Filosofiska tankar angående detta citat.

Of course, social constructivism and the theory of representations have "things in common". I would like to explore Deriabin's suggestion in concrete terms. Yet, I am afraid I am not sufficiently well acquainted with the latest developments of this "trend" to tell what these "things in common" are. Let us leave aside its faddish aspects which are not negligible and his excommunication whose reasons are not clear. In my opinion, what constructionism rejects is easier to understand than what he proposes. Social constructionism presents itself in association with the linguistic turning-point as a new beginning. It claims to be a radical as everyone does today, just as Internet is presented as an upheaval in civilization, and so on. But calling one-self a radical does not make one be such, this is obvious. Among what one considers symptomatic of radicalism, the clearest is the rejection of positivism, empiricism, etc. The problem is that the more one looks at the arguments, the less sure this is. Personally, I find he has quite a lot of elements in common with positivism, f.i.:

logical empiricism grants the same exclusive prominence to language;
knowledge, one says, is a form of redescription. Now Meyerson's, Boltzmann's, Herz's criticism of positivism was precisely that is just wants to describe and refuses to explain. Thus positivism refused to explain the phenomena of heat by the motion of atoms;
there is no "truth": hence a theory is not "truer" than another and choosing one is a matter of power. Yet, Poincare made the same point in several books of his. He used to say that one theory is not truer than another, that one does not choose a theory because it is truer but because it is useful. And he was not the only one to say so.
Mach's relativism is grounded on the idea that there are no foundations, nothing "absolute". This prompted Einstein to say that Mach's relativism is good for destroying but not for constructing. Thus the tendency to think of truth as something that does not exist and ultimately as something that must not exist is a phenomena of the modern age. There is some reason to believe that this tendency first appeared in 19th century positivism. At the same time as the tendency to believe in the end if ideology or the end of metaphysics from which we should free ourselves. Which Rorty expressed when he said that "we should curse ourselves from our metaphysical needs". This is why I think that constructionism epistemologically assimilates many things that it rejects. Of course, when it mentions truth, foundation, etc., - the point must not be overlooked -, the connotations are negative, they are put between inverted commas. And this is interesting for our theory. Because the social representation of knowledge retains "truth" and "falseness", f.i. as basic cultural categories, just as the social representation of religion retains the categories of "sacred" and "profane". So somewhere it seems to be understood that constructionism is true, right, and the other points of view are false, wrong. Otherwise one would not grasp wherefrom he draws the certritude of being "radical", being in the right, while the others are not "radical" and, on top of that, are wrong.