Samt :)
"Interoperability and management of the Swedish TARAS-system compared with JTIDS/MIDS. The Swedish tactical radiosystem (TARAS) has a similar architecture from a technical point of view as the NATO system Joint Tactical Information Distribution System/Multifunctional Information Distribution System (JTIDS/MIDS). The prime service offered by JTIDS/MIDS is the tactical datalink Link 16. One purpose with this thesis is to describe similarities and dissimilarities between the two radio systems from a technical point of view. According to these similarities and dissimilarities this thesis studies whether there is any ability to adapt the TARAS-system to JTIDS/MIDS or not.
An adaptation which has the ultimate goal of interoperability between Swedish air and seaforces and NATO. Another purpose is to use the flagrant similarity between the systems regarding complexity, and consequently the demand to ensure the efficient and co-ordinated use of data links in any operational theatre cell as a basis for discussion on how a Swedish data link planning and management cell, supporting TARAS, should be organised. By using a selected nation’s, The United Kingdom’s, data link management cell as a basis for discussion it is examined if any conclusions can be drawn as to how a Swedish data link planning and management cell should be organised and working in the future. The issues regarding organisational level within the Swedish Armed Forces, major tasks and competency of the crew is examined. The conclusions in the thesis is that there is no interoperability between the two systems TARAS and JTIDS/MIDS.
Consequently, Sweden must leave the TARAS-system and adapt the JTIDS/MIDS-system if any interoperability at the highest level, between on the human level (brain-to-brain), is to be achieved. Regarding the data link planning and management cell, the only general conclusion that is possible to draw in the comparison with the U.K. cell is that the Swedish analogue should be organised in a joint way and within the framework of the organisation of the Air Component Commander’s organisation. When it comes to tasks and competency of the crew, the dissimilar philosophies for using the systems and the use of NCOs, a category that doesn’t exists in Sweden, makes further comparisons impossible. " The JTIDS uses 127 different frequency hopping patterns, the TARAS used up to 256.
Denna pdf brukade vara tillgänglig på annalindhbiblioteket.se
Har den här med:
Our Swedish Data-link updates every second, as compared to Link16 (every twelfth second) This makes it possible for us to fly 'radar silent' and even shoot its missiles from it without any own radar. And the data-link is able to steer you in, in every detail (close control) through its data commands. Which means that Gripen will be operational even with radio jammed.
"With the deployment of S-TADIL J , operational units will have three possible data link paths that can be used to support multi-ship data link coordinated operations. S-TADIL J supports the same levels of surveillance and weapon coordination data exchange provided by Link-11 and Link-16. The TADIL J message standard is implemented on S-TADIL J to provide for the same level of information content as Link-16."
And "Utilising time division architecture, Link 16 JUs have pre-assigned sets of multiple time slots in which to transmit their data and to receive data from other units. The time slots of a net can be parcelled out to one or more Network Participation Group (NPG), which are defined by operational function and by the types of messages that will be transmitted in it"
Och sen det här.
"Among the “major headaches” anticipated in this program, Huff said, is obtaining permission from the U.S. government to share JTRS technology with the MIDS partner countries.
He said the MIDS office is working with the Defense Department and the National Security Agency to figure out how the Europeans can participate in this program.
“For each software module, we have to seek NSA guidance to release information,” he said. “It’s very painful.”
Unlike the current MIDS, where the encryption chip is a piece of hardware, the JTRS is entirely software based. “In JTRS, we have reprogrammable [security] engines, keys, cryptographic algorithms, and code that is not releasable,” said Huff. “Somehow, we have to come up with a way to package it in an anti-tamper environment. NSA is working on this.”
Under a worst-case scenario, the allies would have to develop their own software and each partner would have to come up with compatible algorithms for interoperability, said Huff. “We really don’t want to do that. We want the United States to do the [security] work and find a way to provide it to them.”
Although, what that will have to do with defending my Sweden in case of a sudden attack beats me?
The best trained forces outside of Sweden.
The code keys stored in the States?
Tja, vad gör vi inte för att få leka med NATO? Detta hoppas jag dock har förändrats, 'öpna och slutna' nycklar (assymetrisk kryptering) är ingen nyhet på internet, titta på pgp och zimmerman för det. Att USA fann detta besvärligt påminner mig om detta.
"The author was involved in the import of many software based weapon systems while in Armscor in his youth. In each case South African software engineers controlled the software and made sure of the algorithm integrity. In each and every case the imported software was found to be incompetent”, but because of DoD policy in those days, the problem and above equation was recognised and South Africa kept control of the system software.
In the middle 90’s the author’s company sold a radar warning simulator to a European NATO member for their F16s. During the tests it was conclusively established that the F16 electronic warfare system was blind over half its intended frequency spectrum. It was operationally useless. When these aircraft were required for use in Bosnia, a US approved operation, the USAF issued “combat software” with the “latest upgrades”. After the deployment, the upgraded software was erased. This NATO country could then only use its aircraft in US approved operations and had in fact, no sovereignty."
From South African Army Journal 2008 issue 2.
Allt detta är diverse information jag fann på nätet när jag först skrev om den. Har också för mig att man kunde splitta TADILJ i tre olika slots för att updatera snabbare, så 12 delat med 3, var 4:de sekund? Å andra sidan, kan dom så kan nog vi med, eller?
Sen så är det så att all denna information finns, i alla fall har funnits, på nätet. Om nu någon ser detta som hemligt? Ibland verkar information 'tas bort', även där. Det gör den dock inte 'hemligare' än vad den en gång var, när den publicerades, av respektive intressenter.
