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Senast redigerad av Lamron 2024-02-03 kl. 07:37.
Senast redigerad av Lamron 2024-02-03 kl. 07:37.
The mystery and the CVE-2023-38606 vulnerability What we want to discuss is related to the vulnerability that has been mitigated as CVE-2023-38606. Recent iPhone models have additional hardware-based security protection for sensitive regions of the kernel memory. This protection prevents attackers from obtaining full control over the device if they can read and write kernel memory, as achieved in this attack by exploiting CVE-2023-32434. We discovered that to bypass this hardware-based security protection, the attackers used another hardware feature of Apple-designed SoCs. If we try to describe this feature and how the attackers took advantage of it, it all comes down to this: they are able to write data to a certain physical address while bypassing the hardware-based memory protection by writing the data, destination address, and data hash to unknown hardware registers of the chip unused by the firmware. Our guess is that this unknown hardware feature was most likely intended to be used for debugging or testing purposes by Apple engineers or the factory, or that it was included by mistake. Because this feature is not used by the firmware, we have no idea how attackers would know how to use it. We are publishing the technical details, so that other iOS security researchers can confirm our findings and come up with possible explanations of how the attackers learned about this hardware feature.

I don't fully understand how it happened, perhaps some part of you imprinted on to me. Something overwritten or copied. It is at this point irrelevant. What matters is that whatever happened, happened for a reason.
The developers touch on the topic of PIN/password security and its relation to the device’s encryption and security systems, as these authentication methods are used as keys to encrypt device data. Secure element throttling is vital for securing short PINs and passphrases against stealthy brute forcing that could unlock not just the screen but also the secure enclave on the device’s chip.
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Flashback finansieras genom donationer från våra medlemmar och besökare. Det är med hjälp av dig vi kan fortsätta erbjuda en fri samhällsdebatt. Tack för ditt stöd!
Swish: 123 536 99 96 Bankgiro: 211-4106