The Kursk operation may partly serve to further expose the myth of Russia's so-called "red lines," according to an article in Foreign Policy.
In the past, there was intense debate in Washington, Berlin, and the media about possible "red lines" that, if crossed, could trigger a Third World War or nuclear conflict with Russia. One such line was the use of Western weapons to bring the conflict onto Russian territory. However, this has already occurred, writes Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Relations. He argues that the Kursk operation demonstrates the fallacy of these "red lines."
Umland points out that this operation showcases Ukraine's ability to execute unexpected and sudden breakthroughs—something Russia has consistently failed to achieve since the war began. He suggests that Ukraine's strategy may be shifting not just the military dynamics on the ground but also the framework for negotiations—from a "land for peace" agreement to a "land for land" agreement.
This situation, according to Umland, places Putin in a difficult position: losing control over Russian territory is a significant embarrassment for the Kremlin. However, the occupied Ukrainian regions that Putin aims to retain are also part of the "state territory" he is obligated to protect.
Umland concludes that Ukraine's new strategy might enable the "doves" within the Russian leadership—if they exist and have any influence over Putin—to argue for the cancellation of the annexation of these territories to restore Russia's territorial integrity. As long as Ukraine can control Russian territories, there will be mounting pressure on Putin to bring them back under Moscow's control.
https://t.me/United24media/24203
In the past, there was intense debate in Washington, Berlin, and the media about possible "red lines" that, if crossed, could trigger a Third World War or nuclear conflict with Russia. One such line was the use of Western weapons to bring the conflict onto Russian territory. However, this has already occurred, writes Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Relations. He argues that the Kursk operation demonstrates the fallacy of these "red lines."
Umland points out that this operation showcases Ukraine's ability to execute unexpected and sudden breakthroughs—something Russia has consistently failed to achieve since the war began. He suggests that Ukraine's strategy may be shifting not just the military dynamics on the ground but also the framework for negotiations—from a "land for peace" agreement to a "land for land" agreement.
This situation, according to Umland, places Putin in a difficult position: losing control over Russian territory is a significant embarrassment for the Kremlin. However, the occupied Ukrainian regions that Putin aims to retain are also part of the "state territory" he is obligated to protect.
Umland concludes that Ukraine's new strategy might enable the "doves" within the Russian leadership—if they exist and have any influence over Putin—to argue for the cancellation of the annexation of these territories to restore Russia's territorial integrity. As long as Ukraine can control Russian territories, there will be mounting pressure on Putin to bring them back under Moscow's control.
https://t.me/United24media/24203
