Citat:
Ursprungligen postat av
Teofrastus
Jo, men det är inte så att de här teorierna är likvärdiga. I och med de hårda vetenskapernas framsteg har realismen gått segrande ur striden. Det innebär att all subjektivistisk filosofi kan kastas i skräpkorgen. Det finns ingen anledning att hålla ett seminarium där de betraktas som konkurrerande teorier. Det är de inte längre!
Det kan man verkligen ifrågasätta..
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/r...sem-challenge/
Citat:
According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independently of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects exist independently of our ability to discover they do. Unless this is so, metaphysical realists argue, none of our beliefs about our world could be objectively true since true beliefs tell us how things are and beliefs are objective when true or false independently of what anyone might think.
Many philosophers believe metaphysical realism is just plain common sense. Others believe it to be a direct implication of modern science, which paints humans as fallible creatures adrift in an inhospitable world not of their making. Nonetheless, metaphysical realism is controversial. Besides the analytic question of what it means to assert that objects exist independently of the mind, metaphysical realism also raises epistemological problems: how can we obtain knowledge of a mind-independent world? There are also prior semantic problems, such as how links are set up between our beliefs and the mind-independent states of affairs they allegedly represent. This is the Representation Problem.
Anti-realists deny the world is mind-independent. Believing the epistemological and semantic problems to be insoluble, they conclude realism must be false. In this entry I review a number of semantic and epistemological challenges to realism all based on the Representation Problem:
The Manifestation Argument: the cognitive and linguistic behaviour of an agent provides no evidence that realist mind/world links exist;
The Language Acquisition Argument: if such links were to exist language learning would be impossible;
The Brain-in-a-Vat Argument: realism entails both that we could be massively deluded (‘brains in a vat’) and that if we were we could not even form the belief that we were;
The Conceptual Relativity Argument: it is senseless to ask what the world contains independently of how we conceive of it, since the objects that exist depend on the conceptual scheme used to classify them;
The Model-Theoretic Argument: realists must either hold that an ideal theory passing every conceivable test could be false or that perfectly determinate terms like ‘cat’ are massively indeterminate, and both alternatives are absurd.
I proceed by first defining metaphysical realism, illustrating its distinctive mind-independence claim with some examples and distinguishing it from other doctrines with which it is often confused, in particular factualism. I then outline the Representation Problem in the course of presenting the anti-realist challenges to metaphysical realism that are based on it. I discuss metaphysical realist responses to these challenges, indicating how the debates have proceeded, suggesting various alternatives and countenancing anti-realist replies.
The aim throughout will be to see whether the realist can respond to the anti-realist challenges and so much of the subsequent discussion will be taken up with attempts to formulate realist replies to these challenges that have some initial credibility. However it needs to be noted that all these replies are provisional: anti-realism gains much of its force by highlighting a gap between realist metaphysics and epistemology that no one really knows how to bridge.
Fysikens framsteg krossade ju fysikens 'realism' i och med utvecklingen av kvantfysiken...
