"Så vem blir då Kenneth Hermele, till sist?
Han ser sig som svensk, "men aldrig judisk svensk, alltid svensk jude. Svenskar var – och är – några andra. Svenskar kan förvisso vara trevliga, som en vän till min mamma brukade säga, men de är inte som jag"."
"Så vem blir då Kenneth Hermele, till sist?
Han ser sig som svensk, "men aldrig judisk svensk, alltid svensk jude. Svenskar var – och är – några andra. Svenskar kan förvisso vara trevliga, som en vän till min mamma brukade säga, men de är inte som jag"."
"Så vem blir då Kenneth Hermele, till sist?
Han ser sig som svensk, "men aldrig judisk svensk, alltid svensk jude. Svenskar var – och är – några andra. Svenskar kan förvisso vara trevliga, som en vän till min mamma brukade säga, men de är inte som jag"."
The idea that the press had both the capability and the desire to control public thought and thereby determine the actions of the electorate acting in its voting capacity has carried currency long before Chomsky or Moldbug. Walter Lippmann and John Dewey, writing in aftermath of the remarkably effective propaganda campaign orchestrated by the Creel Committee, both took it as a fact that the press had developed and exercised such a power, and only differed in their assessment of it. Lippmann argued the role of the press was as an intermediary between the ruling class and the “bewildered herd” of the public, who lacked the intellectual capacity to understand policy. The political elite created policy, and the “specialized” or credentialed class existed to explain it to the masses in such a way as to ensure their cooperation, seeking not to enable them to make informed decisions, but to determine those decisions on their behalf. Dewey disputed none of this in his rebuttal, instead arguing for true democracy as the only human ideal, asserting the public was fully capable but distracted by technology and corrupted by the influence of the press and special interests. If the public were able to communicate among themselves unimpeded, he said, they might be freed from the shackles of top-down information distribution and able to participate fully and intelligently in the democratic process. As individuals engage healthily with their local community, the power of communication is all that is needed to inject them into a “Great Community” in which they can be active and intelligent participants. With the internet, that scenario has come to pass: the power of the pen has been taken from the priestly class and given to all. The result, however, is quite different from what Dewey foresaw.https://jacobitemag.com/2017/12/05/a...f-programmers/
The principal effect we are seeing now of the internet on the sharing of information and shaping of worldview is the destruction of consensus reality. Advances in technology through the age of print typically increased efficiency and decreased marginal costs by imposing massive fixed costs that could only be borne by institutional power. The internet and the desktop computer obviate the act of printing entirely, sending fixed costs through the floor and setting marginal costs to zero. Disseminating arbitrary text is now trivial for virtually anyone in the first world, and for nearly half of people on the planet. Entire industries are in a state of collapse over this, great institutions that formed around the tools of the industrial age now in the process of unwinding. But while anyone these days can be a publisher, a new set of institutions are on the rise: the technology companies that build the platforms that define how information may or may not flow.
[...]
China again presents a remarkable example of a programmership captured by the state and model of how it may be done elsewhere. Old cyberpunk hands in the 90s believed the internet by its very nature imposed a state of openness and freedom that transcended culture and predicted that its introduction in China would be the beginning of the end of the one-party state. Clearly this has not come to pass. The Great Firewall has effectively created a separate, national internet, complete with its own set of platform companies beholden to the PRC. Monitoring is ubiquitous, with WeChat and Baidu enthusiastically cooperating in censorship and offering the government effectively total access to all content flowing through their services. The government itself announced several years ago it was building a “social credit” system, assigning each citizen a score based on their criminal record, online purchase history, social media posts, likely whatever metric they see value in. In the words of the officials touting its potential, it will “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step.” Despite the western sense of such systems as nightmarish and Orwellian, an affront to the very idea of civil society as embodied by the Public, they are generally well-accepted in China. A vast majority thinks it right and good that the state should control the internet, and the upcoming social credit system is seen by many as a potential solution for what has become one of the lowest-trust societies on the planet.
The western tech industry, though lacking in both political power and prestige compared to that of their priestly forebears, by contrast enjoys a great deal of independence from the state apparatus. They deal with host governments not as subjects, but as parties to negotiation, variously cajoling, capitulating, or defying as a situation calls for. Time will tell whether this is a sign of things to come, or a moment of laxity before control is reasserted. But with our entire world-system in a state of flux presently, even governments are scrambling to adapt, so predicting how it all turns out is futile. As long as platform companies continue to see themselves as simple profit-generating enterprises, the only economic situation that could spur them in supplanting the state is one in which they must take on its roles out of simple necessity, they’ll never do it just because — but that is a topic for another essay. On the cultural side, however, it is entirely plausible the class comes over time to create for itself a higher mission, to become more exclusive and thus accrue prestige and mystique, to conceive of itself as a guiding force and thus seek out avenues to power. Much has been written on the abyssal purposelessness of the modern, cosmopolitan lifestyle. It is not inconceivable that the class best positioned to exert leverage over society in the coming decades decides to fashion something more for itself.
