Efterspelet av stormningen av Kapitolium för Trump och andra inblandade

(a)Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half of the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the crime solicited, or both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years.

Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Clarence BRANDENBURG, Appellant, v. State of OHIO.

DENNIS V. UNITED STATES (1951)
Dennis v. United States is the most prominent cold-war era Supreme Court sedition case. Eugene Dennis and eleven other leaders in the Communist Party of the U.S. were convicted in 1948 under the Smith Act, which criminalized advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government. Following a version of Holmes' and Learned Hand's "clear and present danger" reasoning from the World War I era sedition cases, the Supreme Court ruled against the defendants on the grounds that the First Amendment does not protect speech used in plotting government overthrow. Justice Black and Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that although the defendants harbored a philosophy unfriendly to the U.S. government, were not shown to have taken any specific actions aiming at its overthrow, and argued accordingly that the Smith Act was unconstitutional.

IN CHAPLINSKY the Supreme Court upheld a New Hampshire banning offensive speech toward others in public. Walter Chaplinsky was arrested under this statute for calling the City Marshal of Rochester, New Hampshire, “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,” following a disturbance while Chaplinsky was distributing pamphlets on the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious sect. In its ruling, the court argued that speech that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace, such as the speech Chaplinsky directed against the City Marshal, falls within a limited class of speech it termed “fighting words,” and is a reasonable exception to the right to freedom of speech.

PRIOR TO THE Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, and did not restrict state legislatures. In Gitlow, the Supreme Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the freedom of speech and press provisions in the Bill of Rights to apply to the individual states. During the first Red Scare in the wake of World War I, Benjamin Gitlow was charged under New York’s “Anarchy Law of 1902” for publishing a “Left Wing Manifesto” in a socialist newspaper. The court upheld Gitlow’s conviction, with vigorous dissents from Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes, but in doing so ruled that the case fell under federal authority.

343 U.S. 250 (1952)
Vinson Court
BEAUHARNAIS V. ILLINOIS (1952)
In Beauharnais, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois law outlawing any publication or exhibition depicting "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion." Joseph Beauharnais was convicted under this law for distributing leaflets protesting the encroachment of blacks into white Chicago neighborhoods. In his majority opinion Frankfurter argued that Beauharnais's leaflets were libelous, and therefore were not protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Black's dissent argues that the law in question was overbroad and permitted regulation far beyond the narrow criteria of criminal libel. In this case, Black argues, Beauharnais's speech, however objectionable, was "a genuine effort to petition [his] elected representatives" and therefore ought to have the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Aftermath
In 1957, the Court in Yates v. United States restricted the holding in Dennis, ruling that the Smith Act did not prohibit advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine. While Yates did not overrule Dennis, it rendered the broad conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act unenforceable. Finally, in 1969, Brandenburg v. Ohio held that "mere advocacy" of violence was per se protected speech. Brandenburg was a de facto overruling of Dennis, defining the bar for constitutionally unprotected speech to be incitement to "imminent lawless action".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_v._United_States

Approximately 215 people were indicted under the legislation, including alleged communists, anarchists, and fascists. Prosecutions under the Smith Act continued until a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1957 reversed a number of convictions under the Act as being unconstitutional. The law has been amended several times.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_Act

siister:
Om du inte kan hitta något som säger att det Ray Epps är tillräckligt för att klassas som incitement to imminent lawless action så tycker jag du ska lämna domstolarna, lagarna och Brandenburgtestet borta från diskussionen.