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Ursprungligen postat av
nerdnerd
Om matematisk platonism är falsifierad på något får du gärna dela med dig av detta isf rätt så nya rön.
F ö ska du nog inte blanda ihop matematik hur som helst med empiriska vetenskaper.
Är det någon särskild kurs eller litteratur om vetenskapsteori resp matematikfilosofi som du rekommenderar? Själv gillar jag Kuhn om det förra.
Antingen så läser du inte ordentligt svaren du får, eller så förstår du inte det jag skriver.
Kanske är det också jag som inte förstår vad du skriver.
Förtydliga gärna vad du menar om du uppfattar missförstånd från min sida.
Hur skulle man kunna falsifiera den platonska idévärlden?
Förutom att platonismen är ofalsifierbar är den självevident för alla som har tillgång till idévärlden.
Det är däremot inte evident att matematiska propositioner existerar annat än intersubjektivt.
Hur blandar jag ihop matematik med empiriska vetenskaper menar du?
Enligt mig blandar du ihop vetenskap med religion. Objektivitet existerar inte inom vetenskapen.
Det jag specifikt tänkte på när jag rekommenderade dig att läsa vetenskapsteori var objektivitetsproblemet.
Du verkar inte ha snappat upp min citering från wikipediaartikeln om intersubjektivitet som postades i svar till dig.
En utmärkt artikel i ämnet:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/s...c-objectivity/
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3. Objectivity as Absence of Normative Commitments and the Value-Free Ideal
In the previous section we have presented arguments against the view of objectivity as faithfulness to facts and an impersonal “view from nowhere”. An alternative view is that science is objective to the extent that it is value-free. Why would we identify objectivity with value-freedom or regard the latter as a prerequisite for the former? Part of the answer is empiricism. If science is in the business of producing empirical knowledge, and if differences about value judgments cannot be settled by empirical means, values should have no place in science. In the following we will try to make this intuition more precise.
3.1 Epistemic and Contextual Values
Before addressing what we will call the “value-free ideal”, it will be helpful to distinguish four stages at which values may affect science. They are: (i) the choice of a scientific research problem; (ii) the gathering of evidence in relation to the problem; (iii) the acceptance of a scientific hypothesis or theory as an adequate answer to the problem on the basis of the evidence; (iv) the proliferation and application of scientific research results (Weber 1917 [1949]).
Most philosophers of science would agree that the role of values in science is contentious only with respect to dimensions (ii) and (iii): the gathering of evidence and the acceptance of scientific theories. It is almost universally accepted that the choice of a research problem is often influenced by interests of individual scientists, funding parties, and society as a whole. This influence may make science more shallow and slow down its long-run progress, but it has benefits, too: scientists will focus on providing solutions to those intellectual problems that are considered urgent by society and they may actually improve people’s lives. Similarly, the proliferation and application of scientific research results is evidently affected by the personal values of journal editors and end users, and little can be done about this. The real debate is about whether or not the “core” of scientific reasoning—the gathering of evidence and the assessment and acceptance scientific theories—is, and should be, value-free.
We have introduced the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence above. The problem does not stop, however, at values being required for filling the gap between theory and evidence. A further complication is that these values can conflict with each other. Consider the classical problem of fitting a mathematical function to a data set. The researcher often has the choice between using a complex function, which makes the relationship between the variables less simple but fits the data more accurately, or postulating a simpler relationship that is less accurate. Simplicity and accuracy are both important cognitive values, and trading them off requires a careful value judgment. However, philosophers of science tend to regard value-ladenness in this sense as benign. Cognitive values (sometimes also called “epistemic” or “constitutive” values) such as predictive accuracy, scope, unification, explanatory power, simplicity and coherence with other accepted theories are taken to be indicative of the truth of a theory and therefore provide reasons for preferring one theory over another (McMullin 1982, 2009; Laudan 1984; Steel 2010). Kuhn (1977) even claims that cognitive values define the shared commitments of science, that is, the standards of theory assessment that characterize the scientific approach as a whole. Note that not every philosopher entertains the same list of cognitive values: subjective differences in ranking and applying cognitive values do not vanish, a point Kuhn made emphatically.
In most views, the objectivity and authority of science is not threatened by cognitive values, but only by non-cognitive or contextual values. Contextual values are moral, personal, social, political and cultural values such as pleasure, justice and equality, conservation of the natural environment and diversity. The most notorious cases of improper uses of such values involve travesties of scientific reasoning, where the intrusion of contextual values led to an intolerant and oppressive scientific agenda with devastating epistemic and social consequences. In the Third Reich, a large part of contemporary physics, such as the theory of relativity, was condemned because its inventors were Jewish; in the Soviet Union, biologist Nikolai Vavilov was sentenced to death (and died in prison) because his theories of genetic inheritance did not match Marxist-Leninist ideology. Both states tried to foster a science that was motivated by political convictions (“Deutsche Physik” in Nazi Germany, Lysenko’s Lamarckian theory of inheritance and denial of genetics), leading to disastrous epistemic and institutional effects.
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Unlike the VFI, the VNT is not normative: its subject is whether the judgments that scientists make are, or could possibly be, free of contextual values. Similarly, Hugh Lacey (1999) distinguishes three principal components or aspects of value-free science: impartiality, neutrality and autonomy. Impartiality means that theories are solely accepted or appraised in virtue of their contribution to the cognitive values of science, such as truth, accuracy or explanatory power. This excludes the influence of contextual values, as stated above. Neutrality means that scientific theories make no value statements about the world: they are concerned with what there is, not with what there should be. Finally, scientific autonomy means that the scientific agenda is shaped by the desire to increase scientific knowledge, and that contextual values have no place in scientific method.
These three interpretations of value-free science can be combined with each other, or used individually. All of them, however, are subject to criticisms that we examine below. Denying the VNT, or the attainability of Lacey’s three criteria for value-free science, poses a challenge for scientific objectivity: one can either conclude that the ideal of objectivity should be rejected, or develop a conception of objectivity that differs from the VFI.
3.2 Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses and Value Neutrality
Lacey’s characterization of value-free science and the VNT were once mainstream positions in philosophy of science. Their widespread acceptance was closely connected to Reichenbach’s famous distinction between context of discovery and context of justification. Reichenbach first made this distinction with respect to the epistemology of mathematics:
the objective relation from the given entities to the solution, and the subjective way of finding it, are clearly separated for problems of a deductive character […] we must learn to make the same distinction for the problem of the inductive relation from facts to theories. (Reichenbach 1938: 36–37)
The standard interpretation of this statement marks contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, as irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory—the relation that is crucial for the objectivity of science. Contextual values are restricted to a matter of individual psychology that may influence the discovery, development and proliferation of a scientific theory, but not its epistemic status.
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Science, then, cannot be value-free because no scientist ever works exclusively in the supposedly value-free zone of assessing and accepting hypotheses. Evidence is gathered and hypotheses are assessed and accepted in the light of their potential for application and fruitful research avenues. Both cognitive and contextual value judgments guide these choices and are themselves influenced by their results.
Objektivitet är ett ideal inom vetenskapen, inget som faktiskt existerar.