Evergrande I Kina kan gå i konkurs (300 miljarder dollar)

Den grundläggande anledningen till att några av våra kamrater har vaga ideal och skakade övertygelser är att den historiska materialismens åsikter inte är starka. Det är nödvändigt att utbilda och vägleda de breda massorna av partimedlemmar och kadrer för att förena praktiken av socialismens gemensamma ideal med kinesiska särdrag och fastheten i kommunismens höga ideal, för att vara from, uthållig, pålitlig och djupgående. Med fasta ideal och övertygelser kommer du att stå längre, vidga din horisont och bredda ditt hjärta. Du kan hålla dig till rätt politisk riktning, inte vara stolt eller otålig i tider av seger och välstånd, och inte sjunka eller vackla i svårigheter och motgångar. Tål testet av olika risker och svårigheter, motstå medvetet erosionen av olika dekadenta idéer och behåll alltid kommunisternas politiska kvaliteter.

Vårt parti har fortsatt att utgå från de nationella förhållandena i vårt land och utforska och integrera i de olika historiska perioderna av revolution, konstruktion och reformer.

Det är en omfattande konstruktion av ett välbärgat samhälle. Det är enda sättet att påskynda socialistisk modernisering och inse den kinesiska nationens stora föryngring. Så länge vi insisterar på att gå vår egen väg oberoende och obevekligt fortsätta att utvecklar socialism med kinesiska särdrag, kommer vi att kunna bygga upp ett välbärgat samhälle i alla avseenden genom 100-årsjubileet för grundandet av Kinas kommunistiska parti, och vi kommer säkert att kunna bygga upp en välmående, stark och demokratisk civilisation under 100 -årsjubileet för grundandet av Folkrepubliken Kina, ett harmoniskt socialistiskt modernt land.

The views expressed in these pages are far from unified, either in their diagnosis of what precisely
China’s state capitalist system is or in their prognosis for how the United States and other market
economies should respond. Some contributors, such as Arthur Kroeber, argue that the term “state
capitalism” might itself be inapposite given the variety of actors—government, party, and private—that
play important roles in China’s economy. While some, including the present author, believe that the
transformations to China’s political-economic system over the past decade are significant enough that
they represent a new paradigm of Chinese state capitalism, others, including Wendy Leutert and Sarah
Eaton, argue that when it comes to the role of state-owned enterprises, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s
approach is “surprisingly consistent” with his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao. As Scott Kennedy
argues in the final contribution to this edited volume, there remain critical, even fundamental, debates
that have yet to be resolved about how to understand and respond to Chinese state capitalism; until
some form of basic agreement is achieved, policy responses will remain only partially effective.

One area of consensus throughout this edited volume, however, is that the CCP wields expanding
de facto and de jure power over nearly all areas of political and economic activity in China. This is
a development with a clear demarcation in 2012, which saw the accession to power of Xi Jinping.
While the country has been under the unchallenged rule of the CCP since its founding in 1949, the
functional role and organizational strength of the CCP has undulated over this 70-plus-year period,
most notably regarding its direct involvement in the economy. During the “reform and opening
up” period, the party remained the sole political authority but yielded regulatory authority to the
government (the State Council) and remained focused on political and ideological tasks. This is no
longer the case. The Party, as Xi Jinping has repeatedly reminded us, is at the very core of all domestic
activities, and Xi himself now stands unchallenged at the core of all major decisionmaking.


It is this feature of China’s state capitalist system—the expansive and expanding role of the CCP—that
poses the most significant challenges not only in how the workings and structure of China’s economy
are understood, but also in how market economies can and should respond. This volume does not
conclusively resolve this critical dilemma, but the authors hope that it can help further a much-needed
discussion with careful and considered analysis.

Democracy and markets both provide feedback mechanisms that signal when governments or firms are on the wrong path, allowing corrective action to take place. Once a CCP policy becomes entrenched – such as the one-child policy, or environmentally destructive economic practices, or overinvestment in infrastructure and excessive reliance upon debt – feedback signals are too muted and mechanisms of accountability too weak to ensure a change in course. These shortcomings partly explain why so few of the economic reforms approved at the 18th Communist Party Congress of 2012 have actually been implemented thus far.