Jag vet inte så mycket om Dugin eller hans ideologi. Men Ezzelino hade länkat till detta i en annan tråd:
http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:CrzYkoVRSfQJ:www.ciaonet.org/wps/duj01/duj01.pdf+dugin+geopolitics&hl=sv&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl= se&client=firefox-a
Citat:
The Moscow-Teheran Axis
The most ambitious and complex part of Dugin’s program concerns the South, where the
focal point is a Moscow-Teheran axis. “The idea of a continental Russian-Islamic alliance,” he
writes, “lies at the foundation of anti-Atlanticist strategy… [T]his alliance is based on the
traditional character of Russian and Islamic civilization…” (p. 158). “On the whole,” he
continues, “the entire Islamic zone represents a naturally friendly geopolitical reality in relation
to the Eurasian Empire, since the Islamic tradition … fully understands the spiritual
incompatibility of America and religion. The Atlanticists themselves see the Islamic world, on
the whole, as their potential opponent” (p. 239).
As the result of an especially broad Grand Alliance to be concluded with Iran, Eurasia-
Russia, Dugin maintains, will enjoy the prospect of realizing a centuries-old Russian dream and
finally reaching the “warm seas” of the Indian Ocean. “In relation to the South,” he writes, “the
‘geopolitical axis of history’ [Russia] has only one imperative – geopolitical expansion to the
shores of the Indian Ocean” (p. 341). “Having received geopolitical access – in the first place,
naval bases – on the Iranian shores,” he writes, “Eurasia will enjoy full security from the strategy
of the ‘Anaconda ring’…” (p. 241). Eurasia-Russia and the Empire of Iran, he emphasizes, will
have “one and the same geopolitical tendency…” (p. 242).
As a consequence of this Grand Alliance, Eurasia-Russia, Dugin asserts, should be
prepared to divide up the imperial spoils with “the Islamic Empire in the South” (p. 239). After asking the question “What is the Russian South?” Dugin answers that it includes “the Caucasus
[all of it]”; “the eastern and northern shores of the Caspian (the territories of Kazakhstan and
Turkmeniya)”; “Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgiziya and Tajikistan”;
plus “Mongolia” (already discussed). Even these regions, he notes, should be seen “as zones of
further geopolitical expansion to the south and not as ‘eternal borders of Russia’” (p. 343).
“Control over the Caucasus,” Dugin notes at one point in the book, “opens … an exit to the
‘warm seas’…” (p. 349).
The extensive stretch of territory lying to the south of the Russian Federation is, thus, to
be divvied up with a future Iranian Empire and, it emerges, with Armenia as well. “A special
geopolitical role,” Dugin writes, “is played by Armenia, which is a traditional and reliable ally of
Russia in the Caucasus. Armenia will serve as a most important strategic base in the thwarting
of Turkish aggression to the north and to the east…” It is necessary, therefore, he maintains, to
create “the [subsidiary] axis Moscow-Erevan-Teheran” (p. 352). “The Armenians,” Dugin
underlines with approval, “are an Aryan people … [like] the Iranians and the Kurds” (p. 243).
Azerbaijan represents one example of how the trio Eurasia-Russia, Iran, and Armenia
might choose to divide up the spoils. “If Azerbaijan,” Dugin warns, “maintains its [present] pro-
Turkish orientation, then that ‘country’ will be split up among Iran, Russia and Armenia. Almost
the same holds true with regard to other regions of the Caucasus – Chechnya, Abkhaziya,
Dagestan, etc.” (p. 243). “It makes sense,” Dugin writes elsewhere, “to bind Azerbaijan to Iran”
(p. 352).
Dugin underlines that Kazakhstan will be integrated “into a common continental bloc
with Russia” (p. 354). Abkhaziya, too, will be tied “directly to Russia” (p. 351). A “united
Osetiya” might also, he speculates, be incorporated into Eurasia-Russia (p. 351). And as for the remaining parts of Georgia? Dugin implies that what remains of this Orthodox Christian country
after Russia absorbs Abkhaziya and South Osetiya might be turned over to Iran as booty,
appropriate punishment, presumably, for its prickly independent course toward Russia in the
post-communist period.