There is no reason it has to go any particular way; it is easy to envision any number of wildly different eventualities. Maybe the tech companies step in to fill the selfsame role of the press, serving as a bulwark for the liberal order and thus granting it a second wind. Perhaps states begin to consume the industry, deciding the potential of these technologies as instruments of social control outweighs the public backlash, which they may by doing so be in a position to snuff out. Political crisis or simple decay leads to de facto extraterritoriality for tech campuses, which graduates into true sovereignty. Surprise election result could lead to the transformation of the government along technocratic lines, obviating the need for further maneuvers to secure a place of power when an established one presents itself for the taking. Regulated out of existence, or deskilled to the point that good-enough workers become commonplace and thus fungible, and the industry ends up having no more social impact than any other particular manufacturing or business profession. Or maybe they never aspire to anything and just keep selling ads until the bottom falls out of the whole enterprise.
The primary responsibility of a priesthood is to create a shared reality for the flock. As the Church was to Christendom, and the press was to the public, programmers are now in a better position than any to construct the new reality that is to define the world after the present one, by now moribund, finally makes its exit.
The Tragedy of Liberalismhttp://iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_arti...all_Deneen.php
In the main, American political conflicts since the end of the Civil War have been fought along this broad division within liberalism itself. We have grown accustomed to liberalism being the norm and defining the predictable battlefield for our political debates. Largely accepting at least the Hartzian view, if not also Fukuyama’s claim that liberalism constitutes the “end of history,” we have been so preoccupied with the divisions and differences arising from these two distinct variants of liberalism that our debate within the liberal frame obscures from us an implicit acknowledgment that the question of regime has been settled—liberalism is the natural order for humanity. Further, the intensifying division between the two sides of liberalism also obscures the basic continuities between these two iterations of liberalism, and in particular makes it nearly impossible to reflect on the question of whether the liberal order itself remains viable. The bifurcation within liberalism masks a deeper agreement that has led to the working out of liberalism’s deeper logic, which, ironically, brings us today to a crisis within liberalism itself that now appears sudden and inexplicable.
[...]
First, both classical liberalism and progressive liberalism are commonly arrayed against the persistence of culture as a basic organizing form of human life, and together devise economic, social, and political structures in order to replace the variety and expanse of existing cultures with a pervasive anti-culture. Local cultures, often religious and traditional, were seen by the architects of both classical and progressive liberalism as obstacles to the achievement of individual liberty. Shaping the worldview of individuals from the youngest age, cultural norms came to be seen as a main obstruction to the perception of the self as a free, independent, autonomous, and unconnected chooser. Whether in the form of classical liberalism’s tale of the “state of nature,” which portrayed the natural condition of human beings as one in which culture was wholly absent, or progressive critiques of tradition and custom (for instance, the main object of John Stuart Mill’s concern about “tyranny of the majority” in his classic essay On Liberty), a continuous feature and core ambition of liberalism was the critique and eradication of culture as a given, to be replaced by a pervasive anti-culture in which remnants of cultures would be reduced to consumer choices.
[...]
Finally, liberalism today is most obviously undergoing a legitimation crisis because of its extraordinary success in producing a new aristocracy, or “liberalocracy.” Liberalism’s architects, whether its classical architects such as John Locke or more progressive builders such as John Stuart Mill, similarly encouraged the displacement of aristocratic orders—delegitimated because of their wholly arbitrary claim to rule—and their replacement with a new kind of aristocracy whose claim to rule would be based on its ability to use talents that would become salient in a world shorn of cultural norms, natural constraints, geographic stability, and interpersonal obligations. Liberalism proposed to establish the base conditions for the emergence of this new aristocracy—our so-called meritocracy—that would blend Locke’s classical liberal hope that an “industrious and rational” class would arise and Mill’s recommendation that the authority of custom be shattered so that exceptional individuals who engaged in “experiments in living” would emerge and advance progress.
