2011-03-26, 17:26
#1
Okay, jag tänkte att vi kanske kunde få gång i detta forum genom att införa lite filosofisk ande. Då filosofi ju, som metod, handlar om kritiskt samtal, och då kritik ofta är nyttigt för tänkning, tänkte jag att vi kunde börja på det.
För att denna tråd (eller webinar
) ska skilja sig från en vanlig diskussionstråd, ska vi vara mera solidariska. Här ska vi inte bara skjuta ner en teori, utan ge kritik av ordval, formuleringar, argument etc., och vi ska sikta mot att få fram bästa möjliga resultatet.
På universiteten är det ju vanlig rutin, att forskarna presenterar deras material, så det kan kritiseras, och jag tänker, att detta kan vara idealet.
Just nu sitter jag och pysslar med en artikel om amerikanska teolog William L. Craigs cosmologiska gudsbevis. Jag har dock lite problem med strukturen, och kanske mina formuleringar inte är så skarpa. Därför tänkte jag att slänga upp den i kväll eller imorgon, och då kunde vi börja med att kritisera den, och se hur bra hela konceptet fungerar.
Men vad tycker folk, finns det stämning för det, eller påminner iden för mycket om en vanlig diskussion?
Själv ser jag en klar skillnad, då man vanligen slänger fram mindre fulländade ideer eller frågor. Här tänker jag att vi ska lägga fram färdiga eller nästan färdiga arbeten - nivå och ämne kan variera. Tror att det kommer resultera i en annorlunda tråd än de vanliga diskussionstråderna - lite mer i stil med Heidegger-tråden, men förhoppningvis mer livligt.
Här under kan ni se ett utkast till artikeln jag håller på med. Språket är inte korrigerat, och en del av begreppen är suddiga. Det är mest bara en grovskiss. Demolera den! Kritisera gärna mina argument, mitt begreppsbruk samt språkliga fel. Allt, inkl. förödande kritik, är välkomna:
On the Calam cosmological argument
In this article I wish to show that the cosmological argument is inconsistent and should be abandoned. I think it can be demonstrated that premise 1 is contradicting premise 2, if premise 2 is construed as the law of energies konstans. If it is construed as to allow for god to create additional being, then it is in conflict with the law of energies constans, and hence is very problematic.
The cosmological god proof, Craigs version:
The argument runs like this:
(1) Whatever begins to exist must have a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) Therefore the universe had a cause. (from 1&2)
The argument is valid since it’s formal structure is:
(1) All P are Q
(2) R is P
(3) R is Q (from 1&2)
So we cannot refute the argument by showing that the conclusion doesn’t follow , but I think that an alternative route is available: to show that the premises are false. This has been tried before, and Craig has met some of the objections. I am not convinced that the argument can be successfully defended.
If premise 1 is taken literally, the principle is logically false. If ontologically substantial existence can be caused, then it is in direct violation with the law of the constance of energy, and a looming regress is threatening in the background, only pushing the problematic creation one step back at a time. I take “existence” as used in the premise to be substantial, since otherwise we would confine causation to events or higherorder properties, and not fundamental existence, such as the universe as a totality.
If we let causation range over substantial existence, then the premise is logically inconsistent, since any thing that is substantially more than the cause (and not just a transformation of energy, or displacement of energy in accordance with the laws of physics) must be added being, and as such a violation of the law, since the cause cannot fully account for the effect. To give an example of normal causation, think of the following: we might say that turning on the lightswitch causes light to exist, since it emanates from the lightbulp as an effect of us creating a circuit. Before our switching on the light, no light emanated from the lightbulp. There were no light. But the light that, as an effect of our action, came to existence is no added being. In accordance with the laws of physics, energy was converted into a new form, so that it changed appearance – it became light. The energy used in the action of switching on the light was turned into momentum and friction. The energy conserved in the electrical system was partly turned into lightwaves etc. No substantial being was created.
There is something suspect in talking about causing fundamental existence. In taking the raw energy, that constitutes everything in the universe, and is “self-dependent” , to have been caused by something extra-physical. What I am suggesting is that talking about causation behind the being of the universe is metaphysically problematic – maybe even invalid. This kind of fundamental causation is not postulated by any theory. Big bang-theory doesn’t claim that the singlurarity has been caused, simply that it is the cause of the universe as it looks now (one might even say that the universe is uncaused, but that the internal “way things look” is caused by it’s fundamental nature – and so also the singularity is just a modus of the universe).
