Början på ett mediakrig om mångkulturen?

Tino Sanandaji: Arbetsförmedlingen vägrar räkna på invandrares intäkter och kostnader, det enda de räknar på är ”sysselsättning”
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Arbetsförmedlingen är politiserad myndighet som ofta argerat som en förlängd arm av Socialdemokratin. Generaldirektör är Mikael Sjöberg, S-politiker som råkar vara Göran Perssons kusin och som Göran Persson råkade utnämna till generaldirektör.

När Mikael Sjöberg senare tog över Arbetsförmedlingen 2014 började de plötsligen föra en aktivismkampanj att kräva mer invandring, om och om igen.
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Det är alltid samma inkorrekta argument som motbevisas på några rader. Välfärdens finansiering är fråga om självförsörjande som betalar skatt. Arbetsförmedlingen vägrar räkna på invandrares intäkter och kostnader, det enda de räknar på är ”sysselsättning”.

For decades now, the freedom to speak and argue—the most fundamental right of a free people—has been under assault by neo-Marxist advocates of a “more just society.” But it is only recently that their efforts have succeeded in shutting down an ever-widening range of venues of public debate: first in academia, then in the media, and of late in politics. Today the fundamental right to free speech is under threat not just from speech codes—that is, from proscriptions on what cannot be said—but also increasingly from prescriptive rules about what one must say, as though perfunctory condemnations of Western history were the price of admission to public debate.

Why are societies in Europe and America seemingly intent on suppressing the fundamentally democratic impulses to speak freely, to err, to debate, and even to offend so that, through it all, we might come to learn what passes the common sense test and possibly arrive at a larger national consensus on policy? When did ideological allegiance (liberal vs. illiberal) become a litmus test for what constitutes appropriate public discourse? And how did we get to the point where political expressions of concern for the economic and social welfare of the nation’s own is “xenophobia,” and where the only praiseworthy use of American power is to unconditionally embrace globalization or save the planet by signing onto high-minded but ultimately unenforceable declarations of virtuous intent? Why is it that in Europe today the traditional generosity of its people is all but taken for granted, while that same citizenry’s desire to ensure its own welfare and security, and to transmit its cultural inheritance to the next generation, is often reviled as intolerance by the intelligentsia, politicians, and the media?

The roots of our growing unfreedom were planted in the late 1960s, but only today can we truly appreciate the extent to which the ideas of that era deconstructed our democratic culture. This latest neo-Marxist lurch toward unfreedom happened in the span of a single generation, the result of a cultural unmooring during which conservatives seem to have lost their sense of caution, and liberals their collective mind. Today it is not uncommon to hear that the West itself is—as I was recently told—merely a “cultural construct of the early 20th century,” and that truth requires little empirical testing but is instead dependent on the identity of the individual who expresses it.

Ironically, this latest assault against the foundational values of our democratic tradition was exacerbated by arguably the greatest ideological triumph in the history of the West—and, in hindsight, also our most dangerous moment. The year was 1990

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Indeed, both Americans and Europeans had every reason to celebrate. The world seemed perfectly poised to surf a new tsunami of freedom. History was on our side—or at least so claimed a plethora of op-eds, scholarly articles, and talking heads on television. At the time it seemed natural to many a commentator that what was believed to be universal would soon eclipse the national. The rules and institutions of Western-style democracy had proved their ability to cross the boundaries of culture now that a heterogeneous mix of countries had cast aside the Soviet yoke to take them up. Now that all of Europe had affirmed the value of freedom, was it not obvious that it would conquer the globe? The right to national self-determination was not so much discarded as allegedly transcended.

And yet the moment of the Soviet collapse carried a hidden threat that, in less than three decades, would deepen our divisions and weaken the foundations of individual liberty. Our sense of victory contained within it the seeds of arguably the greatest peril the West has ever confronted: the ideological certitude—not just on the Left—that we had cracked the code of the human condition and could get on with the work of perfecting both the individual and society.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union we lost an enemy whose society was a living example of what projects aimed at re-engineering human nature were likely to yield: the loss of liberty, followed by repression and terror. Once the toxic Bolshevist experiment that had cost millions of lives and created unspeakable human misery was (at least in Europe) no more, the temptation of triumphalism proved too alluring. Since it seemed plausible on a basic level that liberal market capitalism had overpowered communism, it followed that there were no limits to what institutional and market reforms could achieve, especially once one discounted variables like culture and history as explanations for why liberal democracy had flourished in some societies and not others. It seemed that all the post-Cold War wave had to do to succeed was to go global. And so at its moment of triumph the West fell victim to a post-Enlightenment delusion of the perfectibility of man.

Yet the Soviet collapse also empowered neo-Marxists and fellow-progressives in the West to turn inward and focus on the “enemy within,” namely, that of the “system.” Without a tangible reminder of what efforts to re-engineer humanity had produced in Europe and elsewhere, it became possible for the ideologically committed to construct a narrative of what “true socialism” could have achieved if only the Stalinists and Maoists had not corrupted the collectivist dream. At the same time, the business community, no longer tamed by a once powerful sense of national solidarity, grew besotted with spurious claims about the “inevitable logic of the market.” Many among America’s policy and business elites argued that off-shoring the U.S. supply chain to Asia would not only make us rich but would also lead to that region’s export-driven modernization and eventual democratization. They told us that in the era of globalization, export-driven modernization would inevitably lift underdeveloped economies out of poverty, leading to the rise of an educated, empowered middle class that would demand representative government. Even today some continue to cling to this argument, against all evidence to the contrary.

Unfortunately, it is no exaggeration to say that freedom is waning across the West—not because foreign armies have defeated us in battle, or because all of our wealth has been drained by an alien economic power. Rather, the West is increasingly at risk of becoming “post-democratic” because its most basic foundational values of free expression and the liberty and sovereignty of the individual are being banished from the public agora. Discourse at American colleges and universities today more closely resembles that of the notorious Artek indoctrination camp for young Soviet pioneer activists than the “discussion, collaboration, and enlightenment” Thomas Jefferson envisioned when he conceived of the University of Virginia. In both Europe and America those with aspirations for professional attainment in academia, the corporate world, or the media must increasingly bow to the dominant orthodoxies and purge their speech of all incorrect phrases, with the goal of ultimately cleansing their mind of impure thoughts.

Unmoored from its cultural heritage and increasingly ignorant of its history, the West is fragmenting along racial, ethnic, and ideological lines. In the United States the process is well under way of transforming “e pluribus unum” into an American Balkans in which warring groups squabble over past grievances—real and imagined—and where a sense of patriotism and the mutuality of obligation so fundamental to a nation under a republican form of government is being purged from the culture. Here America is not alone, as similar undercurrents of unfreedom are deconstructing some of the oldest political traditions in Europe.

Den ungerska versionen, som lades upp på ett konto som heter Reaktor, har på mindre än två dygn fått hela 450 000 visningar, i ett land med ungefär samma befolkningsstorlek som Sverige.

I artikeln skriver den ungerska tidningen bland annat:

Svenskarna som hittills stött okontrollerat massmottagande, har inte ärligt uttryckt deras tankar och intentioner. De har alla hittat på någon ursäkt för att inte låta ”Ali” in i deras egna hem.

samt

Må hända är svenskarna – förutom den finansiella aspekten – också ett steg före i ytlighet jämfört med centraleuropeerna?’

Bruttonationalprodukt (BNP) är ett mått på den totala ekonomiska aktiviteten i ett land under en tidsperiod, vanligen ett år. Det kan uttryckas som värdet av total konsumtion av varor och tjänster, bruttoinvesteringar samt export minus import.