Citat:
Jag laddade ner Robinson-artikeln nu. Dess beskrivning av vad som hände i Donbass är mycket intressant, den bryter mot "trådsanningen" här, att Ryssland invaderade Donbass med Strelkov och ryska armén.
"March–July 2014
From the moment that the uprising in Donbass began in spring 2014, some commen- tators (e.g. Wilson, 2014, p. 129) claimed that the rebellion was organised not by local Ukrainians but by members of the Russian Army and secret services. However, films taken by Western journalists (e.g. Vice News, 2014a , 2014b) of seizures of government buildings show a very different story, as do accounts by various Western observers (e.g. Gessen, 2014), and accounts by Ukrainian participants (e.g. Regnum Informatsionnoe Agentstvo, 2014). These make it clear that the uprising was, as Kudelia (2014, p. 1) says, ‘primarily a homegrown phenomenon.’ A vast plethora of militias appeared, as separate leaders established power over their own zones of operations. The result was a chaotic situation over which nobody, let alone the Russian government, had any control.
It is true that some Russian citizens participated in the initial uprising, most notably 52 Russians under the command of Igor Strelkov who helped to seize buildings in the towns of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. Despite allegations that he was acting on behalf of the Russian intelligence services, Strelkov himself claims that he came to Ukraine in response to an appeal from Donbass activists. According to Strelkov, the Russian intelligence ser- vices may have been aware of his plans and did nothing to stop him, but he did not carry his actions out under their instructions (Prokhanov & Strelkov, 2014).
Rather than instigate rebellion, Moscow tried to calm matters down. In May 2014, Putin asked that the anti-government forces postpone the referendums they had proposed (Traynor et al., 2014). After the referendums went ahead anyway, and the newly pro- claimed DPR and LPR requested that Russia annex them, the Russian government refused (Sakwa, 2015, p. 209). Subsequently, when Ukraine’s newly elected president, Petro Poroshenko, declared a ceasefire in June 2014, Moscow persuaded the then head of the DPR, Aleksandr Borodai, to abide by the ceasefire and participate in the promised peace talks, despite Borodai’s initial refusal to do so.
No worthwhile evidence has ever been produced showing that units of the Russian Army were in Donbass in the early stages of the conflict. The overwhelming majority of rebel fighters have always been Ukrainian citizens. As Mark Franchetti of The Sunday Times, who accompanied the rebel Vostok Battalion, reported on Ukrainian television, ‘Most of the people in the self-defence forces are from Donbass and the surrounding area. A small percentage is volunteers from Russia’ (Babiy, 2014).
With time, the complement of these volunteers grew. In August 2014, the leader of the DPR, Aleksandr Zakharchenko, estimated their number as 3000–4000 (TASS, 2014). A report based on materials collected by the murdered Russian politician Boris Nemtsov claimed that, ‘The transfer of Russian “volunteers” onto Ukrainian territory has in part been organised with the direct participation of the Russian authorities’ (Yashin & Shorina, 2015, p. 25), and that, ‘Money to pay the fighters is provided by Russian oundations, which are funded with the active support of the Russian authorities’ (Yashin & Shorina, 2015, p. 26). However, little evidence has been provided to support these alle- gations. Various private organisations recruited the majority of the volunteers, and those involved tell a different story to that provided by the Nemtsov report. As one volun- teer organiser, Vladimir Yefimov, said, ‘We get help, for everything except for the salaries, from volunteers and activists. ... [the government] doesn’t help at all’ (Rupert, 2014). ‘The Russian government has hindered us more than anything,’ said Yefimov on another occasion (Roth, 2015, p. 23).
In fact, some volunteers hold extremist political views which are sharply at variance with those of the Kremlin. For instance, Strelkov is a monarchist who associated with radical nationalists such as the head of the Russian General Military Union, Igor Ivanov, whom he appointed chief of the DPR Army’s Political Department. In a letter to a newspa- per in summer 2014, Ivanov (2014) attacked Vladimir Putin, saying ‘Putin is not a traitor of national Russia ... he is simply its ancient enemy.’ The presence of people like Strelkov and Ivanov in high positions in the rebel leadership was indicative of the lack of control Moscow had over the rebellion in its first few months.
The evidence also suggests that at the early stage of the conflict, the rebel militias sup- plied themselves almost entirely by capturing weapons and ammunition from the Ukrai- nian army and security services. While commanding the rebels at Slavyansk, Strelkov regularly complained that he was not receiving support from Russia (e.g. Korrespon- dent.net, 2014). According to the Nemtsov report, ‘the separatists seized 23 tanks, 56 BMPs and BMDs, 26 BTRs [boevye machiny pekhoty, boevye machiny desanta, and brone- transportery, various types of armoured personnel carriers], 19 SPGs [self-propelled guns], 17 towed guns, 2 AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] pieces from the Ukrainian armed forces’ (Yashin & Shorina, 2015, p. 41). ...
"
Dvs: Ryssland som stat var reaktiva. De drogs in i kriget i Donbass. Läs resten i artikeln.
