was derived from English law, under which bribery was understood as an officeholder’s abuse of the power of an office to obtain a private benefit rather than for the public interest. This definition not only encompasses Trump’s conduct—it practically defines it.

Recall that Article II, Section 4, says the president “shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” In contrast to the prescriptive definition of “treason” in Article III, Section 3, the term “bribery” is not defined there or elsewhere in the constitutional text. Some of Trump’s defenders have taken advantage of that silence by attempting to apply the standard in the modern federal criminal bribery statute, arguing that impeachment for bribery is off the table unless there is a quid pro quo. They claim that Trump’s conduct falls short of that standard because he did not explicitly link the withheld aid to the requested investigation of a political rival.

In fact, Trump’s conduct almost certainly satisfies the modern statutory standard for bribery. As Randall Eliason has explained, a quid pro quo “need not be stated in express terms; corrupt actors are seldom so clumsy, and the law may not be evaded through winks and nods.” We have little doubt that a prosecutor would be able to establish a quid pro quo based on what was said on the call and the surrounding facts and context. (As an aside, Trump’s conduct also likely qualifies as extortion. As James Lindgren has explained at length, historically there has been a substantial overlap between the concepts of extortion and bribery, and around the time of the Founding, the terms were often used to describe the same conduct.)