Slaget vid Agincourt

Since there were usually more than three crossbowmen for each pavesari it would seem that the crossbowmen took turns to shoot from behind the cover provided by the pavise shields or mantlets held by the pavesarii. Each man would then step back to span and load his weapon before returning to shoot. This would also have solved the problem of elbow room caused by the fact that a crossbow was held laterally while being shot. If this was in fact the Genoese crossbowmen's proper battlefield tactic, then their failure at Crécy becomes much easier to understand. Here they were clearly operating without their pavise mantlet-shields. It was traditional for Italian crossbow 'teams' to place their bows and pavises in baggage carts or on mules while on the march. At Crécy the crossbowmen had their crossbows but the pavises were indeed in the baggage waggons. Quite what the pavesarii were expected to do when the Genoese infantry were ordered forward at Crécy is unknown, though the written sources do mention spearmen advancing together with the crossbowmen. [...]

Crossbowmen, whether Genoese or otherwise, were essentially a static, or at least a defensive, form of infantry. King Philip's decision to send them forward against the English at Crécy, particularly as they were sent without their pavises, strongly suggests that the men in command of the French army during this battle had no real idea of how to use what were at that time regarded as the finest infantry in Christian Europe. The failure of the Genoese crossbowmen and their other infantry at Crécy was relatively brief and easily explained. They were used to forming part of disciplined and structured armies in which they would be closely supported by equally professional cavalry. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Genoese were not keen on advancing without proper preparation, without their pavises and without adequate reserves of ammunition from the supply waggons. Furthermore, they would be attacking at the end of a long day's march with the setting sun directly in their eyes. Their officers complained to the Count of Alençon, to whose battle or division they appear to have been attached, but were ignored.

So the Genoese formed up under the immediate command of Ottone Doria, probably slightly to the left of the centre of the French position, with the Prince of Wales' battle or division as their nearest target. The 2,000 to 6,000 Genoese were, of course, greatly outnumbered by the opposing English longbowmen; perhaps even being outnumbered by the closest archers in the Prince of Wales' division alone. With a sound of trumpets and drums the Genoese crossbowmen and their accompanying spearmen moved forward in three stages, each pause being signalled by a shout which would have rippled along the Genoese front as the order was passed from unit to unit. This enabled the foot soldiers to remain in formation and to adjust their dressing at each pause. Their role was to get close enough to break up the enemy line with crossbow fire, whereupon the French cavalry would charge and take advantage of any weakness in the English front. In fact, the Genoese only seem to have shot their crossbows the third time they halted, when they were about 150 metres from the Prince of Wales' battle.

Later legend recalled two great black crows which flew over the battlefield as the infantry advanced. More significant was a sudden and apparently intense shower of rain - the first in six weeks –which made the ground slippery. The bottom of the Vallée des Clercs remains very muddy, even a day after rain, for at least 250 metres from its junction with the river Maye. More importantly, the shower soaked the strings of the Genoese crossbows, making them stretch and thus lose power. The near contemporary chronicler, Jean de Venette, clearly stated that the English longbowmen took the strings from their bows and kept them dry beneath their helmets. This, however, could not be done with a crossbow which required a powerful piece of machinery to be unstrung and restrung. The rain accounts for the ease with which the crude but effective longbows of the English archers outranged their opponents.

In ordinary circumstances the only advantages that a longbow had over its more sophisticated opponent was the rapidity with which it could be shot, and its ability to rain heavy arrows from high trajectory. In terms of accuracy, range and penetrating power, the advantage should have lain with the Genoese crossbows. When the Genoese did shoot they had to do so uphill with a low sun either in their eyes or slightly to their left. This was a particular disadvantage for men who aimed directly at their targets rather than dropping arrows on them in showers. As they loosed their weapons the Genoese were almost simultaneously hit by an arrow storm shot by archers in the Prince of Wales' division. A few English cannon apparently added to the noise, terror and casualties. [...]

Without their pavises and outranged by their opponents the Genoese infantry suffered severe losses, wavered and then streamed back. [...] Why then did the Genoese crossbowmen's own leaders agree to such a disastrous tactic, or did they have no say in the matter? One reason might lie in the relatively low status of their commanders. These were not members of the senior French nobility. Nor, in fact, were they even members of the highest echelons of the nobility of the neighbouring Empire. They may have been highly experienced and professional soldiers, but to those who commanded the French army at Crécy they were probably 'mere soldiers' and, because of their characteristic involvement in naval piracy, barely gentlemen.