If this analysis (or something like it) is true, then the first premise is false, since it is formulated in a way that forces us to presuppose that fundamental being can be caused. As I have tried to show, this assumption is very implausible. It should be reconstrued, then, to say:
(1) Fundamental being cannot be caused.
Which is just a laymans way of confirming the law of (energins konstans). And now it follows that premise 2 is obviously false, unless we take the universe to be another modus of some fundamental energy – but if we do this, then we are talking about the universe in another sense than I have been doing it, and that only camouflages the looming regress. Because in order to not violate LEK, we need to distinguish between the universe as it is now, and the fundamental substance of which it is a function. If there is a fundamental substance, more fundamental than the laws that govern inside the universe, such as quantum mechanics, then it is this substance that needs explanation, according to the cosmological argument – since BigBang would not be problematic unless it aimed at explaining fundamental existence – but since BB postulates a singularity, and since it’s predictions cannot cross a certain threshold in time ((quantuum collapse) time being constituted after the alleged BB), then BB is nothing more than an approximation of the history of the universe from the beginning of time. It never aims at giving a metaphysical explanation of existence as such.
As it seems now, the suspect must be the supporting argument that establishes the unreality of infinity, so that being needs a causal explanation. But I think the arguments offered by Craig aren’t powerful enough to support the necessity of being being created or caused. Now, of course there are different theories of time, but Since being as being need not presuppose time (poäng som inte har skrivits: Craigs förståelse av infinity är irrelevant för saken, då "infinit" i denna metafysiska sammanhang måste förstås som "oskapad" - en egenskap Craigs gud har. Men vi borde inse att Craig inte har några medel till att visa på, att den fundamentala substans måste vara skapad, och om man gottar analysen hittills, kan det inte finnas annat och mera än denna och dens olika modi, och då har vi ju reucerad Craigs kristna gud till något liknande Spinozas gud - och vägrer vi detta står vi med det gamla problem, att denna gud måste skapa "substantial fundemental being" - Craig har hamnat i ett dilemma, tror jag.)
För att denna tråd (eller webinar
) ska skilja sig från en vanlig diskussionstråd, ska vi vara mera solidariska. Här ska vi inte bara skjuta ner en teori, utan ge kritik av ordval, formuleringar, argument etc., och vi ska sikta mot att få fram bästa möjliga resultatet.På universiteten är det ju vanlig rutin, att forskarna presenterar deras material, så det kan kritiseras, och jag tänker, att detta kan vara idealet.
Just nu sitter jag och pysslar med en artikel om amerikanska teolog William L. Craigs cosmologiska gudsbevis. Jag har dock lite problem med strukturen, och kanske mina formuleringar inte är så skarpa. Därför tänkte jag att slänga upp den i kväll eller imorgon, och då kunde vi börja med att kritisera den, och se hur bra hela konceptet fungerar.
Men vad tycker folk, finns det stämning för det, eller påminner iden för mycket om en vanlig diskussion?
Själv ser jag en klar skillnad, då man vanligen slänger fram mindre fulländade ideer eller frågor. Här tänker jag att vi ska lägga fram färdiga eller nästan färdiga arbeten - nivå och ämne kan variera. Tror att det kommer resultera i en annorlunda tråd än de vanliga diskussionstråderna - lite mer i stil med Heidegger-tråden, men förhoppningvis mer livligt.
Här under kan ni se ett utkast till artikeln jag håller på med. Språket är inte korrigerat, och en del av begreppen är suddiga. Det är mest bara en grovskiss. Demolera den! Kritisera gärna mina argument, mitt begreppsbruk samt språkliga fel. Allt, inkl. förödande kritik, är välkomna:
On the Calam cosmological argument
In this article I wish to show that the cosmological argument is inconsistent and should be abandoned. I think it can be demonstrated that premise 1 is contradicting premise 2, if premise 2 is construed as the law of energies konstans. If it is construed as to allow for god to create additional being, then it is in conflict with the law of energies constans, and hence is very problematic.