The results of this civilizational transformation are accumulating everywhere. Our society is increasingly defined by economic winners and losers, with winners congregating in wealthy cities and surrounding counties, while losers largely remain in place, literally and figuratively, swamped by a global economy that rewards the highly educated cognitive elite while offering bread crumbs to those left in “flyover country.” Trends observed decades ago by Robert Reich and Christopher Lasch, among others, who decried the growing phenomenon of “the secession of the successful” or the “revolt of the elite,” are today institutionalized, especially through family, neighborhood, and schools, and replicated by generational succession. Children of the successful receive the requisite preparation and entry into the ruling class, while those who lack those attainments are much less capable of affording, much less being even sufficiently knowledgeable about, the basic prerequisites needed to push their way into the upper echelon.
[...]
The ship of liberalism is in dangerous waters not because it hasn’t yet realized its potential but because it overwhelmingly has. Our political battles are likely to continue to be shaped by the dominant narrative to which we have all become accustomed—conservative against progressive, right against left. And all the while, the logic of liberalism will inexorably continue to unfold, impelling the ship toward the inevitable iceberg while its passengers bicker not over the arrangement of the deck chairs but over which end of the ship will stay above water when the iceberg strikes.
The Tragedy of Liberalismhttp://iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_arti...all_Deneen.php
In the main, American political conflicts since the end of the Civil War have been fought along this broad division within liberalism itself.
[...]
First, both classical liberalism and progressive liberalism are commonly arrayed against the persistence of culture as a basic organizing form of human life, and together devise economic, social, and political structures in order to replace the variety and expanse of existing cultures with a pervasive anti-culture. Local cultures, often religious and traditional, were seen by the architects of both classical and progressive liberalism as obstacles to the achievement of individual liberty. Shaping the worldview of individuals from the youngest age, cultural norms came to be seen as a main obstruction to the perception of the self as a free, independent, autonomous, and unconnected chooser. Whether in the form of classical liberalism’s tale of the “state of nature,” which portrayed the natural condition of human beings as one in which culture was wholly absent, or progressive critiques of tradition and custom (for instance, the main object of John Stuart Mill’s concern about “tyranny of the majority” in his classic essay On Liberty), a continuous feature and core ambition of liberalism was the critique and eradication of culture as a given, to be replaced by a pervasive anti-culture in which remnants of cultures would be reduced to consumer choices.
[...]
Finally, liberalism today is most obviously undergoing a legitimation crisis because of its extraordinary success in producing a new aristocracy, or “liberalocracy.” Liberalism’s architects, whether its classical architects such as John Locke or more progressive builders such as John Stuart Mill, similarly encouraged the displacement of aristocratic orders—delegitimated because of their wholly arbitrary claim to rule—and their replacement with a new kind of aristocracy whose claim to rule would be based on its ability to use talents that would become salient in a world shorn of cultural norms, natural constraints, geographic stability, and interpersonal obligations. Liberalism proposed to establish the base conditions for the emergence of this new aristocracy—our so-called meritocracy—that would blend Locke’s classical liberal hope that an “industrious and rational” class would arise and Mill’s recommendation that the authority of custom be shattered so that exceptional individuals who engaged in “experiments in living” would emerge and advance progress.
The results of this civilizational transformation are accumulating everywhere. Our society is increasingly defined by economic winners and losers, with winners congregating in wealthy cities and surrounding counties, while losers largely remain in place, literally and figuratively, swamped by a global economy that rewards the highly educated cognitive elite while offering bread crumbs to those left in “flyover country.” Trends observed decades ago by Robert Reich and Christopher Lasch, among others, who decried the growing phenomenon of “the secession of the successful” or the “revolt of the elite,” are today institutionalized, especially through family, neighborhood, and schools, and replicated by generational succession. Children of the successful receive the requisite preparation and entry into the ruling class, while those who lack those attainments are much less capable of affording, much less being even sufficiently knowledgeable about, the basic prerequisites needed to push their way into the upper echelon.
[...]
The ship of liberalism is in dangerous waters not because it hasn’t yet realized its potential but because it overwhelmingly has. Our political battles are likely to continue to be shaped by the dominant narrative to which we have all become accustomed—conservative against progressive, right against left. And all the while, the logic of liberalism will inexorably continue to unfold, impelling the ship toward the inevitable iceberg while its passengers bicker not over the arrangement of the deck chairs but over which end of the ship will stay above water when the iceberg strikes.
"Så vem blir då Kenneth Hermele, till sist?
Han ser sig som svensk, "men aldrig judisk svensk, alltid svensk jude. Svenskar var – och är – några andra. Svenskar kan förvisso vara trevliga, som en vän till min mamma brukade säga, men de är inte som jag"."
