https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/108840/#:~:text=Dec%2025%20%28Interfax%29%20-%20Russian%20GDP%20could%20grow,%22Investment%20wi ll%20grow%20 about%202%25%20compared%20to%202024.
Ryssland väntas växa runt 2-2,5% nästa år. Fortsatt brist på arbetskraft vilket tvingar upp lönerna för arbetare. En längre genomgång finns här, skrivet av judiska propagandasiten MEMRI som tydligen även har personal för att studera Ryssland.
https://www.memri.org/reports/russias-economic-prospects-2025-and-beyond
Texten är skriven av nån väldigt antagonistisk till Ryssland men är rätt så intressant ändå.
Ryssland kommer fortsätta växa ekonomiskt. Den där krisen som tråden är besatt av är om den kommer åtskilliga år bort.
Ryssland väntas växa runt 2-2,5% nästa år. Fortsatt brist på arbetskraft vilket tvingar upp lönerna för arbetare. En längre genomgång finns här, skrivet av judiska propagandasiten MEMRI som tydligen även har personal för att studera Ryssland.
https://www.memri.org/reports/russias-economic-prospects-2025-and-beyond
Texten är skriven av nån väldigt antagonistisk till Ryssland men är rätt så intressant ändå.
Citat:
The most important point here is that the Kremlin now sincerely believes that the economic vulnerability has, if not completely ended, declined to a level at which it can be simply ignored. For the second year in a row, the federal revenues exceed expectations,[4] and for the first time the Finance Ministry ventured to propose a deficit-free budget. In the past it had featured a 0.5 percent GDP shortage,[5] but the people in the government call it "structurally deficit free," whatever that means.[6] This shift, I would argue, reflects the fact that the Russian economy is now thought to be able to produce almost any amount of government revenue that might be needed for Russian President Vladimir Putin's war efforts ...
However, these days, the Kremlin targets the elites and the upper strata of the middle class as well as all Russian businesses since it believes they are earning too much. Such an approach has its logic; in 2023, the combined profits of Russian businesses adjusted by subtracting their combined losses, hit an all-time high of 33.4 trillion rubles, or roughly 20 percent of GDP.[11]
The real wages, on their part, are expected to rise in 2024 by 9.2 percent,[12] a pace unseen since the early 2000s. Putin, as one may see, now believes that the wealthy should share their wealth with the state – and so, I would say, sends a clear signal that the Russian economy is working not so much for the benefit of the people but for that of the state ...
Many experts question the very possibility of a new period of expansion, citing the extra high interest rates and increasing inflation, but I want to focus on a quite important issue: In Russia, high rates will for sure demotivate individual borrowers from getting mortgages or consumer loans, but they might affect business much less. In recent years, the government has adopted dozens of subsidized loan programs for small businesses, agricultural companies, hi-tech enterprises, and, of course, for armaments producers and state-controlled corporations. Until the beginning of 2022, the Russian banks issued around five trillion rubles in such subsidized loans,[18] not to mention more than six trillion rubles disbursed through subsidized mortgage plans since 2020.[19] Moreover, the Russian mid-sized and small business has been relying for years on "organic" growth, as its profits were the most important source for new investment. In all these cases, business is not hurt too much by the growing interest rates, but may benefit from the increasing prices for its products. What we see these days is, I would repeat, an adjustment to new foreign trade practices, to new price dynamics, to changing cost of credit, etc. – but at the same time the aggregate domestic demand shows no signs of declining. Moreover, the bank deposits of both Russian citizens and Russian corporate entities are growing, with the former advancing at record pace, increasing by an incredible 54 percent from early 2022 to more than 57 trillion rubles ...
What should be emphasized here is reversal of a long-time trend that had led to a decrease of labor's share in the Russian GDP. While in the early 2000s it averaged around 48-50 percent, it has been declining steadily since then, hitting an all-time low of 38.8 percent in 2021.[23] Now, with fierce competition for employees, the workers may dictate their conditions to the businesspeople, and the trend of growing labor compensation looks quite serious.
By the end of this year, the labor share in GDP may exceed 42 percent, and, probably, it may be back to 48 percent in 2027-2028. This change may have a fundamental impact on the Russian economy since together with the growing autarky it would significantly increase the domestic demand for consumer goods and services and keep the Russian economy growing even if the war stops and some kind of armistice, if not a peace treaty, is brokered. The growth in ordinary workers' income looks like a trend unseen since the 2000s and it has a tremendous influence on the popular acceptance of Putin's "war economy."
However, these days, the Kremlin targets the elites and the upper strata of the middle class as well as all Russian businesses since it believes they are earning too much. Such an approach has its logic; in 2023, the combined profits of Russian businesses adjusted by subtracting their combined losses, hit an all-time high of 33.4 trillion rubles, or roughly 20 percent of GDP.[11]
The real wages, on their part, are expected to rise in 2024 by 9.2 percent,[12] a pace unseen since the early 2000s. Putin, as one may see, now believes that the wealthy should share their wealth with the state – and so, I would say, sends a clear signal that the Russian economy is working not so much for the benefit of the people but for that of the state ...
Many experts question the very possibility of a new period of expansion, citing the extra high interest rates and increasing inflation, but I want to focus on a quite important issue: In Russia, high rates will for sure demotivate individual borrowers from getting mortgages or consumer loans, but they might affect business much less. In recent years, the government has adopted dozens of subsidized loan programs for small businesses, agricultural companies, hi-tech enterprises, and, of course, for armaments producers and state-controlled corporations. Until the beginning of 2022, the Russian banks issued around five trillion rubles in such subsidized loans,[18] not to mention more than six trillion rubles disbursed through subsidized mortgage plans since 2020.[19] Moreover, the Russian mid-sized and small business has been relying for years on "organic" growth, as its profits were the most important source for new investment. In all these cases, business is not hurt too much by the growing interest rates, but may benefit from the increasing prices for its products. What we see these days is, I would repeat, an adjustment to new foreign trade practices, to new price dynamics, to changing cost of credit, etc. – but at the same time the aggregate domestic demand shows no signs of declining. Moreover, the bank deposits of both Russian citizens and Russian corporate entities are growing, with the former advancing at record pace, increasing by an incredible 54 percent from early 2022 to more than 57 trillion rubles ...
What should be emphasized here is reversal of a long-time trend that had led to a decrease of labor's share in the Russian GDP. While in the early 2000s it averaged around 48-50 percent, it has been declining steadily since then, hitting an all-time low of 38.8 percent in 2021.[23] Now, with fierce competition for employees, the workers may dictate their conditions to the businesspeople, and the trend of growing labor compensation looks quite serious.
By the end of this year, the labor share in GDP may exceed 42 percent, and, probably, it may be back to 48 percent in 2027-2028. This change may have a fundamental impact on the Russian economy since together with the growing autarky it would significantly increase the domestic demand for consumer goods and services and keep the Russian economy growing even if the war stops and some kind of armistice, if not a peace treaty, is brokered. The growth in ordinary workers' income looks like a trend unseen since the 2000s and it has a tremendous influence on the popular acceptance of Putin's "war economy."
Ryssland kommer fortsätta växa ekonomiskt. Den där krisen som tråden är besatt av är om den kommer åtskilliga år bort.
