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Ursprungligen postat av
Q2000
Var STG 44 verkligen så mycket bättre än MP 40? Hade det gjort stor skillnad i ww2?
StG 44 var ett betydligt effektivare vapen än MP 40, men hade knappast gjort nån skillnad ändå. Kom ihåg att Tyskland vann i princip alla sina segrar innan de hade sina "supervapen" (Tiger, Panther, Sturmgewehr, Me 262, whatever) och förlorade nästan alla slag efter att de hade dem. Krig avgörs inte av handeldvapen - och särskilt inte av kpistar och gevär som dödar minst av alla - utan av numerär, logistik och tunga vapensystem.
Med ovanståede sagt har det faktiskt gjorts ett ambitiöst-nördigt försök att mäta StG 44s taktiska effekt. En
skribent i en amerikansk vapentidning kom fram till att den var betydande genom att jämföra hur det gick för två tyska fallskärmsjägardivisioner i Ardennerslaget:
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Sturmgewehrs made possible a far better combat record for the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division in the Ardennes. After bloodying US V Corps in the aforementioned Battle of Duren, elements of the 3rd broke through American defenses south of Loshiem on December 16th. Wadehn’s men inflicted such a sharp defeat on the American 99th Division in the environs of Honsfeld on the 16th that GI’s would later refer to the battle as the “victimization” of their outfit. Of particular note, troopers of the US 14th Cavalry Group credited the “overwhelming small arms fire” administered by the advancing German parachute infantry as the major reason compelling the 14th Cavalry’s withdrawal from their defensive positions on 0730 hours of the 16th. [...]
Another proof of the StG 44’s effectiveness in the Battle of the Bulge can be found in the casualties suffered by the Fallschirmjaeger divisions. Third Fallschirmjaeger lost a total of 2636 men in the battle (364 killed, 1255 wounded and 1017 missing). Losses for the 5th were 8329 men (1000 killed, 3765 wounded and 3564 missing) in the same time period. These losses amount to 21.13% and 50.69% of the starting strengths of the 3rd and 5th Divisions respectively. The catastrophic losses endured by the men of the 5th Division are astounding in light of the fact that the Division’s combat strength was theoretically far greater than that of the 3rd due to the artillery attached. Many of the 5th losses are missing. Read this as captured, as the poor small arms equipment of the 5th would tend to hinder any escape attempts made by small groups of infantry. A further drawback to true combat power of the 5th Division was the restricted terrain of the Ardennes that typically favors close combat weapons such as small arms. Hence the added artillery did not compensate for lack of assault rifles in the 5th Fallschirmjaeger Division.
American World War II veteran and military historian Trevor N. Dupuy introduced a mathematical system for evaluating troop performance in his book, Hilter’s Last Gamble (Harper Collins, New York, 1994). Dupuy almost invariably rates the performance of German troops superior to their American counterparts. Such is the case in the battles from 16 to 18 December, as the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division spearheads the advance of I SS Panzer Corps. Regarding the two clashes involving the 5th Fallschirmjaeger Division (16- 19 December and Harlange) however, Dupuy rates the German paratroops slightly inferior to the GIs. Given the fact that no appreciable difference existed in the quality of the converted Luftwaffe field personnel that wound up in the 3rd and 5th Divisions, and that both faced equivalent opposition (average quality US infantry and one tank division each), the difference in performance must rely on the equipment of the paratroops. It has already been demonstrated that the artillery advantages enjoyed by the 5th Division delivered less real combat power than the small arms driven firepower superiority of the 3rd. This firepower superiority can result from nothing other than the higher distribution density of StG 44s in the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division.
Femte FJ-divisionen hade ungefär tre gånger så många StG 44 som tredje. Man kan ha olika åsikter om ministudien ovan, men den är i alla fall ett försök.
Artikeln nämner också, närmast i förbigående, vad som verkligen avgjorde både slaget och kriget:
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American main forces consisted of the 1st and 26th Divisions. The US 2nd Division, in concert with V Corps, lent its artillery assets to the defense of Butgenbach, resulting in a total of 23 artillery battalions available for the battle. This massed artillery was too much for the Germans, who consequently broke off the attack and conducted an active defense in the area northwest of St. Vith until 15 January 1945.
Vid Bütgenbach sköts tre tyska divisioner bokstavligt talat i småbitar av det amerikanska artilleriet. Ett amerikanskt ögonvittne konstaterade efteråt att fälten såg ut som om de var plöjda. Jag vet inte hur många tyskar som dog med MP 40 respektive StG 44 i armarna, men det spelade ingen större roll.