"Ett skäl till att det är så svårt att bryta upp segregation, är att segregation ofta är en hyfsat välfungerande lösning på ett faktiskt problem.https://www.fokus.se/2018/01/tvastatslosningar/
Ett tydligt exempel är skolval. En engagerad förälder med barn i en skola där den verkliga vardagliga makten ligger hos bråkiga och våldsamma elever utan intresse för utbildning, har en moralisk skyldighet att göra något för att förbättra situationen, i första hand för sina egna barn. Den enklaste lösningen är att flytta de egna barnen till en bättre skola, där makten ligger hos lärare och skolledare och eleverna är ambitiösa.
Ur ett samhällsperspektiv är förstås problemet att det leder till att den dåliga skolan blir ännu sämre och att elever med goda förutsättningar samlas i egna reservat. Samhället segregeras. Man kan på goda grunder argumentera för att föräldrar också har en bredare moralisk skyldighet än den som gäller deras egna barn. Man kan hävda att de har en moralisk skyldighet att inte ytterligare försämra en redan dålig samhällssituation, utan istället borde göra allt de kan för att åtgärda själva problemet. De borde med andra ord engagera sig för att göra den dåliga skolan bättre.
Och visst är det så. Men dilemmat uppstår om man måste offra sina egna barns skolgång, för att försöka förbättra andra barns skolgång.
Kan det vara en moralisk plikt att medvetet vara en sämre förälder för sina egna barn, i syfte att möjligen göra chanserna lite bättre för andras barn?
En hel del moralfilosofer skulle svara ja. Stora delar av modern filosofi vägrar att lägga särskild moralisk vikt vid familjeband eller andra tillhörigheter som hembygd, nationalitet, eller för den delen art. Att sålla ut människor för särbehandling, bara på grund av att de är människor, kallas speciesism.
Men man kan också betrakta familj, samhälle, historia – allt sådant som ibland betecknas som tillfälligheter eller »sociala konstruktioner«– som själva grunden för all verklig moral. Då blir det inte bara orimligt, utan rent av oförsvarligt, att offra sina egna barn, som man har ett alldeles särskilt ansvar för, på altaret till någon samhällsidé."
"Ett skäl till att det är så svårt att bryta upp segregation, är att segregation ofta är en hyfsat välfungerande lösning på ett faktiskt problem.https://www.fokus.se/2018/01/tvastatslosningar/
Ett tydligt exempel är skolval. En engagerad förälder med barn i en skola där den verkliga vardagliga makten ligger hos bråkiga och våldsamma elever utan intresse för utbildning, har en moralisk skyldighet att göra något för att förbättra situationen, i första hand för sina egna barn. Den enklaste lösningen är att flytta de egna barnen till en bättre skola, där makten ligger hos lärare och skolledare och eleverna är ambitiösa.
Ur ett samhällsperspektiv är förstås problemet att det leder till att den dåliga skolan blir ännu sämre och att elever med goda förutsättningar samlas i egna reservat. Samhället segregeras. Man kan på goda grunder argumentera för att föräldrar också har en bredare moralisk skyldighet än den som gäller deras egna barn. Man kan hävda att de har en moralisk skyldighet att inte ytterligare försämra en redan dålig samhällssituation, utan istället borde göra allt de kan för att åtgärda själva problemet. De borde med andra ord engagera sig för att göra den dåliga skolan bättre.
Och visst är det så. Men dilemmat uppstår om man måste offra sina egna barns skolgång, för att försöka förbättra andra barns skolgång.
Kan det vara en moralisk plikt att medvetet vara en sämre förälder för sina egna barn, i syfte att möjligen göra chanserna lite bättre för andras barn?
En hel del moralfilosofer skulle svara ja. Stora delar av modern filosofi vägrar att lägga särskild moralisk vikt vid familjeband eller andra tillhörigheter som hembygd, nationalitet, eller för den delen art. Att sålla ut människor för särbehandling, bara på grund av att de är människor, kallas speciesism.
Men man kan också betrakta familj, samhälle, historia – allt sådant som ibland betecknas som tillfälligheter eller »sociala konstruktioner«– som själva grunden för all verklig moral. Då blir det inte bara orimligt, utan rent av oförsvarligt, att offra sina egna barn, som man har ett alldeles särskilt ansvar för, på altaret till någon samhällsidé."
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Flashback finansieras genom donationer från våra medlemmar och besökare. Det är med hjälp av dig vi kan fortsätta erbjuda en fri samhällsdebatt. Tack för ditt stöd!
Swish: 123 536 99 96 Bankgiro: 211-4106