A key reason for concluding a Grand Alliance with Iran, Dugin explains, is Russia’s need
for a Muslim ally in its struggle against secular Turkey and “Islamic Saudi Arabia” with its
dangerous Wahhabism. Turkey, it emerges, is to be treated as harshly as the United States and
China. “It is important,” Dugin writes, “to take into consideration the necessity of affixing to
Turkey the role of ‘scapegoat’ in this [Eurasian] project” (p. 244). Kurds, Armenians, and other
Turkish minorities are to be provoked into rebellion. There is a need, Dugin stresses, to create
“geopolitical shocks” within Turkey (p. 352). Like Azerbaijan, Dugin predicts, Turkey could in
the future be dismembered by Eurasia-Russia, Iran and Armenia. If, however, such a
dismemberment should not occur, then, like China, Turkey must be encouraged to expand
exclusively southward, “into the Arab world through Baghdad, Damascus, and Riyadh…”
Det är radikalt annorlunda ... känns lite 1850-talet, uttryckt sådär, tankebanorna. Intressant att han hade tagit upp Abchazien och Sydossetien. Axeln Moskva-Jerevan-Tehran existerar redan till viss del.
Edit:
Citat:
The Moscow-Berlin Axis
Within the territorial sprawl of Eurasia, Dugin’s program focuses upon the formation of
three key “axes”: Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Tokyo, and Moscow-Teheran. With regard to the
future of Europe, Dugin writes: “The task of Moscow is to tear Europe away from the control of
the U.S. (NATO), to assist European unification, and to strengthen ties with Central Europe
under the aegis of the fundamental external axis Moscow-Berlin. Eurasia needs a united,
friendly Europe” (p. 369). In advocating such a path, Dugin appears to be influenced by the
writings of the European New Right who, from the 1970s on, argued for “the strict neutrality of
Europe and its departure from NATO” (p. 139). The basic principle underlying the Moscow-
Berlin axis, Dugin writes, will be “the principle of a common enemy [that is, the United States]”
(p. 216).
In exchange for cooperating with Russia in this project, Germany, Dugin proposes, ought
to be given back “Kaliningrad oblast’ (Eastern Prussia)” (p. 228). As a result of a Grand Alliance concluded between Russia and Germany, the two countries will divvy up into de facto
spheres of dominance the territories lying between them. There is to be no “sanitary cordon.”
“The task of Eurasia,” Dugin emphasizes, “consists in making sure such a [sanitary] cordon does
not exist” (p. 370). Russia and Germany together, he insists, “must decide all disputed questions
together and in advance...” (p. 226)
Detta visar kanske att Ryssland inte hotar nord- och centraleuropa.
Citat:
The Moscow-Tokyo Axis
The cornerstone of Dugin’s approach to the Far East lies in the creation of a “Moscow-
Tokyo Axis.” In relation to Japan, he emphasizes, “the principle of a common enemy [that is,
the United States]” will prove decisive (p. 234). As in the case of Germany, Japan is to be
offered an imperial Grand Bargain. Dugin recommends that the Kuriles be restored to Japan as
Kaliningrad is to be restored to Germany (p. 238). For future expansion purposes, Japan is to be
encouraged to impose “its own ‘new order,’ which it planned to carry out in the 1930’s, in the
Pacific Ocean” (p. 277).
Another important ally of Eurasia-Russia, Dugin notes, will be India, which, like Japan,
will be invited to join Russia in efforts to contain and perhaps dismember China. The two
Koreas and Vietnam will also be invited to participate in this effort (p. 360). Mongolia is seen as
constituting “a strategic ally of Russia” and is to be directly absorbed into Eurasia-Russia. (p.
363).
Like the United States, the People’s Republic of China is seen as constituting an
enormous danger for Eurasia-Russia.