The cosmological god proof, Craigs version:
The argument runs like this:
(1) Whatever begins to exist must have a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) Therefore the universe had a cause. (from 1&2)
The argument is valid since it’s formal structure is:
(1) All P are Q
(2) R is P
(3) R is Q (from 1&2)
So we cannot refute the argument by showing that the conclusion doesn’t follow , but I think that an alternative route is available: to show that the premises are false. This has been tried before, and Craig has met some of the objections. I am not convinced that the argument can be successfully defended.
If premise 1 is taken literally, the principle is logically false. If ontologically substantial existence can be caused, then it is in direct violation with the law of the constance of energy, and a looming regress is threatening in the background, only pushing the problematic creation one step back at a time. I take “existence” as used in the premise to be substantial, since otherwise we would confine causation to events or higherorder properties, and not fundamental existence, such as the universe as a totality.
If we let causation range over substantial existence, then the premise is logically inconsistent, since any thing that is substantially more than the cause (and not just a transformation of energy, or displacement of energy in accordance with the laws of physics) must be added being, and as such a violation of the law, since the cause cannot fully account for the effect. To give an example of normal causation, think of the following: we might say that turning on the lightswitch causes light to exist, since it emanates from the lightbulp as an effect of us creating a circuit. Before our switching on the light, no light emanated from the lightbulp. There were no light. But the light that, as an effect of our action, came to existence is no added being. In accordance with the laws of physics, energy was converted into a new form, so that it changed appearance – it became light. The energy used in the action of switching on the light was turned into momentum and friction. The energy conserved in the electrical system was partly turned into lightwaves etc. No substantial being was created.
There is something suspect in talking about causing fundamental existence. In taking the raw energy, that constitutes everything in the universe, and is “self-dependent” , to have been caused by something extra-physical. What I am suggesting is that talking about causation behind the being of the universe is metaphysically problematic – maybe even invalid. This kind of fundamental causation is not postulated by any theory. Big bang-theory doesn’t claim that the singlurarity has been caused, simply that it is the cause of the universe as it looks now (one might even say that the universe is uncaused, but that the internal “way things look” is caused by it’s fundamental nature – and so also the singularity is just a modus of the universe).
If this analysis (or something like it) is true, then the first premise is false, since it is formulated in a way that forces us to presuppose that fundamental being can be caused. As I have tried to show, this assumption is very implausible. It should be reconstrued, then, to say:
(1) Fundamental being cannot be caused.
Which is just a laymans way of confirming the law of (energins konstans). And now it follows that premise 2 is obviously false, unless we take the universe to be another modus of some fundamental energy – but if we do this, then we are talking about the universe in another sense than I have been doing it, and that only camouflages the looming regress. Because in order to not violate LEK, we need to distinguish between the universe as it is now, and the fundamental substance of which it is a function. If there is a fundamental substance, more fundamental than the laws that govern inside the universe, such as quantum mechanics, then it is this substance that needs explanation, according to the cosmological argument – since BigBang would not be problematic unless it aimed at explaining fundamental existence – but since BB postulates a singularity, and since it’s predictions cannot cross a certain threshold in time ((quantuum collapse) time being constituted after the alleged BB), then BB is nothing more than an approximation of the history of the universe from the beginning of time. It never aims at giving a metaphysical explanation of existence as such.
As it seems now, the suspect must be the supporting argument that establishes the unreality of infinity, so that being needs a causal explanation. But I think the arguments offered by Craig aren’t powerful enough to support the necessity of being being created or caused. Now, of course there are different theories of time, but Since being as being need not presuppose time (poäng som inte har skrivits: Craigs förståelse av infinity är irrelevant för saken, då "infinit" i denna metafysiska sammanhang måste förstås som "oskapad" - en egenskap Craigs gud har. Men vi borde inse att Craig inte har några medel till att visa på, att den fundamentala substans måste vara skapad, och om man gottar analysen hittills, kan det inte finnas annat och mera än denna och dens olika modi, och då har vi ju reucerad Craigs kristna gud till något liknande Spinozas gud - och vägrer vi detta står vi med det gamla problem, att denna gud måste skapa "substantial fundemental being" - Craig har hamnat i ett dilemma, tror jag.)