Vet inte om studien från Yale redan har länkats i tråden:
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- Sidorna 50-51 beskriver hur all rysk industriproduktion har rasat, trots Putins försäkranden om import-substitution.
- En annan viktig poäng är Ryssland är mycket mer beroende av sina import- och exportpartners än vice versa. T.ex. säljer Ryssland 85% av sin gas till EU, men EU köper bara drygt 40% från Ryssland. Likaså är Kinas export till Ryssland liten (eftersom storleken på den ryska ekonomin är som Skandinavien!) men Rysslands import från Kina är helt dominerande.
- Att med bakgrund av allt som nämns nedan tro att Ryssland tjänar på sanktionerna är så verklighetsfrånvänt att jag betvivlar att ens de som skriver det tror på det.
Sammanfattning av studien:
Russia’s strategic positioning as a commodities exporter has irrevocably deteriorated, as it now deals from a position of weakness with the loss of its erstwhile main markets, and faces steep challenges executing a “pivot to Asia” with non-fungible exports such as piped gas – as we explain further in Section II of this paper.
- Despite some lingering supply chain leakiness, Russian imports have largely collapsed, and the country faces stark challenges securing crucial inputs, parts, and technology from hesitant trade partners, leading to widespread supply shortages within its domestic economy – as we explain further in Section III of this paper.
- Despite Putin’s delusions of self-sufficiency and import substitution, Russian domestic production has come to a complete standstill with no capacity to replace lost businesses, products and talent; the hollowing out of Russia’s domestic innovation and production base has led to soaring prices and consumer angst – as we explain further in Section IV of this paper.
- As a result of the business retreat, Russia has lost companies representing ~40% of its GDP, reversing nearly all of three decades’ worth of foreign investment and buttressing unprecedented simultaneous capital and population flight in a mass exodus of Russia’s economic base – as we explain further in Section V of this paper.
- Putin is resorting to patently unsustainable, dramatic fiscal and monetary intervention to smooth over these structural economic weaknesses, which has already sent his government budget into deficit for the first time in years and drained his foreign reserves even with high energy prices – and Kremlin finances are in much, much more dire straits than conventionally understood – as we explain further in Section VI of this paper.
- Russian domestic financial markets, as an indicator of both present conditions and future outlook, are the worst performing markets in the entire world this year despite strict capital controls, and have priced in sustained, persistent weakness within the economy with liquidity and credit contracting – in addition to Russia being substantively cut off from international financial markets, limiting its ability to tap into pools of capital needed for the revitalization of its crippled economy – as we explain further in Section VII of this paper.
- Looking ahead, there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia – as we explain further in Section VIII of this paper.
