Citat:
Ursprungligen postat av
Pottkusk
Kinas handel med omvärlden har minskat av det enkla skälet att den globala ekonomin gått in i lågkonjunktur.
Nja, riktigt så enkelt är det inte. Här nedan ser du en liten sammanfattning av några av Kinas ekonomiska problem, av chefsekonomerna för Ostasien och Kina, på banken Société Générale.
Den svaga efterfrågan bland Kinas hushåll, är främst orsakad av krisen i Kinas fastighetssektor (vilken under de senaste decennierna varit den främsta motorn för Kinas tillväxt).
Kinas lokala myndigheter har också kraftigt överinvesterat i infrastruktur, under de senaste decennierna. Detta har finansierats genom Local Government Financing Vehicles, en form av fonder som dragit in kapital genom att sälja obligationer till företag och privatpersoner, i utbyte mot ränta. Dessa LGFV är nu så skuldtyngda att de riskerar gå i konkurs, genom att de inte längre förmår betala ränta till obligationsägarna, vilket hade orsakat en finanskris.
Enda sättet att undvika att LGFV går i konkurs, är genom att kinesiska myndigheter fortsätter att pumpa in pengar i de skuldtyngda och förlustgående fonderna. Detta kräver enorma resurser, och innebär att nya pengar som borde använts för att stimulera efterfrågan bland Kinas hushåll, istället måste användas för att underhålla skulder efter tidigare infrastrukturprojekt. Detta bidrar till pressa ner Kinas tillväxt, på liknande sätt som skett i Japan de senaste decennierna.
Japan överinvesterade också kraftigt i olönsamma infrastrukturprojekt, och blev därefter sittande med enorma skuldberg, som det tagit decennier att betala av, och vilket lett till att Japan knappt haft någon tillväxt alls de senaste tre decennierna. Alla pengarna har gått till att betala av de gamla skulderna, snarare än att investera i ny tillväxt.
Citat:
China is drifting toward a deflation trap
Wei Yao is chief Asia-Pacific economist at Societe Generale in Hong Kong. Michelle Lam is greater China economist at the bank.
China is at growing risk of slipping into deflation. To escape a scenario of severe deflation like Japan experienced in the 1990s will require a dramatic reset of the policy mindset in Beijing.
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China's reopening recovery has been disappointing to date. Following a decent rebound in the first quarter of 2023, activity indicators slowed sharply across the board, highlighting the weakness of domestic demand.
Worse, there are growing signs that the property sector may be at risk of a double-dip recession. Meanwhile, inflationary pressure has been lackluster lately.
More importantly, structural adjustments in the property sector are damaging confidence and prompting households to deleverage. Under the government's campaign to curb speculation, home prices corrected last year by the most since 2015.
With the introduction of a property tax on the horizon, the long-held belief among households that home prices will just keep on rising appears to have vanished. Some have started to make mortgage prepayments or sell apartments previously purchased for investment.
As a result, household debt has stabilized at 60% of gross domestic product since 2020 after doubling over the previous decade. If home prices fail to stabilize, deleveraging behavior will likely intensify. This, together with dim income prospects, will weigh on consumer demand and pressure prices.
The risk of deflation is further exacerbated by China's overinvestment in traditional infrastructure.
The overinvestment problem has manifested itself in the long-term decline in the profitability of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). The debt carried by these entities adds up to nearly half of China's annual GDP. Research by the IMF found that the assets tied to around 40% of the LGFV debt did not generate enough earnings to cover interest expenses for the three years through 2020.
Given that the fiscal position of China's local governments weakened substantially amid the pandemic and the property slowdown, concerns over the ability of the LGFVs to pay back their debts have mounted.
Currently, policymakers seem to prefer "soft restructuring" of the debt of some of the insolvent LGVFs through interest rate cuts and adding years to repayment terms. This would avoid imminent defaults that could trigger financial instability, but keeping zombie LGFVs alive will pose risks to banks' capital, undermine productivity, and intensify the problem of capital misallocation.
Slower income growth will weaken aggregate demand, which will make it harder to sustain unproductive assets. The longer the restructuring of LGFV debt takes, the longer this downward spiral could last and the more entrenched deflation could become.
China's economic position shares a lot of similarities with that of Japan's three decades ago, including a housing bubble, bad debt and aging demographics.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Chin...deflation-trap
