IQ Square Debate: Var Neville Chamberlains appeasementpolitik rätt eller inte?

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If ever a politician got a bum rap it's Neville Chamberlain. He has gone down in history as the British prime minster whose policy of appeasement in the 1930s allowed the Nazis to flourish unopposed. He has never been forgiven for ceding part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in the Munich Agreement of September 1938, and for returning home triumphantly declaring "peace for our time". The very word "appeasement" is now synonymous with him, signifying a craven refusal to stand up to bullies and aggressors. What a contrast to Winston Churchill, the man who took over as prime minister and who has ever since been credited with restoring Britain's backbone.

But is the standard verdict on Chamberlain a fair one? After all, memories of the slaughter of the First World War were still fresh in the minds of the British, who were desperate to avoid another conflagration. And anyway what choice did Chamberlain have in 1938? There's a good case for arguing that the delay in hostilities engineered at Munich allowed time for military and air power to be strengthened.

Ursprungligen postat av Ankdammsman

Som påpekas i ingressen ovan (länken funkar inte) hade han dåligt med alternativ eftersom britterna började rusta för sent. Det var dåliga beslut av tidigare politiker som spökade, precis som i Sverige där 1925 års katastrofala försvarsbeslut fick långtgående följder.

Britterna förtjänar kritik för mycket, som sin förvirrade politik som försvårade en enad front mot Hitler och underminerade Frankrike (som de dessutom sen skyllde det mesta på). Men Chamberlain är mer syndabock än huvudansvarig

Dr. Boyd D. Cathey

5.0 out of 5 stars Charmley Is Right



Reviewed in the United States on March 21, 2001

English historian John Charmley has disturbed World War II "establishment historians"--and established myths--by his iconoclastic re-interpretaion of the origins and beginning of the 1939-1945 war. Yet, in a series of closely reasoned studies he makes telling points that reveal a number of missed opportunities, in the months and weeks before and even after the outbreak of war, to have secured a satisfactory resolution of the growing hostility between the UK and Germany. He does not say that this resolution would have been permanent in the long run; indeed, the two powers may have eventually ended up in conflict. Nevertheless, the possibility that Britain could have kept out of a general war for another couple of years, while Germany was expending its resources and materiel in a war in the East, might well have changed the course of history. The "war hawk" party in London, egged on surreptiously by the Roosevelt administration and ideological "anti-fascists," managed to get Britain mired in a conflict for which it was not ready and which in the end totally exhausted it, which ended its role as world power, and that meant the destruction of the "empire." Churchill's vaunted promise to "defend the empire" was made hollow as he presided over the very destruction of that empire--and of historic Britain. Charmley offers ample notes and primary sources for his interpretation. While certainly not a new view--Barnett, Taylor and others have made similar points--Charmley's points deserve respectful consideration--not the "Establishment" condescension (and apparent fear!) that some have exhibited.

Criticism
Some historians find Charmley's view of the situation of Britain in the Second World War implausible at best[citation needed]. Many historians argue that it is difficult to blame the fall of the British Empire on Churchill, as it was exceedingly likely to fall anyway. Scholars also find the idea of a truce with Germany unwise at best, as Richard M. Langworth wrote:

Every serious military account of the Second World War shows that Germany came within a hair of taking Russia out even as it was. With no enemy at his back, tying up materiel and divisions in the West; without Britain's campaign in Africa; without the Americans and British succoring Stalin by sea; without Roosevelt's courting war with Germany in the Atlantic, Hitler would have thrown everything he had into Russia. The siege of Leningrad, the attack on Moscow, the battle of Stalingrad would almost certainly have gone the other way, if not in 1941 then certainly by 1942.[6]
A more general critique of the idea of making peace with Germany comes from Manfred Weidhorn:

Prudential (albeit immoral) as that solution might have been, the critics assume that (1) Hitler would deal; (2) the British Coalition government would let Churchill deal; (3) Hitler would be faithful to the deal; (4) Russia would have gone under; (5) America would keep out; (6) The British Empire still had a long way to go; (7) a Britain tied to Hitler would have remained democratic; (8) American hegemony is bad. As Langworth, Smith, et al. point out, most of these Charmley assumptions (1–3, 6–8) are dubious.[7]
Military historian Correlli Barnett calls it "absurd ... that instead of going to war Britain could, and should, have lived with Wilhelmine Germany's domination of western Europe. This is glibly clever but actually preposterous as his claim ... that Britain could and should have unilaterally withdrawn into neutrality in 1940–41"[8]

Hitler förnedrade och avsatte Chamberlain som tack för att han varit så tillmötesgående. Som så ofta trodde man att fienden (här engelsmännen) var för fega för att gå ut i krig, och som vanligt var det helt fel. Rädsla är tvärtom ett grundmotiv för krig.

Every serious military account of the Second World War shows that Germany came within a hair of taking Russia out even as it was. With no enemy at his back, tying up materiel and divisions in the West; without Britain's campaign in Africa; without the Americans and British succoring Stalin by sea; without Roosevelt's courting war with Germany in the Atlantic, Hitler would have thrown everything he had into Russia. The siege of Leningrad, the attack on Moscow, the battle of Stalingrad would almost certainly have gone the other way, if not in 1941 then certainly by 1942.

Hitler förnedrade och avsatte Chamberlain som tack för att han varit så tillmötesgående. Som så ofta trodde man att fienden (här engelsmännen) var för fega för att gå ut i krig, och som vanligt var det helt fel. Rädsla är tvärtom ett grundmotiv för krig.

Every serious military account of the Second World War shows that Germany came within a hair of taking Russia out even as it was. With no enemy at his back, tying up materiel and divisions in the West; without Britain's campaign in Africa; without the Americans and British succoring Stalin by sea; without Roosevelt's courting war with Germany in the Atlantic, Hitler would have thrown everything he had into Russia. The siege of Leningrad, the attack on Moscow, the battle of Stalingrad would almost certainly have gone the other way, if not in 1941 then certainly by 1942.