Putin beordrar styrkor att gå in i Ukraina - INVASION NU (2022-02-24)

The third (and last) likely theater of operations for a major offensive by the RF Armed Forces is Zaporizhzhia.

From a theoretical standpoint, the offensive should be carried out there in any case, simultaneously with the strike from Belarus and/or the Russian border area. But it can also have independent significance or become the direction of the main blow (whereas all other actions will be distracting). The recent “toad jump” of units of the RF Armed Forces on a wide front closer to the main positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (as a result of which the troops came into direct combat contact with the enemy in his defensive positions) can be considered as a reduction of the ground before the attack (although there may not be an attack, naturally).

The closes targets of the offensive in this area should be the cities of Orekhov and Hulay-Pole, without which an attack on the city of Zaporizhzhia itself is unlikely due to the possibility of a strike into the flank and rear by the attacking AFU.

Among the “benefits” of this direction is the flat terrain, which can be successfully defended only by concentrating forces in large settlements. Among the disadvantages, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been creating lines of fortified strongholds at the forefront and in-depth throughout the year. And, in order to quickly break through the front, again, a lot of forces are required, concentrated in well-trained and reliably controlled units and formations. And again, I must note that an offensive here, too, will certainly lead to heavy losses in the ranks of the attackers (in manpower and equipment), and a huge consumption of ammunition. However, if successful, local encirclements and the defeat of units and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are possible, which will make the enemy worry about the rear of the Donetsk group. Will our generals be able to achieve such a result, we will soon find out (or we will not know if there is no offensive).

General conclusion: at the moment, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation DO NOT HAVE A SUPERIORITY OVER THE APU ANYWHERE, that would guarantee the success of a large-scale strategic offensive. It is possible (theoretically) to create only one “shock fist” in one of the above directions, using the rest as auxiliary ones. (Diverting and restricting attacks can continue, of course, on the Donetsk front).

But, in any case, a full-scale offensive battle will very quickly and inevitably lead to very large losses and the depletion of those resources that have been accumulated as a result of previous mobilisation and other preparatory actions. And, regardless of successes, it will not lead to the complete defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (precisely because of the lack of strategic reserves).

In any case, whether our military leaders decide to launch an offensive or wait for the spring “offensive” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this year, in order to hold the front, both the mobilisation of people and industry and the rear as a whole will inevitably be required. And the longer our military-political leadership (embarrassed by the uncertainty of the consequences of these measures in the socio-political and socio-economic spheres) delays with them, the less chance we will have of a military defeat of Ukraine until the moment when “dear Western partners” decide to enter the war themselves, convinced of the mutual exhaustion of the opponents’ forces.

At the moment, based on the statements of Peskov and other clowns in power, it seems that until a new major defeat happens (whether on the offensive or on the defensive), no one in the Kremlin will do anything, letting everything “take its own course”.