Hitta lite mer uppgifter. Först o främst påstås det att SR-71 inte flög över Sovjet pga att det kunde missuppfattas som en attack. För det andra påstås det att man slutade att flyga SR-71 över Vietnam efter det att ryssarna hade levererat bättre SAM-utrustning.
"In reality the USSR had successful ABM capability by the early 1960's. They were about two decades ahead of the US with regards to ABM capability. It caused the now defunct ABMT, to ensure M.A.D. in no way the USSR needed MiG-25 against SR-71, their non-export SAM and ABM systems of the time would undoubtedly be more than enough to down invading SR-71. Yet, what truly prevented SR-71 from Soviet skies was the imminent risk of it being misinterpreted as an attack, resulting in full scale nuclear retaliation on the US in return. Both the US and the USSR realized this when Powers was shot down in his U-2 on 1st of May 1960. That event put an end to all potential US future overflights in the USSR. The SR-71 was used to test Soviet reaction times and snoop around at the Soviet borders at best. It never overflew the USSR. The Soviet nuclear deterrence was simply ennough to prevent SR-71 overflights in the USSR. The imminent risk of nuclear war was far too great.
SR-71's greatest success was overflying North Vietnamese SA-2 sites, incapable of engaging the SR-71, due to RCS and ECM techniques being viable against the Soviet SA-2 export equipment (namely the export command guidance & radar). The SA-2 missiles were in fact physically capable of intercepting the SR-71, but the Soviet command guidance & radars exported to Vietnam was not. The USSR had non-export SA-2 variants capable of downing the SR-71 (S-75M / 20D) some of which were nuclear tipped, to make absolutely positively sure the intruding aircraft goes down, even if you miss it by a mile. Yet it did not matter much in Vietnam anyhow, when SR-71 overflew a SA-2 site in North Vietnam, they simply moved the site to a new location. A now declassified document, written in 1967 by the main blackbird operator claimed that "Based on simulator test results, it appears that the probability of kill in North Vietnam is nil for either aircraft [A-12 and SR-71] with presently utilized configurstions and flight profiles, as long as the ECM techniques remain viable. In any event, it should beconcluded that the radar cross section is too high for any particular operation, .... " One year later (in 1968) the Soviet Union exported a new SA-2 variant to Vietnam, capable of downing the SR-71 (either by a more powerful command guidance, homing directly for the ECM unit or visually). It was almost incapable of even missing the SR-71. This led the US to withdraw the SR-71 from active service in North Vietnam the same year (1968), admitting that the SA-2 deployed in North Vietnam indeed was capable of downing SR-71 prior to losing one. It was proved by the system shooting down other US aircraft utilizing the very same ECM techniques as protected the SR-71. North Vietnam could indeed shoot down SR-71, even with a great probability of kill in 1968. The US didn't even dare risk it. That was SR-71's greatest success. Its speed was not what kept it safe, viable ECM was, at least according to the main operator of the blackbird. The Soviet SAM had no physical problems reaching a SR-71. Not even in Vietnam, by 1968 the US did not even dare (risk) flying their SR-71 in the skies above North Vietnam."
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOfcPlFo6hg
"In reality the USSR had successful ABM capability by the early 1960's. They were about two decades ahead of the US with regards to ABM capability. It caused the now defunct ABMT, to ensure M.A.D. in no way the USSR needed MiG-25 against SR-71, their non-export SAM and ABM systems of the time would undoubtedly be more than enough to down invading SR-71. Yet, what truly prevented SR-71 from Soviet skies was the imminent risk of it being misinterpreted as an attack, resulting in full scale nuclear retaliation on the US in return. Both the US and the USSR realized this when Powers was shot down in his U-2 on 1st of May 1960. That event put an end to all potential US future overflights in the USSR. The SR-71 was used to test Soviet reaction times and snoop around at the Soviet borders at best. It never overflew the USSR. The Soviet nuclear deterrence was simply ennough to prevent SR-71 overflights in the USSR. The imminent risk of nuclear war was far too great.
SR-71's greatest success was overflying North Vietnamese SA-2 sites, incapable of engaging the SR-71, due to RCS and ECM techniques being viable against the Soviet SA-2 export equipment (namely the export command guidance & radar). The SA-2 missiles were in fact physically capable of intercepting the SR-71, but the Soviet command guidance & radars exported to Vietnam was not. The USSR had non-export SA-2 variants capable of downing the SR-71 (S-75M / 20D) some of which were nuclear tipped, to make absolutely positively sure the intruding aircraft goes down, even if you miss it by a mile. Yet it did not matter much in Vietnam anyhow, when SR-71 overflew a SA-2 site in North Vietnam, they simply moved the site to a new location. A now declassified document, written in 1967 by the main blackbird operator claimed that "Based on simulator test results, it appears that the probability of kill in North Vietnam is nil for either aircraft [A-12 and SR-71] with presently utilized configurstions and flight profiles, as long as the ECM techniques remain viable. In any event, it should beconcluded that the radar cross section is too high for any particular operation, .... " One year later (in 1968) the Soviet Union exported a new SA-2 variant to Vietnam, capable of downing the SR-71 (either by a more powerful command guidance, homing directly for the ECM unit or visually). It was almost incapable of even missing the SR-71. This led the US to withdraw the SR-71 from active service in North Vietnam the same year (1968), admitting that the SA-2 deployed in North Vietnam indeed was capable of downing SR-71 prior to losing one. It was proved by the system shooting down other US aircraft utilizing the very same ECM techniques as protected the SR-71. North Vietnam could indeed shoot down SR-71, even with a great probability of kill in 1968. The US didn't even dare risk it. That was SR-71's greatest success. Its speed was not what kept it safe, viable ECM was, at least according to the main operator of the blackbird. The Soviet SAM had no physical problems reaching a SR-71. Not even in Vietnam, by 1968 the US did not even dare (risk) flying their SR-71 in the skies above North Vietnam."
Ovan hittade jag i kommentarerna till
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOfcPlFo6hg