"March–July 2014
From the moment that the uprising in Donbass began in spring 2014, some commen- tators (e.g. Wilson, 2014, p. 129) claimed that the rebellion was organised not by local Ukrainians but by members of the Russian Army and secret services. However, films taken by Western journalists (e.g. Vice News, 2014a , 2014b) of seizures of government buildings show a very different story, as do accounts by various Western observers (e.g. Gessen, 2014), and accounts by Ukrainian participants (e.g. Regnum Informatsionnoe Agentstvo, 2014). These make it clear that the uprising was, as Kudelia (2014, p. 1) says, ‘primarily a homegrown phenomenon.’ A vast plethora of militias appeared, as separate leaders established power over their own zones of operations. The result was a chaotic situation over which nobody, let alone the Russian government, had any control.
It is true that some Russian citizens participated in the initial uprising, most notably 52 Russians under the command of Igor Strelkov who helped to seize buildings in the towns of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. Despite allegations that he was acting on behalf of the Russian intelligence services, Strelkov himself claims that he came to Ukraine in response to an appeal from Donbass activists. According to Strelkov, the Russian intelligence ser- vices may have been aware of his plans and did nothing to stop him, but he did not carry his actions out under their instructions (Prokhanov & Strelkov, 2014).
Rather than instigate rebellion, Moscow tried to calm matters down. In May 2014, Putin asked that the anti-government forces postpone the referendums they had proposed (Traynor et al., 2014). After the referendums went ahead anyway, and the newly pro- claimed DPR and LPR requested that Russia annex them, the Russian government refused (Sakwa, 2015, p. 209). Subsequently, when Ukraine’s newly elected president, Petro Poroshenko, declared a ceasefire in June 2014, Moscow persuaded the then head of the DPR, Aleksandr Borodai, to abide by the ceasefire and participate in the promised peace talks, despite Borodai’s initial refusal to do so.
No worthwhile evidence has ever been produced showing that units of the Russian Army were in Donbass in the early stages of the conflict. The overwhelming majority of rebel fighters have always been Ukrainian citizens. As Mark Franchetti of The Sunday Times, who accompanied the rebel Vostok Battalion, reported on Ukrainian television, ‘Most of the people in the self-defence forces are from Donbass and the surrounding area. A small percentage is volunteers from Russia’ (Babiy, 2014).
With time, the complement of these volunteers grew. In August 2014, the leader of the DPR, Aleksandr Zakharchenko, estimated their number as 3000–4000 (TASS, 2014). A report based on materials collected by the murdered Russian politician Boris Nemtsov claimed that, ‘The transfer of Russian “volunteers” onto Ukrainian territory has in part been organised with the direct participation of the Russian authorities’ (Yashin & Shorina, 2015, p. 25), and that, ‘Money to pay the fighters is provided by Russian oundations, which are funded with the active support of the Russian authorities’ (Yashin & Shorina, 2015, p. 26). However, little evidence has been provided to support these alle- gations. Various private organisations recruited the majority of the volunteers, and those involved tell a different story to that provided by the Nemtsov report. As one volun- teer organiser, Vladimir Yefimov, said, ‘We get help, for everything except for the salaries, from volunteers and activists. ... [the government] doesn’t help at all’ (Rupert, 2014). ‘The Russian government has hindered us more than anything,’ said Yefimov on another occasion (Roth, 2015, p. 23).
In fact, some volunteers hold extremist political views which are sharply at variance with those of the Kremlin. For instance, Strelkov is a monarchist who associated with radical nationalists such as the head of the Russian General Military Union, Igor Ivanov, whom he appointed chief of the DPR Army’s Political Department. In a letter to a newspa- per in summer 2014, Ivanov (2014) attacked Vladimir Putin, saying ‘Putin is not a traitor of national Russia ... he is simply its ancient enemy.’ The presence of people like Strelkov and Ivanov in high positions in the rebel leadership was indicative of the lack of control Moscow had over the rebellion in its first few months.
The evidence also suggests that at the early stage of the conflict, the rebel militias sup- plied themselves almost entirely by capturing weapons and ammunition from the Ukrai- nian army and security services. While commanding the rebels at Slavyansk, Strelkov regularly complained that he was not receiving support from Russia (e.g. Korrespon- dent.net, 2014). According to the Nemtsov report, ‘the separatists seized 23 tanks, 56 BMPs and BMDs, 26 BTRs [boevye machiny pekhoty, boevye machiny desanta, and brone- transportery, various types of armoured personnel carriers], 19 SPGs [self-propelled guns], 17 towed guns, 2 AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] pieces from the Ukrainian armed forces’ (Yashin & Shorina, 2015, p. 41). ...
"
Dvs: Ryssland som stat var reaktiva. De drogs in i kriget i Donbass. Läs resten i artikeln.
De har velat kontrollera Ukraina som kontrollerat Vitryssland, delvis genom allmän korruption och tidigare relationer med nyckelfigurer såsom Yanukovich, när de insåg att inflytandet började minska så utnyttjade de missnöjet i Donbass, genom att starta en konflikt där och invadera Krim. Detta är inte reaktivt, Ryssarna har hållt på i decennier
Helt ärligt jävligt trött på dina relativiserande berättelser och A4
r för att ursäkta rysslands invasion.
Citat:
Samt att överste orchen vill ha en propagandaseger inför årsdagen för sin lilla specialoperation. Något att visa upp till de hjärntvättade massorna på hemmaplan (och vissa sågspån här i tråden också)."RUSSIA STRONGK!"
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