Report by Grayston Lynch of the Central Intelligence AgencyUDT=Underwater Demolishion Team
Washington, May 4, 1961.
//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Lynch prepared the report for the investigative committee chaired by General Taylor.
AFTER ACTION REPORT ON OPERATION
....
2. Plan For Blue Beach:
....
The reconnaissance of the beach itself and the marking of the landing sites was to be conducted by the UDT, teams that had been especially trained for this job for the last four months. There were three of these teams: one three-man team in the Barbara J. for Red Beach, one five-man team for Blue Beach, and one three-man team for Green Beach were aboard the Blagar. They were to land as soon as the LCI's arrived in the landing areas and while the LCVP's and small boats were loading the troops.
"White Star teams continued to deploy and rotate in and out of Laos. In 1961 the Special Forces initial A team entry and buildup began in South Vietnam. Our SF troops in Laos rotated in and out of the country for the next ten years. I do not know when the end of Operation White Star was declared.(Det kan således vara dags att starta upp din favorit webläsare och gåggla lite)
"White Star teams continued to deploy and rotate in and out of Laos. In 1961 the Special Forces initial A team entry and buildup began in South Vietnam. Our SF troops in Laos rotated in and out of the country for the next ten years. I do not know when the end of Operation White Star was declared.(Det kan således vara dags att starta upp din favorit webläsare och gåggla lite)
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Washington, February 14, 1963, 3:56 p.m.
"Assistant Secretary Harriman called in Soviet Ambassador Feb 13 to make oral statement on Laos. He informed Ambassador his remarks amplified what President had said to Mikoyan and contained comments on Soviet statements.
As President told Mikoyan large numbers of Vietminh remain in Laos. These are in excess of 2,000.
...
North Vietnamese have also been using Laos to interfere in South Vietnam contrary to Geneva agreements."
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, March 29, 1963
8. North Vietnam serves as a primary logistics base for the Pathet Lao forces, and continues to provide significant cadre support to the Pathet Lao military units.
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Washington, February 14, 1963, 3:56 p.m.
"Assistant Secretary Harriman called in Soviet Ambassador Feb 13 to make oral statement on Laos. He informed Ambassador his remarks amplified what President had said to Mikoyan and contained comments on Soviet statements.
As President told Mikoyan large numbers of Vietminh remain in Laos. These are in excess of 2,000.
...
North Vietnamese have also been using Laos to interfere in South Vietnam contrary to Geneva agreements."
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, March 29, 1963
8. North Vietnam serves as a primary logistics base for the Pathet Lao forces, and continues to provide significant cadre support to the Pathet Lao military units.
Summary Record of the 512th National Security Council Meeting
Washington, April 20, 1963, 11:10 a.m.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS
The President requested that a study be made for his consideration next week of feasible military actions to be taken against the northern Vietnamese.
The President asked whether we should talk to the Thais about U.S. ground forces coming into Thailand now.
The President asked why we need to follow such a careful policy toward Cuba in view of the fact that the Russians appear to be prepared to see the Geneva Accords destroyed. He approved the proposed U–2 flights over the supply routes in North Vietnam. He agreed that we should be prepared to move U.S. air forces in Thailand, but suggested that we consult the Thais about our plans only after we know Khrushchev's views concerning the current situation in Laos.
The President commented that with the prisoners out of Cuba, we might be in a position to act against Cuba if Khrushchev made no move to halt the deterioration in Laos. He asked what action we could take against Cuba.
a. Placement of 75mm and 57mm weapons in Meo position within range of Khang Khay and Ban Lieng (Sinkapo's hqs). Plan was to divert pressure on Kong Le by shelling. However Meos now under instructions not to fire until further authorization received.
Summary Record of the 512th National Security Council Meeting
Washington, April 20, 1963, 11:10 a.m.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS
The President requested that a study be made for his consideration next week of feasible military actions to be taken against the northern Vietnamese.
The President asked whether we should talk to the Thais about U.S. ground forces coming into Thailand now.
The President asked why we need to follow such a careful policy toward Cuba in view of the fact that the Russians appear to be prepared to see the Geneva Accords destroyed. He approved the proposed U–2 flights over the supply routes in North Vietnam. He agreed that we should be prepared to move U.S. air forces in Thailand, but suggested that we consult the Thais about our plans only after we know Khrushchev's views concerning the current situation in Laos.
a. Placement of 75mm and 57mm weapons in Meo position within range of Khang Khay and Ban Lieng (Sinkapo's hqs). Plan was to divert pressure on Kong Le by shelling. However Meos now under instructions not to fire until further authorization received.
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