Citat:
Ursprungligen postat av
torppet
Nej, det går nu inte. Rysslands kärnvapen används bara om de blir anfallna. Det kan inte Putin eller någon annan bestämma. Men... det kan Joe Biden göra - trycka på knappen och vips har vi kärnvapen över oss alla. Problemet med kärnvapnen är att Ryssland har luftvärnsskydd mot dem. Så när USA skickar NUKS så träffar ryssarna dem och de kanske exploderar var som helst uppe i luften ovanför Europa och så dalar det ner radioaktiv sörja som alla dör av. Ja, utom Kina och stora delar av Ryssland. Men hela Europa brinner upp och en stor del av Amerika, för ryssarna besvarade och sköt sina laddningar som skydd mot USAs laddningar.
Lilla torppet. Ändringar i ryssens doktrin när det gäller kärnvapen är på väg att ske.
Citat:
On February 19, Vladimir Putin launched an exercise involving Russian strategic forces. On February 24—the day Putin invaded Ukraine—he warned that Russia would respond immediately to those who stood in its way, with consequences that “will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”
...
In June 2020, Putin signed a decree—the Basic Principles of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Domain of Nuclear Deterrence—that specifies two conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons. The first is unsurprising: “The Russian Federation retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies…” But that sentence ends with an unusual statement: “… and also in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is put under threat” [emphasis added].
...
The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review ascribed to Russia the view that “the threat of nuclear escalation or even first use of nuclear weapons would serve to de-escalate a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.” Russian military theorists have certainly discussed this idea of “escalating to de-escalate,” though whether it is a part of Russian doctrine is disputed among students of Russian strategy. “Escalating to de-escalate” in a war with NATO would run the serious risk of escalation rather than de-escalation. In a local war with a non-nuclear adversary, however, the small-scale tactical use of nuclear weapons might be a serious temptation, especially if the war were not going according to plan. In short, the impulse to escalate in a tight corner could be strong.
https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/read-the-fine-print-russias-nuclear-weapon-use-policy/
För att inte tala om följande:
Citat:
The Kremlin implemented the first changes to its nuclear policy in the 1993 military doctrine, which eliminated mention of the “no first use” policy that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union.
...
In 2020, the Kremlin published its first declassified nuclear doctrine (as opposed to military doctrine), which made explicit two additional factors that could provoke a Russian nuclear response. This document lists four scenarios for nuclear employment:
1) Receipt of reliable data about the launch of ballistic missiles against Russia or its allies
2) Use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) against Russia or its allies
3) Attacks against Russian nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure
4) Aggression against Russia with conventional weapons that threatens “the very existence” of the Russian state
Angrepp gällande ovan punkterna 3 och 4 har redan skett från ukrainskt håll. Ännu ingen reaktion från ryssen. Men jag fortsätter med artikeln.
Eller som putte själv sade 2022:
Citat:
As Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border, Vladimir Putin issued the first of many implicit threats against direct NATO intervention in the conflict: “I would now like to say something very important for those who may be tempted to interfere in these developments from the outside. No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”
Mhmh. Vilka konsekvenser? Bara snack, ingen verkstad.
Men jag fortsätter:
Citat:
A November New York Times article reported that Russian military leaders discussed the conditions for nuclear employment in October, although these conversations did not involve President Putin.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-calibration-war-ukraine
Orkar inte citera mer. Läs själva, bitte.